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INTRODUCTION
BM came to the United States from Nicaragua as a young
child and became a lawful permanent resident in 1987.1 In
August 2007, Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE")
detained BM and held him for more than a year during
deportation proceedings.2 Prior to his detention, BM had lived
1. Brief for Petitioner at 3, BM v. Mukasey, 382 F. App'x. 417 (5th Cir. 2010) (No.
08-60586) [hereinafter BM Brief]. The cases of BM and FH presented here wvere both
handled by the Immigration Clinic at the University of Texas School of Law. Our
clients have given their permission to summarize their stories for this Artide but have
preferred to preserve the confidentiality of their names.
2. Id. at 5. In the United States. proceedings initiated by Immigration and
Customs Enforcement ("ICE") to deport or exclude an individual are technically
referred to as "removal proceedings." See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006) (providing for
removal proceedings). This Article will use the layimen's term "deportation"
intLerchangeably with the technical tern "removal." These proceedings take place
before an immigration court and include consideration of an individual's removability
as well as any applications for "relief from removal" that would grant the individual
permission to remain in Lhe United States without regard to removability. See id.; see
also, e.g:, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006) (providing for asylum); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2006)
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in Austin, Texas and had worked for the state government. His
entire immediate family lived in the United States, and his
mother suffered from terminal cancer.4 Yet, ICE detained BM
under immigration law's mandatory detention provisions while
pursuing deportation based on two drug possession convictions.)
ICE succeeded in deporting BM, but in 2010, the US Supreme
Court overturned the line of cases that had prevented BM from
applying to remain in the United States.b BM returned to the
United States for additional immigration court hearings to
decide his immigration status, and he eventually won the right
to resume his life in this country. ICE detained BM for an
additional three months during the renewed proceedings and
for a period after BM received approval from the immigration
court to remain in the United States as a lawful permanent
resident.7
FH has lived a very different experience from BM but also
faced immigration detention in the United States. FH fled his
country of Eritrea by foot after the Eritrean military tortured
him, including by tying his legs and arms together behind his
back and hanging him from a tree in the infamous helicopter
position.' FH presented himself at the US border on August 26,
2010 seeking asylum and was immediately detained. ICE held
FH in immigration detention for more than a month, although
he has a US citizen brother and other close family members who
(providing for cancellation of removal); 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006) (providing for
adjustment of status). Because the language of international human rights law does not
track this US law terminology, I will often refer to immigration court proceedings more
generally as "proceedings to determine status" or "proceedings to determine whether
an individual will be allowed to remain in the United States.
3. 1BM Brief, supra note 1, at 5.
4. Id. at 4.
5. Id. at 3-4; 8 U.S.C. 1226(c) (2006) (providing for mandatory immigration
detention in certain cases).
6. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010); Letter Request for Bond
Hearing from Barbara Hines, Attorney for Respondent. Univ. of Tex. Immigration
Clinic, to the Honorable judge Glenn McPhaul, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev.
(Nov. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from Barbara Hines] (on file wvith author).
7. See Letter fron Barbara Hines, supra note 6.
8. See Brief for Respondent, Matter of FH (2011) [hereinafter FH Briel] (on file
with the author). Identifying inforimation has been redacted to preserve the
confidentiality of this asylum proceeding
9. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b) (1) (B) (ii) (2006); Docunents frtom File of FH (2010)
(on file wvith the author).
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wished to host him during immigration court proceedings to
decide his asylum claim."o In detaining him, ICE did not
consider the fact that US immigration courts grant eighty-five
percent of Eritrean asylum claims, which is not surprising since
the US State Department reports that human rights abuses in
Eritrea are rampant and Eritrean asylum seekers returned home
are often "disappeared."" After release from detention, FH
lived with his family in Austin, Texas, attended all immigration
court proceedings, and received asylum in the immigration
court in November 2011.'2
The United States detained 429,000 migrants like BM and
FH during 2011, the last year for which definitive numbers are
available.'- These 429,000 detainees were held during
proceedings to determine whether they would be deported or
allowed to remain in the United States and, in some cases, until
physical deportation could take place.' 4 They were held in the
custody of ICE, the federal entity within the Department of
Homeland Security ("DHS") charged with enforcing the
immigration laws.1 Detention of migrants has followed a
significant and steady upward course over the last two decades as
detention has expanded and become the presumptive norm in
immigration cases.'" This trend has proceeded largely
unchecked despite efforts at reform by advocates concerned
with the humanitarian and financial impact of such a large-scale
10. FH Brief, supra note 8, at 32.
11. See OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & TLCH.. U.S. DLP'T OF JUSTICE,
IMMIGRATION COURTS: FY 2011 ASYLU M STATISTICS, available at http://www.justice.gov/
coir/cfoia/foiafreq.htm; see also BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, U.S. L)EP'T. OF STATE, 2010
HUMA N RIGHTS RLPORT: ERITREA 4 (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/
docurments/organization/ 160120.pdf.
12. Order of the linmigration Judge (Nov. 14, 2011) (on file with the author).
13. See OFFICL OF IIilGRATION STATISTICS. U.S. DLP'T OF HOMELAIND SLC..
ANN AL REPORT: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2011 (2012) [hereinafter DIS
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 20111.
14. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1225. 1226. 1229a. 1231 (2006).
15. About ICE: Overview, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCFMENIT,
http://www.ice.gov/about/overview (last visited Feb. 13, 2013); see also Detention
Management, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMLNT, http://www.ice.gov/
detention-nanagerent (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
16. See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (providing statistics on growth of
detention); see also infra notes 226-29. 236 and accompanying text (establishing extent
of US reliance on detention).
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detention program that lacks cogent contours.17 The trend
currently shows no sign of reversal."
In the meantime, human rights bodies have overcome their
traditional reluctance to adjudicate claims touching on central
aspects of statehood and sovereignty and have developed
meaningful international human rights law standards for
assessing immigration detention practices. The newly-developed
standards call into question many aspects of the current
immigration detention system that leads to the widespread
detention of asylum seekers and other migrants in the United
States. '9 The international standards provide a helpful legal
framework for considering immigration detention in the United
States, particularly as they derive from binding international
legal norms and have much in common with US law regarding
civil detention in contexts not as contentious as immigration.20
17. See, e.g., A . BAR Assoc., RESOLUTION AN) REPORT ON ABA CTVII
IMMIGRATION DETENTION STANDARDS AUGUST 2012 (2012); HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST,
JAILS AND JLIMPSUITS: TRANSFORMING THE U.S. IMMIGRATION DLTLNTION SYSTEM-A
TWO-YEAR RIEIEW (2011) [hereinafterJAILS AN) jUMPSUITS]; I UTHERAN IMMIGRATION
& REFU GEE SERV., LUNLOCKING LIBERTY: A WAY FORWARD FOR 1.S. IMMIGRATION
DETENTION POLICY (2011) [hercinafter UNLOCKING LIBERTY]: HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST,
1U.S. I)ETENTION OF ASYLUN SEEKERS: SEEKING PROTECTION, FINDING PRISON (2009)
[hereinafter U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS]; AMNESTY INT'I, JAILED WITHOUT
JUSTICL: IMMIGRATION DETLNTION IN THL USA (2009) [hcrcinaftr JAILLD WVITHOUT
JUSTICE].
18. See infra Part I (describing continued expansion of immigration detention);
see also Keep Our C oninunities Safe Act of 2011, H.R. 1932. 112th Cong. (2011)
(proposing significant expansion of immigration detention); Conference Call by John
Morton, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Aug. 6,
2009) [hereinafter Morton Press Conference on Detention Reform] (transcript on file
with the author) (announcing that ICE planned major reforms to the immigration
detention system and clarifying that the reforms would not "reduce the number of
people presently detained"); John T. Morton. Assistant. Sec'y of Homeland Sec. for
ICE, Speech at the Migration Policy Institute: Immigration & Customs Bureau Agenda
(Jan. 25, 2010), available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/ program /(ustomsP
[hereinafter Morton MPI Speech] (stating that detention will continue "on a grand
scale").
19. See infira Part IV (analyzing in detail gencral and specific incompatibilities
between the immigration detention regime in the United States and international
human rights standards on immigration detention).
20. Civil detention is confinement not imposed as punishment after a full
criminal proceeding. It is also called administrative, preventive, or non-punitive
detention. See Zadvydas v. I)avis, 533 1.S. 678, 690-91 (2001); David Cole, In Aid of
Removal: Due Process Limits on humigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 1006 (2002)
[hereinafter Cole, In Aid of Removal]; see also ALICE EDWARDS, U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR
REFUGEES, BACK TO BASICS: THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY AN) SECURITY OF PERSON ANT)
2013] 247
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Human rights law analysis should therefore spur positive
changes to immigration detention in the United States that will
bring rationality back to our system and protect liberty.
While immigration detention has ballooned in the United
States, the available scholarship includes few efforts to analyze
the various components that interact to create such a massive
detention system. There is even less scholarship available
analyzing the new international human rights standards as
applied to US immigration detention. In the late 1990s and early
2000s, some scholars analyzed the detention framework that
evolved after Congress adopted restrictive immigration measures
in 1996 that increased detention.21 However, that literature
involved only a guess at what was to come and could not address
the current reality of detention expanded beyond any
expectation. Nor could that scholarship incorporate a human
rights analysis, since the human rights standards developed with
specificity only in recent years. Much more recently, scholars in
the United States have begun to use human rights law to
consider immigration detention, but they have done so mainly
by analyzing discrete aspects of immigration detention in the
United States.2 Meanwhile, international scholars have begun to
evaluate immigration detention laws and policies from a human
'ALTLRNATIVLS To DETLNTION' OF RLFUGELS, ASYLUM-SEEKLRS, STATLLESS PLRSONS AND
OTHER MIGRANTS 8 (2011) [hereinafter BACK TO BASICs] (distinguishing civil
iunigration detention fron criminal detention).
21. See Cole. In Aid of Removal, supra note 20, at 1022-26: Michele R. Pistone,
Just ie Delayed isjustice Denied: A Proposalfor Ending t lnnecessay Detention of Asyum-
seekers, 12 HARV. HNI. R1s.J. 197, 232-47 (1999). Se generally Stephen H. Legomsky,
The Detention ofAliens: Theories. Rules, and Discretion, 30 U. MIAMI INTLR-AM. L. RLV. 531
(1999).
22. See Barbara A. Frey & X. Kevin Zhao, The Criminalization of Imigration and the
International Norm of Non-Discrimination: Deportation and Detention in US. Inmigation
Law, 29 LAW & INEQ. 279, 301-11 (2011) (considering mandatory detention
provisions); Bridget Kessler, In Jail, No Notice, No Hearing ... No Problem? A Closer Look at
humigration Detention and the Due Process Standards of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 24 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 571, 583-603 (2009) (focusing on
procedures for detcntion prior to initiation of deportation proceedings): see also
Michelle Brand & Christiana Lundholm, Human Rights Behind Bars Advancing the Rights
of Immigration Detainees in the United States Through Human Right Fram eworks, 22 GEo.
I\IIuR. L.J. 147, 156-58 (2008) (presenting potential strategies for using human rights
law to address detention without analyzing which componcnts of detention iay violate
human rights provisions).
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rights perspective.2" However, that work has not focused on the
particularities of the US immigration detention system.
This Article represents a first effort, then, to synthesize and
present the recently-developed international human rights
standards and apply those rules to the US immigration
detention system in a systematic manner. In so doing, the Article
demonstrates how the application of international human rights
law standards can bring rationality and humanity to US
immigration detention by revitalizing the right to liberty, which
constitutes a core conception in both international human
rights law and US law. The Article does not suggest that
immigration detention in the United States should be abolished.
It does urge realignment of US law in a way that would scale
back immigration detention in order to bring the detention
system and its components into line with international human
rights norms and with the US tradition of liberty that treats civil
detention as an exceptional situation.
While many concerns exist regarding immigration
detention conditions, including the harsh prison-like
environment at many facilities, inadequate health care and the
remote placement of facilities that impedes access to counsel
and family visitation," I do not consider those issues in this
Article.25 Instead, the Article focuses on the fact and extent of
23. See generall GALINA CORNELISSE, IMMIGRATION )ETENTION AN) HUMAN
RIGHTS: RLTHIKING TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY (2010) (considering the impact on
sovereignty of immigration detention rules in Europe); )ANiFT. WILSHER, IMMIGRATION
)ETENTION: L AW, -ITSTORY, POLITICS (2012) (describing evolution of detention and
international law, particularly in Europe); Eleanor Accr & Jake Goodman, Reaffr ming
Rights: Human Rights Protections of Migrants, Asylum Seekers, and Refugees in Immigration
Detention, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.j. 507 (2010) (urging changes to a proposed international
instrument to improve implementation of human rights standards on immigration
detention); Cathryn Costello, Human Rights and the Elusive Universal Subject: Immigration
Detention Under International Human Rights and EU Law, 19 IND.J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
257 (2012) (analyzing tensions between human rights and immigration detention in
Europe).
24. See, e.g., Brand & Lundholn. supra note 22, at 158-63: U.S. DETENTION OF
ASYLUM SEEKERS, supra note 17. at 17-30, 51-67; JAILLD WITHOLT JUSTICE, supra note
17, at 29-43.
25. One author has suggested that well-intentioned efforts to improve conditions
in inmigration detention may lead to continued detention of large numbers of
migrants by making immigration detention more acceptable. See MICHAEL FLYNN,
GLOBAL DETENTION PROJECT, ON THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF HLIMAN RIGHTS
PROMOTION ON 1IilGRATION DETENTION (2012); see also Anil Klhan, Rethinking
Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L REV. SIDEBAR 42, 58 (2010) (explaining that "it
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migrant detention, regardless of the conditions of the specific
detention placement. The analysis does treat all US immigration
detention as "hard" detention, implicating the full panoply of
liberty concerns involved in civil detention. In other words, no
adult immigration detention facilities in the United States allow
free movement out of the facility or otherwise have conditions
that call into question their classification as detention facilities.26
Nor does the Article explore the very real negative
consequences of detention for migrants, because the
deprivation of liberty itself must be understood as having a
severe impact that demands justification, without a showing of
further harm. If there were any doubt, however, the harm
caused by detention has been well-documented. Among other
impacts, studies show that detention leads to deterioration of
the mental and physical health of detained migrants as well as
their families.27 Additional studies show that migrants in
detention are much less likely to obtain counsel and are much
more likely to lose their immigration cases."
may not be sufficient to focus exclusively on improving conditions of confinement" to
address foundational problems with immigration detention).
26. See Michael Barajas, ICE'Sofl'Detention Statgy at Newlmmigration Facility Begs
the Question: Why do Lowest-Risk Detainees Need to be Detained at All? SAN AN ONTO
CURRENT, Mar. 21, 2012 (quoting Gary Mead, Executive Associate Director of ICE
Enforcement & Removal Operations, as recognizing that individuals at the newest
"civil" detention facility are still "detained"). The facilities where unaccompanied
minors are held, which are under thc jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, rather than ICE, present a softer form of custody. See 6 U.S.C.
279(a) (2006); WOMEN'S REFUGEE COMM'N, HALvAY HOME: UNACCOMPANTED
CHILDREN IN IMMIGRATION CUSTODY 5-19 (2009) [hereinafter WRC, HALFWAY HOME].
In addition, for children, release and reunification wvith family members is emphasized
over detention. See WRC, HAL FWAY HOME, supra, at 8. For these reasons, this Article
does not address the detention of children.
27. See Kalina Brabeck & Qingwen Xu, The Impact oj Detention and Deportation on
Latino hnmigrant Children and Families: A Quantitative Exploration. 32 HISP.J. BEHAV. SC.
341, 345-46. 354-55 (2010) (documenting increased mental health difficulties of US
citizens and other family members of migrants subject to detention and deportation);
Allen S. Keller ct al., Mental Health of Detained Asylun Seekes, 362 LANCET 1721, 1722
(2003) (explaining that "detaining asylum seekers exaccrbates symptoms of depression,
anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder"); Nina Bernstein, Docaments Reveal Earlier
hnmigration Deaths, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2010), www.nytiles.com/2010/01/10/
nyregion/10Odctainsidc.html.
28. See Symposium, Inn atie Approaches to Immigrt Representation: Exploring New
Partnerships. 33 CAwOZO L. RLV. 357, 363-64 (2011) (explaining that detained
migrants in removal proceedings in New York City went unrepresntcid at a rate of sixty
percent, which is much higher than the rate for non-detained individuals, and
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Finally, this Article focuses on those individuals who are
detained pending a decision as to whether they will be deported
or will gain the ability to remain in the United States. Most
detained migrants with a final decision ordering deportation,
either through an abbreviated process or after full proceedings
to adjudicate immigration status, are removed quite quickly.
They therefore remain in detention for a short period of time
pending execution of the deportation.29 US law already imposes
time limits and procedural requirements on the detention of
such migrants with a final removal order, although problems
remain with the implementation of these rules.so The
justification for detention of migrants after issuance of a
removal order is also more obvious, including under
international human rights standards., The US government has
already decided that these migrants must leave the United
States, and only physical removal remains. This group of
detainees does not present the same considerations regarding
the appropriateness of detention as those detainees with a
pending decision in their cases.
With these premises in mind, the Article first describes the
current state of immigration detention in the United States in
Part I. Part II then traces the recent unfolding of well-developed
international human rights standards regarding immigration
detention and sets out the human rights law framework for
evaluating immigration detention. Part III proceeds to consider
the relevance of the international standards in analyzing US
immigration detention. It first explores the binding nature of
the international human rights standards, at least as a question
of international law. Next, it compares the international human
additionally, unrepresented detained individuals have only a three percent success rate
in achieving permission to remain in the United States); see also Andrew 1. Schoenholtz
& Han1utal Bernstein, Improving Immigration Adjudications Through Competent Counsel, 21
GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 55-56 (2008) (pointing out that detainees are more limited
than non-detained migrants in obtaining counsel and representation is the "singic
most important non-nicrit factor" detcrmining outcomes in inmigration proceedings).
29. See DORA SCHRTRO, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMIIGRATION DETENTION
OVLRVIW AND RLCOMMENDATIONS 6 (2009) [hereinafter SCHRIRO STUDY] (noting that
average detention times are longer for individuals seeking relief as compared to those
pursuing only voluntary removal); see also infra notes 42, 52 and accompanying text.
30. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 241.4-5 (2012); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 701 (2001); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371. 373 (2005).
31. See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
2013]
252 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:243
rights framework to US law on civil detention in non-
immigration contexts, concluding that the standards are almost
fully in line with one another. Given these similarities, as well as
the importance of complying with international obligations, I
conclude in this Part that the United States should realign the
US immigration detention system so that it meets the
international standards. Specifically, I propose that courts
should intervene, where necessary, to protect liberty and due
process by giving substance to the international standards
through the interpretation of US statutory and constitutional
provisions. Part IV engages in a detailed analysis of the US
immigration detention system and its various components as
measured against international human rights standards.
Significant incompatibilities with international human rights law
are identified, and this Part urges delimitation of US law to
resolve these incompatibilities and curb the excesses of
immigration detention in the United States.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION
The current immigration detention system sweeps
hundreds of thousands of migrants into ICE custody each year.,
All are detained pending either adjudication of immigration
status or deportation and are thus held in civil or administrative
detention." These migrants include lawful permanent residents
like BM who face deportation as a result of criminal convictions,
asylum seekers like FH, undocumented migrants with long
periods of residence in the United States, recent unlawful
border-crossers seeking work, and individuals with final
deportation orders waiting to be physically removed to their
32. See DHS IMNMIRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 2011, supra note 13. at 1
(reporting the detention of 429,000 migrants in 2011); DONALD KERWIN & SERENA Yl-
YING LIN, MIGRATION POLR INST., IMMIGRANT DETENTION: CAN ICE MEET ITS LEGAL
IMPERATIVES AND CASE MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES? 7 (2009) [hereinafter MPI
STUDY] (illustrating this trend over the last decade).
33. See 8 U.S.C. 1226 (2006) (providing for detention "pending a decision on
whether the alien is to be removed from the United States"): 8 U.S.C. 1231 (2006)
(providing for detention after entry of a removal order); Morton Press Conference on
Detention Reform, supra note 18 (acknowledging that ICE detention is "civil in
naLtre"): SCHlRIRO STUDY, supra note 29, at 2, 4 (emphasizing that ICE detention is
administrative and must be distinguished from criminal incarceration).
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countries.34 Migrants detained pending a decision constitute
roughly sixty percent of all immigration detainees at any given
moment.35
Rapid expansion has characterized the US immigration
detention system for some time now. In the last decade,
immigration detention has more than doubled from 209,000
immigration detainees in 200136 to 429,000 immigration
detainees in 2011." The steady growth of detention becomes
34. See 8 U.S.C. 1226 (providing for detention during immigration proceedings);
8 U.S.C. § I 182(a), 1227(a) (2006) (providing grounds of deportation that can lead to
deportation proceedings, including grounds that affect undocumented individuals and
grounds that affect lawful permanent residents and other individuals who lkgally
entered the United States); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) (2006) (providing for detention of
asyltum seekers and others placed in expedited removal proceedings upon
apprehension at or near the border); see generally jAILED WITHOUTJUSTICF, supra note
17; UNiLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 17, at 5-6.
35. See MPI STUDY, supra note 32, at 16-17 (providing data supporting the
conclusion that sixty-three percent of immigration detainees had pending cases, where
pending cases are calculated as a percentage of the total number of cases for which
information was available regarding pending or post-final order status).
36. Id. at 7.
37. DHS IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 2011, supra note 13, at 1. The
numbers have varied somewhat over the last few years while remaining at very high
levels approaching the more than 400,000 detentions taking place in 2011. See id.
(reporting that 429,000 migrants were detained in 2011); see also OFFICE OF
IIilGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL REPORT-
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2009, at 1 (Aug. 2010) [hereinafter DHS
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONs 2009] (reporting that 383,000 migrants were
detained in 2009; OFFICE OF IIMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
ANN -AL REPORT-MMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010, at 1 (June 2011)
[hereinafter DHS IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 2010] (reporting that 363,000
migrants were detained in 2010). The fluctuations and the overall high rate of
detention have little relation to unauthorized border crossing trends, since unlawlil
crossings have been in steady decline in recent years. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMLLAND SEC., APPREHENSIONS BY THE U.S. BORDER
PATROL: 2005-20 10, at 1 (2011) (noting that apprehension statistics serve as a proxy for
illegal entry into the United States and reporting that border apprehensions declined
sixty-one percent between 2005 and 2010); U.S. BORDER PATROL NATIONWIDE ILLEGAL
ALIEN APPREHENSIONS FITSCAL YEARS 1925-2011, at I ( 2011) (showing downward trend
in border apprehensions between 2009 and 2011); )HS IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS 2011, supra note 13, at 3 (noting that apprehensions along the Southwest
border decreased twenty-seven percent from 2010 to 2011); I)HS IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 2009, supra, at 1 (showing that apprehensions at the border
were trending downwards); see also Lourdes Medrano, Behind Decline in US-Iexico
Border Crossings: Higher Risks, Lower Rewards, CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR (I)ec. 14, 2011),
http: /www.csmonior.coi/USA/2011/1214/Behind-decline-in-US-Mexico-border-
crossings-higher-risks-lower-rewards (reportmig recent low number of apprehensions
along the US-Mexico border as a reflection of the lower number of illegal crossings).
254 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:243
even more apparent if average daily population over the last two
decades is considered. In 1994, immigration authorities held an
average of 6,785 detainees a da." 8 By 2011, the average daily
population had reached 33,330, an almost five-fold increase over
a fifteen-year period.39
The expansion of immigration detention has been
particularly dramatic in recent years. In 2005, there were
238,000 immigration detainees each year,"4 1 but that number
increased by almost 200,000 in just five years to the 2011 figure
of 429,000.4'
A significant number of those detained are summarily
removed and thus remain in detention only for a very brief
period of time. However, many others undergo lengthy
immigration court proceedings to determine whether they may
remain in the United States and may be detained for all or a
significant portion of those proceedings. For example, during
2011, the US government deported more than 250,000
individuals through reinstatement of removal and expedited
removal, which are expedited programs requiring only the most
perfunctory adjudication by ICE in most cases.42 However,
during that same time, ICE detained more than 125,000
migrants through full-fledged proceedings in immigration
court? For 2011, the immigration courts reported that they
completed proceedings in 128,745 cases involving detained
38. See ALisON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RI32369, IMMIGRATION-RELATEf)
DETENTION: CURRENT LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 12 (2004). available at
http://digital.1ibrar .unt.edu/ark:/67531/imetacrs5951/mli/1/highres_d/
RL32369_2004Apr28.pdf.
39. Fact Sheet. Detention Management, U.S. INIMICRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
(Nov. 10, 2011), http //wwy.ice. gov/ news/l ibrar/ factsheets /detention-mgnt.htm
[hereinafter ICE, De tetion Fact Sheet]; see also U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT SALARILS AND EXPENSES, FISCAL YEAR 2013 CONGRLssIoNAL BUDGET
JUSTIFICATION 37 (2013), http:,// wy.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/mgmt/dhs-
congressional-budget-justification-fy2013.pdf [hereinafter DHS CONGRESSIONAL
BLDGETJLSTIFICATION].
40. OFIcE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMEIANT) SEC., ANNUAL
RLPORT-IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2005. at 1 (2006).
41. DHS INmIIRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 2011. supra note 13, at 1.
42. Id.; see infra Part IV.B., for an explanation of the expedited removal and
reinsLtatemclt of emo val processes.
43. See OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS & TECH., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICL, FY 2011:
STATISTICALYEARBOOK01 (2012) [hereinafter EOIRSTATSTICALYFARBOOK2011].
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immigrants.44 This number of more than 125,000 detainees
pending a determination of status in immigration court
proceedings is consistent with ICE statistics.45 Overall, forty-two
percent of deportation cases completed in the immigration
courts in 2011 involved detained immigrants, demonstrating the
prevalence of detention during proceedings that will result in a
determination regarding removability and immigration status.46
44. Id. The actual number of immigration court proceedings involving detained
migrants in 2011 would be greater than that number, because the statistic relates only
to cases in which the migrant was detained at completion of the immigration court
case. Some cases last longer than one year, meaning that some migrants detained
during 2011 would not appear in the statistics for that year, because their cases would
not have been completed until a subsequent year. See Latest Immigration Court Numbers,
as ofjanuary 2013, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Feb. 6, 2013),
http://trac.syr.edu/iimmigration/reports/latcstinimmcourLt (reporting that, on average,
pending cases have been awaiting conclusion for almost a year and a half); MPI STUDY,
supra note 32, at 16, 19 (reporting on individuals who remained in detention for longer
than a year pending a result in their deportation proceedings). Other inigrants held in
detention during immigration court proceedings in 2011 would not appear in this
statistic, because they would have been detained during some period of the
proceedings but released before completion of the case. EOIR STATISTICAL YARBOOK
2011, supra note 43, at 12, H3 (providing information regarding individuals released
on bond during immigration court proceedings); Detainees Leaving ICE Detention from
the Port Isabel Service Processing Cente. TRANSACTIONAL RLCORDS ACCLSS
CLEARINGHOUSE (2010), http:/a/tra. sy.ediu/immigration/detention/200803/PIC/
exit [hereinafter Detainees Leaving ICE Detention] (reporting on immigration detainces
released on bond during pending deportation proceedings).
45. ICE reports that it removed 392,000 immigrants in 2011. DHS IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 2011, supra note 13, at 1. If the approximately 250,000
individuals who faced only suinmary removal proceedings are subtracted from those
figures, 142,000 individuals remain. Id. Many of those 142,000 individuals would have
faced detention and deportation in proceedings before the immigration courts. Some
individuals removed were likely not detained at all or for the full pendency of the
immigration court proceedings. On the other hand, the actual number of individuals
in detention during proceedings before the immigration courts would also include
those who were not removed at the end of proceedings. A number of those detained
would have won the right to remain in the United States. Of the approximately 220,000
cases completed in immigration court in 2011, more than 55,000 (greater than twenty-
five percent) resulted in relief or dismissal of the deportation proceedings. EOIR
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2011, supra note 43, at D2. The estimate of more than 125,000
in detention pending a decision on deportability and status is therefore reliable and
errs on the side of a more conservative estimate.
46. See EOIR STATTSTICAL YEARBOOK 2011, supra note 43, at 01. In a submission to
the Inter-American Conission on Human Rights, the US government asserted that
the "vast majority of aliens in immigration proceedings are not detained." Submission
of the Government of the United States to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights with Respect to the Draft Report on Immigration in the United States:
Detention and Due Process. at 9, OEA/Ser.L/V/Ill, doc. 47 (Aug. 2, 2010), available at
http://cidh.org/pdi%20iles/ReportOnlmmigration.USG.Responsel 0. 15.2010).pdf
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Individuals who seek to remain in the United States
generally remain in detention for three months or more, and it
is not uncommon for individuals to stay in detention even
longer, sometimes for more than a year.47 DHS's published
statistics generally do not include information regarding the
typical length of stay." When DHS does provide a figure, the
agency usually asserts that the average length of time in
detention is approximately thirty to thirty-five days.49 However,
this figure does not disaggregate the detention data for those
undergoing contested immigration proceedings to determine
their ability to remain in the United States. 1 It thus includes
those individuals awaiting the outcome of immigration court
proceedings in the same figure with the large numbers of
migrants who are deported by ICE under summary deportation
orders or who leave voluntarily within a day or week of arrest.51
[hereinafter US Submission to the IACHR]. The immigration court statistics belie this
assertion.
47. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
48. See. e.g., DHS IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 2011, sapra note 13, at 1;
ICE, Detention Fact Sheet, supra note 39.
49. See SCHRIRO STUDY, supra note 29, at 6 ("on average, an alien is detained 30
days"); DHS CONGRESSIONAL 1U DGETJUSTIFICATION, supra note 39, at 36 (noting that
the average kngth of stay is thirty-five days); Gary Mead, Human Rights Situation of
Migrant, Workers, Refugee Children and Other Vulnerable Groups in the United
States: Statement Before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Oct. 12,
2007), available at http://ww.oas.org/cs/cidh/audincias/Hearings.aspx?Lang=Eng&
Session=13&page=1 (stating that the "average length of stay . . . [in] custody last
year ... was approximately thirty-five days").
50. The Inter-Anerican Commission on Human Rights has attempted to obtain
disaggregatcd data regarding lkngth of detention for the various categories of
immigrants sub ect to deprivation of liberty, making several requests to the United
States in conjunction with a series of hearings and working group meetings held with
non-governnintal organations. See Letter from Sarah Paoletti, Practice Assoc.
professor & Dir., Transnational Legal Clinic, Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. et al., to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (Oct. 17, 2011) (on file with author);
Telephone Interview with Alvaro Botero at the Intcr-American Coinmn on Human
Rights (Jan. 2012) [hereinafter Botero Telephone Interview] (notes on file with the
author). The lInter-Anerican Commission has not received a response. See id.
51. SCHRIRO STUDY, supra note 29, at 6. DHS has noted that as many as twenty-five
percent of individuals in detention are held for a day or less and that thirty-eight
percent are released within a week. Id. The government's presentation of these
numbers clarifies that the majority of the individuals held only for short periods of time
are not released pending immigration court proceedings. Rather, they depart the
country voluntarily or are removed pursuant to suinmary removal proceedings. Id. In
2011, the government deported more than 250,000 individuals (sixty-four percent of
total removals) through reinstatement of removal and expedited removal. DIS
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Consequently, DHS statistics represent a serious understatement
of the length of detention experienced by most migrants,
particularly those who challenge the grounds for their
deportation or seek asylum or other relief from deportation and
thus are entitled to proceedings to determine whether they will
be allowed to stay in the United States.
A closer look at the government's own figures reveals the
reality that migrants who remain in detention during contested
proceedings experience a much longer average length of
detention. DHS has recognized that the length of time in
detention varies significantly depending on whether the
detainee fights deportation.52 For example, in a 2009 report to
Congress, DHS acknowledged that the average length of
detention for asylum seekers ranges from 48 days to 130 days,
depending on the procedural stance of the asylum claim) At
least fifteen percent and up to forty-eight percent of asylum
seekers remained in detention for longer than 90 days.54
Similarly, an independent study looking at data regarding
detention for a single snapshot day-January 25, 2009-found
that ICE detained migrants for an average of at least eighty-one
days.55 The study further found that ICE held ten percent of
INIiG(RATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 2011, supra note 13. at 1. Another 324,000
individuals returned home voluntarily or otherwvise without a formal removal order. Id.
Some migrants involved in these summary proceedings would never have been
officially detained but instead would have left the United States shortly after an initial
encounter and apprehension by immigration authorities. See DHS IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONs 2011, supra note 13, at 1 (noting that DHS apprehended
642,000 individuals in 2011 while ICE detained 429,000). However, many others would
have been detained, although only for very short periods of time, and their inclusion in
the data significantly affects the statistic for average detention length. See SCHRIRO
STUDY, supra note 29, at 6. In contrast to the ICE statistics, the Department of Justice
provides statistics that separate out pre-trial criminal detention for those held for fewer
than four days. See US. Marshals Service Summar Case Processing Statistics: Fiscal Year
1994-2011, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICL, http://wwwjustice.gov/ofdt/s unnary.htL (last
visited Feb. 13, 2013).
52. See SCHRIRO STU TDY, supra note 29, at 6.
53. See DHS & ICE, DLTENTION AND RLMOVAL OPERATIONS RLPORT: RLoUIRED BY
SECTION 903 OF THF HAITIAN REFU GEE IMMIGRATION FAIRNFSS ACT 5 (2009).
54. See id.; see also DHS & IC, DETAINLD ASYLLM SLLKERS: FISCAL YLAR 2009
RLPORT TO CONGRLSS 8, 44 (2012) (reporting that up to twenty-five percent of asylum
seekers remained in detention for longer than ninety days in 2010 and further noting
that, during 2010, more than 100 asylum seekers remained in custody after a year of
detention).
55. See MPI STUDY, supra note 32, at 16, 19.
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detainees in custody pending removal proceedings for longer
than six months but less than a year, and held more than 500
individuals in detention for longer than a year awaiting final
adjudication of their cases.56 Perversely, individuals with the
opportunity to remain in the United States and with the greatest
interest in doing so will remain in the custody of the US
government for the longest period of time.
A combination of legal, political, and financial
considerations explains the current emphasis on detention in
immigration cases. Much of the early upward tick in
immigration detention resulted from the passage of legislation
in 1996 that broadened the categories of individuals subject to
detention, removal, and mandatory detention. 7 But, that
legislation does not explain the particularly rapid growth of
detention after 2005.
Instead, recent growth in detention levels corresponds to
political trends that have advanced "get-tough" stances towards
crime, border control, and immigration.58 Thus, in the wake of
Congress' adoption of the REAL ID Act,59 connecting
immigration with national security and criminal concerns, and
the introduction of additional legislationNo proposing a harsh
immigration crackdown, then-Secretary of Homeland Security
Michael Chertoff announced new detention policies in the fall
56. See id.: see also ACLU. ISSUL BRIEF UPDATL: PROLONGLD IMMIGRATION
DETENTION OF INDIVTDUALS WHO ARE CHALLENGING REMOVAL 9 (2011) (noting that on
November 1. 2010. 2,743 individuals who were still challenging deportation had been
detained for six months or more).
57. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Codc); Illegal
Immigration Reforim and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-208,
Div. C, I10 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended as amended in scattered sections of 8
and 18 U.S.C.); see also Legoinsky, supra note 21, at 533-34.
58. See, e.g., Gracme Wood. A Boom Behind Bars. BLOOMBLRG BUSINLSSWEEK (Mar.
17, 2011), http://www.businesswveek.con/magazine/content/1 l_13/
b4221076266454.htm (tracing increased detention due to a "get-tough approach on
immigration" and noting parallels between growth in criminal and immigration
detention); see also Adam Liptak, US. Prison Population Dwapfs that oj Other Nations, N.Y.
TIMLS (Apr. 23, 2008), http://ww.nytimes.coti/2008/04/23/world/ameiricas/23iht-
23prison.12253738.,htmi (noting upward trend in criminal incarceration rates in the
United States and noting its connection to the "movement to get tough on crime").
59. Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005).
60. Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of
2005, H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. (2005).
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of 2005.61 He publicly stated that President George W. Bush's
administration had received pressure to deal with illegal
immigration through "tough enforcement" measures.62 In
response, Secretary Chertoff announced intentions to greatly
expand immigration detention capacity with the goal of
detaining all migrants undergoing proceedings to determine
their status, regardless of individual circumstances.6 President
Barack Obama's administration has similarly responded to the
political environment by focusing heavily on immigration
enforcement, including high levels of immigration detention.64
Since 2005, Congress has also emphasized immigration
enforcement and has consistently appropriated funding to
ensure expansive detention.s
6 1. Comprehensive Immigration Reform II: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciar,
109th Cong. 4 (2005) [hereinafter Chertoff Hearing] (statement of Sec'y Michael
Chertoff, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.). This announcement also followed a shift
toward detention effectuated through expansion of the expedited removal program,
which mandates detention of certain recently arriving igrants for rapid deportation.
See 8 U.S.C. 1225 (2006). In 2004 DIS extended the progran's reach to include not
only migrants arriving at the border or at sea but also those apprehended within 100
miles of the border during the first fourteen days after their entry. See Designating
Aliens For Expedited Removal. 69 Fed. Reg. 48877 (Aug. 11, 2004).
62. ChertofT Hearing, supra note 6 1, at 45 (testifying that meetings with members
of Congress established the need for "aggressive and innovative steps" for dealing with
immigration and announcing "tough enforcement" measures).
63. Id.; see also Chris Strohm, DHS to End 'Catch and Release' oJ Illegal Aliens in
October, Gov'T EXEC. (Feb. 3, 2006), http:,// wy.govexec.corn/defense/2006/02/dhs-
to-eind-catch-andie-rcase-of-illegal-aliens-in-october/21082 [hereinafter DHS to End
Catch and Release]. This announcement is known as the end of "catch and release" in
conmonly-used but weighted parlance. It signified a shift in detention policy toward
detcntion and ended the prior situation in which many individuals were relcased
pending removal proceedings in immigration court. Id.; see STSKIN, supra note 38, at 2-
4: Memorandum from Asa Hutchinson. Under Sec'y for Border & Transp. Sec., Dep't
of Homeland Sec. on Detention Prioritization and Notice to Appear Documentary
Requirements I (Oct. 18, 2004) (establishing priority categories for deciding "whether
to detain an alien"); Legonsky, supra note 21, at 543 (noting older case-by-case rilease
policies).
64. janet Napolitano, Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Prepared Remarks at the
(enter for American Progress (Nov. 13, 2009) (referencing repeatedly the importance
of "enforcement" of immigration laws, protecting national security and detaining
"dangerous criminal aliens"); Morton MPI Speech, supra note 18 (reflecting ICE
head's insistence on detention on a "grand scale").
65. See S. REP. No. 112-169, at 52 (2012) [hereinafter 2013 SLNATE REPORT ON
APPROPRIATIONS] (approving funding of detention at the 2010 and 2011 level to
ensure that there will be no return to the "ill-advised 'catch and release' policy"); H.R.
REP. No. 112-492, at 13 (2012) [hereinafter HOUSE 2013 APPROPRIATIONS BILL FOR
DHS] (mandating that "fiunding made available under this heading shall maintain a
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Immigration detention is also big business, which is another
factor leading to its steady growth in recent years. For-profit
prison companies often carry out immigration detention."
These corporations increase their revenues substantially when
immigration detention expands as has occurred in the last
decade, resulting in lucrative contracts.67 Because detention
serves as such an important profit source, private correctional
companies lobby Congress and make campaign contributions to
protect those profits by increasing or maintaining high
detention levels. Reportedly, the Corrections Corporation of
America has spent "more than [US]$23 million in lobbying over
the course of the decade."@' In 2005, the year that began the
most dramatic upward swing in detention, the corporation spent
level of not less than 34,000 detention beds"); Detention of Cri in Aliens: What Has
Congress Bought?, TRANSACTIONAL RLCORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOLSL (Feb. 11 2010),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/224 (tracking substantial increases in
Congressional funding of detention and deportatLion with the goal of protecting
"public safety and national security, particularly by detaining and removing criminal
aliens").
66. See MPI STUDY, supra note 32, at 15 (showing that twelve of seventeen
immigration detention facilities were managed by for-profit correctional companies).
67. Se Garance Burke & Laura Wides-Munoz, Imnmigrants Prove Big Business for
Prison Companies, YAHOO NE'S (Aug. 2, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/immigrants-
prove-big-busine s-prison-companics-084353195.htmli (explaining that the GEO Group,
which cites ICL as its largest client, increased its net income from US$16.9 million to
USS78.6 million since 2000 and further noting that Corrections Corporation of
America ("CCA") carned more than US$162 million in net income in 2011); Chris
Kirkham, Private Prsons Profit Jon Imigration Crackdown, Federal and Local Law
Enforcement Partnerships,. HUFINGTON POST (june 7, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/07/private-priSons-inmmigration-federal-law-
enforcement n 15692 19.html (reporting that "according to securities filings" the two
largest privatc prison corporations, C(A and GEO Group, Inc., "have more than
doubled their revenues" from immigration detention since 2005); see also NATL
IMMIGRATION FORUM, THE MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION: RU NAAY COSTS FOR
IMMIGRATION DETENTION DO NOT ADnn1 UP TO SENSIBLE POIICIFS 5 (2012) (noting that
C(A and GEO reported respective annual revenues of US$1.73 billion and USS1.6
billion in 2011); Corrections Corp. of Am., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 13, 35 (Feb. 25,
2011) (stating that ICE detention has accounted for approximately twelve percent of
revenue in recent years and "filling these available beds would provide substantial
growth"); The GEO Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 33-34 (Mar. 2, 2011)
(stating that ICE detention accounts for thirtcen percent of profits and "loosening" of
iimigration laws or immigration enforcement could adversely impact profits).
68. See Kirkham, supra note 67; see also Burke & Wides-Munoz, supra note 67
(reporting that private corrections companies spent USS32 million on federal lobbying
and on campaign contributions since 2000); Wood, supra note 58 (stating that the C(A
spends an average of US$1-2 million lobbying dollars each year).
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USS4 million lobbying the federal government.69 Some of the
expansion in detention must be attributed to these financial
interests.70
11. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS
On a parallel track, as detention has grown rapidly in the
United States, human rights bodies have developed increasingly
sophisticated, consistent, and cogent standards for addressing
detention of migrants.7' The standards are sufficiently specific
that the laws and practices of states, including the United States,
may be measured against them.
A. Development of the International Human Rights Standards
The trend toward standards development in the
immigration detention context is recent, however. For more
than forty years after the signing of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in 1948 and the birth of modern human rights
law, international bodies made little effort to analyze the
application of human rights norms to immigration detention.
The adoption of multiple international and regional human
rights treaties in the years after the promulgation of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights7 2 failed to secure serious
attention to the issue, even though basic provisions of these
treaties relating to liberty of the person had obvious implications
69. See Kirkham, supra note 67; see also Burke & Wides-Munoz, supra note 67
(stating that private prison companies spent USS5 million on lobbying in 2005).
70. See Kirkham, supra note 67 (making a connection between increased lobbying
in 2005 and increased detention beginning that year).
71. See CORNELISSE, supra note 23, at 337 (noting a "growing body of human
rights law . . . concerned with the practice of immigration detention"); WILSHER, supra
note 23, at 169 (showing how international fora began to look at immigration
detention practices after the 1980s).
72. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
1 .N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Organization of American States, American
Convention on Human Rights art. 1, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No.
36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American
Convention]; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950. 213 U.N.T.S. 221; International Convention on
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant, Workers and Members of their Families.
Dec. 18. 1990, 2220 1.N.T.S. 3 [hereinalter IN Convention on the Rights of Migrants].
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for immigration detention." During this time, international
human rights law slowly eroded traditions of absolute
sovereignty within state territory, at least when confronted with
assertions of individual rights.74 Yet, sovereignty conceptions
continued to reign supreme in connection with a state's power
to control its borders and all related areas, including detention
of immigrants. International bodies remained reluctant to
intervene in this perceived core area of sovereigntV.7
However, this adherence to the extreme version of
sovereignty finally gave way beginning in the 1990s.76 Initially,
international human rights bodies focused on the situation of
refugees and asylum seekers in applying human rights norms to
immigration detention. The UN High Commissioner for
Refugees ("UNHCR") first formulated specific guidelines to
73. See WILSHER, supra notC 23, at 121 (stating that even when international
human rights instruments wvere drafted after World War II, "initially their impact [was]
... rather limited" on immigration issues).
74. SeeLOuIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 13-15 (1990): Peter J. Spiro, Note. The
States and IntenationalHuman Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 569 (1997) (noting that
"the basic pr emise" of human rights is "that nations cannot treat their subjects as they
please" and documenting the expansion of subject matter areas touched by human
rights law).
75. See WIISHER, supra note 23, at 169 (noting acceptance of sovereignty as
justification for immigration detention in early human rights instruments); Stephen
Legonmsky, The Last Bastions of State Sovereignty: Inmigration and Nationality Go Global, in
C(HALIENGES OF GLOBAL IZATION: MIGRATION, LABOR AND (GLOBAL GOVERNANcE 43, 44
(Andrew Sobel ed.. 2009) (citing immigration as one of the last "bastions of national
sovereignty" in relation to the international community) ; Linda S. Bosniak, Human
Right,. State Sovereignty and the Protection of Undocumented Migrants Uhnder the International
Migrant Workers Convention, 25 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 737. 742-43, 749, 757-58 (1991)
(stating that state sovereignty concerns led to delays and ambiguities in the drafting of
the UN Convention on the Rights of Migrants in the 1980s); Costello, supra note 23, at
261-63 (noting that deep-rooted sovereignty considerations impact international
human rights law interpretations in the immigration detention context); Office of the
U.N. High Commi'r for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 24 (Rev. 1) 1-2. The
lInternational Convention on Migrant 'Workers and its Committee (2005), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publicationis/FactSheet24rev.len.pdf (stating that
the UN Convention on the Rights of Migrants was adopted by the General Assembly in
1990 after ten years in development but only received enough State ratificatiois to
come into force in 2003).
76. See Costello, supra note 23, at 259 (dating international human rights focus on
imnigration detention to 1997); INT'L DETENTION COAL., THE ISSUE OF IMMIGRATION
DETENTION AT THE UN LEVL: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS RELEVANT TO THE WORK OF THE
INTERNATIONAL DETENTION COALITION (IDC) 4, 7 (2011) (highlighting increased
attention to iminigraiol detention issues in recent years by human rights bodies at the
United Nations).
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circumscribe the detention of refugees and asylum seekers in
1995 and then revised those guidelines shortly thereafter in
1999.7 These standards adopted in the 1990s represented
UNHCR's framework analyzing detention for several decades
and were only recently superseded through the adoption of new
UNHCR "Detention Guidelines" in 2012.7 Once UNHCR
began to consider detention issues, other human rights bodies
at the United Nations ("UN") also addressed the detention of
refugees and asylum seekers in the 1990s as well.
Then, the UN human rights system widened the circle of
immigration detention under consideration and created bodies
to interpret and monitor human rights norms applicable to the
detention of migrants generally."1 In the last fifteen years, UN
human rights bodies have produced numerous decisions and
resolutions that lay out permissible contours of detention for
asylum seekers and other migrants as well, in accordance with
international human rights law.8'
77. See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, UNHCR's Revised Guidelines on
Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seckers (1999),
available at http://wm.unhr.org/refworld/docid/3c2b3f844.htmil (providing the first
detailed guidance on detention of refugees and asylum seekers); see also U.N. High
Coimi'r for Refugees, Detention of Refugees and Asylun-Seckers (1986), available at
http://wmyunher.org/refvorld/docid/3ac68c43cO.htil (giving the initial statement
regarding the protections due to detainces).
78. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and
Standards relating to the Detention of Asylun-Seckers and Alternatives to Detention
(2012) [hereinafter UNHCR Detention Guidelines], available at
http:/vw/Nkunhcr.org/reivorld/docid/503489533b8.html.
79. See Human Rights Comm., A v. Australia, Communication No. 560/1993. U.N.
Doc. ((PR/(/59/D/560/1993 (Apr. 3, 1997) [hereinafter Human Rights CommiL., A.
v. Australia] (addressing detention of asylum seekers).
80. See Conm'n on Human Rights, Rep. on its 53rd Sess., Mar. 10-Apr. 18. 1997,
at 166, U.N. Doc. E/1997/23 (1997) (mandating that the United Nations 'Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention consider all forms of immigration detention); Report of
the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Conn'n on Human Rights, 56th
Sess., Annex 2. Deliberation No. 5, Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons
under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment regarding the Situation of Immigrants
and Asylum Seekers, U.N. Doc. E/(N.4/200()/4 (1999). [hereinafter Deliberation No.
5] (Setting out initial principles, largely procedural in nature. for evaluating when
immigration detention violates the right to liberty); Comm'n on Human Rights, Rep.
on its 55th Sess., Mar. 22-Apr. 30. 1999, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/167 (1999) (creating
the Special Rapportcurship on the Rights of Migrants).
81. See Human Rights Comm., Communication Ao. 1255,1256,1259,
1260,1266,1268.1270&1288/2004, U.N. Doc. ((PR//90/D/ 1255,1256,
1259,1260.1266,1268,1270801288/2004 (Jul. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Human Rights
Comm., Shaas v. Ausraia] (addressing detention of asylum seekers); Human Rights
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Similarly, the regional human rights bodies for the
Americas, charged with promoting and enforcing human rights
law in the member states of the Organization of American States
("OAS"), began to consider immigration detention issues a little
more than a decade ago, initially in the refugee context and
then in connection with all migrants> Most recently, in 2010,
the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (the
"IACHR" or the "Inter-American Commission") and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (the "Inter-American Court")
issued interpretations regarding the application of human rights
law to immigration detention that laid out the most
Comm., Communication No. 900/1999, U.N. Doc. CC'PR/C/76/D/900/1999 (Oct. 28,
2002) (same). See also Working Grp. on Ai bitrary Detention, U.N. Comimn on Human
Rights, Rep. on its Sixtieth Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3 (2003) [hereinafter 2003
Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention] (setting out concrete guidelines
for the application of human rights norms to immigration detention); Working Grp.
on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Rep. on its Sixty-second Sess.,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/7 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 Report of the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention] (same); Working Grp. on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Coim'n on
Human Rights, Rep. on its Seventh Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/4 (2008) [hereinafter
2008 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention] (same); Working Grp. on
Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Rep. on its Tenth Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/10/21 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 Report of the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention] (same); Working Grp. on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Comm'n on
Human Rights, Rep. on its Thirteenth Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/30 (2010)
[hereinafter 2010 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention] (sain);
Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, Spejic Groups and Individuals:
Migrant Workers, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/85/Add.1 (Jan. 30, 2003) (by Gabricla
Pizarro) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur 2002 Report] (applying human rights norms
to immigration detention); Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/20/24 (Apr. 2. 2012) (by Francois Crepeau) (same) [hereinafter Special
Rapporteur 2012 Report]; Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants,
Addendam: Wission to the United States ojAmerica, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/12/Add.2 (Mar.
5. 2008) (by Jorge Bustamantc) [hereinafter Special Rapporitcur Report on Mission to
the US] (expounding human rights standards while making findings on immigration
detention in the United States); see also U.N. Office of the High Comm'r for Human
Rights, ((PR General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant. 1[
5 (Apr. 11, 1986) [hereinafter General Comment 15] (offering an early general
statement of principles regarding detention of migrants by the U.N. Human Rights
Committee).
82. See INTLR-AMLRICAN COMM'N ON HLMAN RIGHTS, ORG. OF AMLRICAN STATES,
REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF AsUM SEEKERS WITHIN THE
CANADIAN REFLIGLL DETLRMINATION SYSTEM (2000) (establishing detention standards
in the Context of the asylum process in Canada); Ferrer-Mazorra v. United States, Case
9903, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 51/01, OEA/L/V/I11.111, doc. 20 rev. (2001)
(addressing the detention of Cuban migrants); INTER-AMERICAN COMM'N ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, ANNUAL RLPORT OF THL INTER-AMLRICAN COMMISSION ON HLMIAN RIGHTS:
2000 ch. VI (2001) (addressing the detention of migrant workers).
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comprehensive and detailed standards by international human
rights bodies yet.8"
Thus, while it was late in developing, there is now a corpus
of international human rights law on immigration detention.
The international human rights standards include both general
principles and specific guidelines regarding immigration
detention and provide a clear and rational framework for
determining when immigration detention complies with
international human rights law and when it does not.
B. Content o the International Human Rights Standards
The international human rights standards of the United
Nations and the inter-American system are the best developed
and also are those that apply to the United States."4 This Part will
thus focus on the universal and the regional inter-American
standards.8 Given their recent development, the standards
offered by the various international human rights bodies have
83. See Velez Loor v. Panama, preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am, (t. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218 ( Nov. 23, 2010) (holding that
lengthy detention of irregular immigrant, violated international human rights law); see
also INTER-AMERICAN COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON IMMIGRATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: DETENTION AND DUE IROCFSS 11-33 (2010) [hereinafter IACHR
RLPORT ON DLTLNTION] (analyzing international human rights law norms applicable to
immigration detention in the United States).
84. See infra Section III.A. (discussing the binding nature of the relevant human
rights instruments).
85. This Part does not consider the standards developed by European human
rights bodies since they have no direct relevance in the United States. Nor will this Part
reference the statements and resolutions of the political bodies of the United Nations
and the Organization of American States ("OAS"), although there are a number that
urge limitations on detention. See G.A. Res. 64/166, 1[ 4. U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/166
(Mar. 19, 2010) (calling on states to reduce the detention of migrants); OAS General
Assembly, Inter-American Program for the Promotion and Protection of the Human
Rights of Migrants, Including Migrant Workers and Their Families, AG/RES. 2141
(XXXV-O/05) 11, 15 (June 7, 2005) (urging programs to prevent "arbitrary arrest" of
migrants in immigration proceedings). These pronouncements are policy statements
rather than legal standards, and are not entitled to the same weight given to specific
international human rights instruments and to the statements of experts and bodies
appointed to interpret those instruments. See infra notes 168-69 and accompanying
text (describing the persuasive authority of the standards issued by the bodies
appointed to interpret human rights instruments). Finally, the section does not cite to
the UN Convention on the Rights of Migrants, although that instrument includes
provisions relating to immigration detention, because the United States has not ratified
the Lreaty and is not bound by it. See generaIl UN Convention on the Rights of
Migrants, supra note 72.
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not been systematized. This Part presents the standards in a
schema that captures the general principles and individual
requirements set out under international human rights law.
1. Rights that Form the Basis of the International Human Rights
Standards
The international human rights standards relating to
immigration detention rely on bedrock rights guaranteed in
international human rights instruments. The human right to
liberty is a principal source of law. The right to liberty and
freedom from "arbitrary" detention is set forth in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the
"ICCPR")6 as well as in the American Convention on Human
Rights (the "American Convention") ,8 which further develops
the right as originally set out in the American Declaration on
the Rights and Duties of Man ("the American Declaration") .8
The right to due process protected in the ICCPR, the
American Convention and the American Declaration, also serves
as a vital source of law for international standards on
immigration detention. Each treaty establishes that no
individual shall be deprived of physical liberty except as
established by law; additionally each of the treaties includes a
separate provision guaranteeing due process in legal
proceedings"'
86. See ICCPR, supra note 72, art. 9(1) ("Everyone has the right to liberty and
security of pcrson. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.").
87. American Convention, supra note 72, arts. 7(1), 7(3) ("Every person has the
right to personal liberty and security.... No one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or
imiprisonincnt.").
88. See Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, OAS Res. XXX, art. I, OEA/Sery.LA./II.23 (May 12, 1948) [hereinafter
American Declaration] ("Every human being has the right to ... liberty."); Id. art. XXV
(entitling section "Right of protection fron arbitrary arrest").
89. See ICCPR, supra note 72, art. 9(1) ("No one shall be deprived of his liberty
except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by
law."); Id. art. 14(1) (" [E]veryone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal .... "); American Convention, supra
note 72, art. 7(2) ("No one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except for the
reasons and under the conditions established beforchand by the constitution of the
State Party concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto."); Id. art. 8 (1) ("Every
person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantces and within a reasonable time, by
a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law.");
American Declaration, supra note 88, art. XXV ("No person may be deprived of his
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As to refugees and asylum seekers, the limitations on
immigration detention derive from the same human right to
liberty guaranteed to all migrants but also from specific
provisions in the refugee treaties." These treaty provisions
prohibit punishment of or undue restrictions on the rights of
those seeking protection.' The United Nations Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees (the "Refugee Convention")92
provides that states "shall not impose penalties, on account of
their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who enter or are
present in their territory without authorization."93 The treaty
further provides that states may not apply "restrictions other
than those which are necessary" to irregular migrants claiming
refugee status.94
2. General Principles of the International Human Rights
Standards Relating to Immigration Detention
Based on these core rights, international human rights law
establishes general principles on immigration detention. These
principles impose human rights limitations on government
authority to control immigration, require that immigration
detention be used as a last resort, and mandate the non-punitive
nature of immigration detention. In turn, these general
principles lead to a framework requiring that immigration
detention be reasonable, necessary, and proportional in order
to comply with international human rights obligations.
Thus, international human rights law standards on
immigration detention start from the premise that governments
may control immigration and may expel or exclude non-
liberty except in the cases and according to the procedures established by pre-existing
law."); Id. art. XXVI (entitling section "Right to due process of law")
90. See UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 78, 1[1[ 12-14.
91. See id.
92. U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28. 1951. 189
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. This convention was extended by the
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S.
267 [hereinafter Refugee Protocol]. The Refugee Convention entered into force for
the United States on Nov. 1. 1968, through accession to the Refugee Protocol.
Subsequent mentions of the provisions of the treaty will reference only the Relugee
Convention, although the Refugee Protocol is what binds the United States.
93. Id. art. 31(1).
94. Id. art. 31(2); see also id. art. 26 (providing for fteedomn of movement and
choice of residence for refugees).
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citizens." However, this ability to control migration is limited by
the requirement that, even in carrying out immigration control,
states must abide by international human rights norms and
refugee law protections.96 The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights has held succinctly that "States may establish mechanisms
to control the entry into and departure from their territory of
individuals who are not nationals, as long as they are compatible
with the norms of human rights protection."9  Further
developing this rule of law, the court has noted that,
"international law has placed certain limits on the application of
migratory policies that must always be applied . . . whatever the
legal situation of the migrant may be."9
Similarly, the UN Human Rights Committee (the "HRC")
has stated that human rights law "does not recognize the right
of aliens to enter or reside in the territory of a State party" and
that it is "a matter for the State to decide who it will admit to its
territory."9 However, human rights norms, including the right
to liberty, nonetheless apply to protect migrants as the state
makes its determinations. 10 0 Other bodies of the United Nations
have reached similar conclusions.101
95. Velez Loor v. Panama, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Aim. C1. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218. 1 97 (Nov. 23, 2010); General
Comment 15, supra note 81, 11 5, 9; 20 10 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, supra note 81. 1 58, 59; Special Rapportcur Report on Mission to US, supra
note 81. at 7.
96. Velez Loor, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218, 1 97; General Comment 15,
supra note 81. 111 5, 9; 2010 Report of the 'Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,
supra note 81. 58, 59: Special Rapporteur Report on Mission to US. supra note 81,
17; Special Rapporteur 2012 Report, supra note 81, 1 6 ("The fact that a person is
irregularly in the territory of a State does not imply that he or she is not protected by
international human rights standards.").
97. Velez Loor, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218, 1 97.
98. Id. 1 100.
99. General Coiiment 15, supra note 81, 1 5.
100. Seeid. 15, 9.
101. 2010 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, supra note 81,
58, 59 (acknowledging "the sovereign right of States to regulate migration" while
requiring observance of "[s]trict legal limitations" and "judicial safeguards" where
immigration detention is concerned); Special Rapporteur Report on Mission to US,
supra note 81, 1[ 9 (noting that international law "recognizes every State's right to set
immigration criteria and procedures" but "does not allow unfettered discretion to set
policies for detention ... of non-citizens without regard to human rights standards");
see also Special Rapportcur 2012 Report, supra note 81 1[ 6 (confirming that
international human rights standards protect migrants in irregular status).
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Human rights law further establishes the overarching
principle that immigration detention must be a last resort. The
bodies of the universal and inter-American human rights systems
have established a presumption against detention for all
migrants in application of the right to liberty guaranteed in the
respective human rights treaties. In connection with its review of
detention in the United States, the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights looked to the right to liberty and explicitly
established "the paramount principle" that detention during
proceedings is an "exceptional measure."""1 The Inter-American
Commission expounded on this principle establishing that:
"member States must enact immigration laws and establish
immigration policies that are premised on a presumption of
liberty-the right of the immigrant to remain at liberty while his
or her immigration proceedings are pending-and not on a
presumption of detention." 03 Similarly, in analyzing the
application of the right to liberty to migrants, the UN Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention and the UN Special
Rapporteurship on the Human Rights of Migrants have
concluded that detention of migrants must be a "last resort."or
In interpreting states' treaty obligations to asylum seekers
and refugees, UNHCR has established this same "presumption
against detention."1os The UNHCR Detention Guidelines
establish that "detention of asylum-seekers should normally be
avoided" and should be a "measure of last resort, with liberty
being the default position."on
International human rights law establishes the principle of
detention as a last resort as both a global rule for assessing the
overall structure of a state's detention system 1o7 and a decision-
making rule for states to apply in individual determinations.10 8
102. IACHR REPORT ON DETENTION, supra note 83, 1 34.
103. Id. 1[ 39.
104. 2009 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, supra note 81,
67; see 2010 Report of the Working Group on Ai biLrary Detention, supra note 81, 1 59:
Special Rapporteur 2012 Report, supra note 81, 1 68.
105. UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 78, 1 2.
106. Id. 1[1[ 2. 14.
107. See IACHR RLPORT ON DETENTION, supra note 83, 1[1 39. 102 (insisting on
laws and policies establishing a presumption of detention).
108. See UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 78, 1 21 (establishing that
detention can only be "cxceptionally resorted to" where it is "necessary in an individual
case"); 2009 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, supra note 81, 1 67
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So, a state may not rely systemically on detention as a primary
means of immigration control. At the same time, the
presumption against detention must be a touchstone for
individual immigration detention determinations.1 09 It follows
that a detention system will violate the principle that treats
detention as a last resort if it consistently fails to employ the
presumption against detention in individual proceedings.1x0
A final general rule of international human rights law holds
that detention of migrants in connection with immigration
status determinations "should never involve punitive
purposes.""' The human rights bodies have made clear that
detention is allowed solely as an administrative measure, during
the process of determining immigration status or incident to
removal following a decision to deport.112 Applying this
principle, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
has equated immigration detention with "pre-trial" or
"preventive" detention permitted only in non-punitive
circumstances." Where a state deploys detention without
adequate connection to these limited administrative purposes,
detention is punitive and impermissible under international
law. 114
(providing that "detention shall be the last resort" and shall be unlawful in cases where
removal is not possible); see also 2010 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, supra note 81. 159.
109. See UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 78, at 1 (noting that the
guidelines, including the principle of last resort, are intended to guide governments in
the claboration and implementation of detention policies and to guide decision-
makers making assessments about the necessity of detention in individual cases).
I10. See Velez Loor v. Panama, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Coss, Judgment, Inter-Am,. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218, 1 171 (Nov. 23, 2010) (finding a
human rights violation in immigration policies that fail to determine on an individual
basis whether other less restrictive means than physical custody may be utilized to meet
government objectives).
111. Id.; see Special Rapportcur 2012 Report, supra note 81. 11 31. 70 (noting that
detention "should under no circumstance be of a punitive nature"); Special
Rapporteur 2002 Report, supra note 81, 1[1 73 (same).
112. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur 2012 Report, supra note 81. 24, 69, 70.
113. See IACHR REPORT ON DETENTION, supra note 83, 1 34-38 (insisting also
that "immigration violations ought not to be construed as criminal offenses").
114. See Velex Loor. Inter-Am,. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218, 1 171 (holding that
detention is punitive and violates international human rights lawv if it is not necessary
for immigration-re lated purposes in an individual case); IACHR RLPORT ON
DETLNTION, supra note 83, 1 232 (noting that detention lcads to a violation of the right
to liberty absent exceptional circumstances where detention is warranted in connection
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As to asylum seekers, the Refugee Convention also
precludes punitive detention. 1 5  The Refugee Convention
explicitly sets forth that States "shall not impose penalties, on
account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees."1b If
there were any doubt about the reach of this treaty provision,"'7
UNHCR has made clear that its prohibition on punitive
measures includes detention and applies broadly to most asylum
seekers.118
The general principles just outlined underlie the concrete
framework for considering immigration detention, which
requires that detention be reasonable, necessary and
proportional in order to comply with international human
rights obligations. Numerous decisions, resolutions and
interpretations by international human rights bodies have
confirmed this trilogy of necessity, reasonableness and
proportionality.
The UN Special Rapporteurship on the Human Rights of
Migrants has established that detention of migrants must be
"necessary, reasonable and proportional to the objectives to be
achieved."1' In the seminal immigration detention case of
A v. Australia, the UN Human Rights Committee also required a
"proportionality" analysis for immigration detention and held
with immigration proceedings); see also 2010 Report of the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention, supra note 81, 1 58 (establishing that "administrative detention" is
permissible but "crirninalization of irregular migration exceeds the legitimate interests
of States"): VILSHER, supra note 23, at 168 (noting that detention assumes a "punitive
nature" if it is unnecessary for legitimate purposes). In addition to becoming punitive if
it no longer adheres to the bounds of and reasons for civil proceedings', detention may
also violate international human rights norms if the conditions or place of detention
are punitive rather than civil in nature. See. e.g:, Special Rapporteur 2012 Report, supra
note 81, 1 31 (noting that "prison-like conditions" of detention may result in a
detrimination that detention is "punitive in nature"); IACHR RLPORT ON DETLNTION,
Supra note 83, 11 19, 64 (noting that a "genuinely civil detention system" must have
special conditions reilecting the non-punive nature of the detention).
115. UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 78, 1 32.
116. Refugee Convention, supra note 92, art. 31 (1).
117. The treaty specifically provides that penalties are inappropriate where
refugees are "coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom wvas
threatened ... provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and
show good cause for their illegal entry or presence." Id.
118. See UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 78, 11 11-14, 32 (establishing
that illegal entry or stay does not give the State the power to detain, and detention may
not serve as a punitive measure for illegal entry or presence).
119. Special Rapporteur 2012 Report, supra note 81, 9.
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that immigration detention is arbitrary and thus violative of the
right to liberty protected in the ICCPR "if it is not necessary."12o
The Inter-American Court reached an almost identical holding
in Velez Loor v. Panama, providing that a custodial measure
would be arbitrary unless applied only when "necessary and
proportionate."'12 The Inter-American Commission has also
concluded that "standards of necessity and proportionality
should be applied" to detention of migrants.122
In the refugee context, the UNHCR Detention Guidelines
establish that states may resort to detention of asylum seekers
only if detention is "necessary," "reasonable in all the
circumstances," and "proportionate to a legitimate purpose."23
A recent analysis of the current state of international law on
immigration detention commissioned by UNHCR notes the
importance of each of the requirements of reasonableness,
necessity and proportionality: "In assessing whether detention is
necessary and reasonable in all the circumstances, the standard
of proportionality is applied."124
3. Specific Requirements of International Human Rights Law
Regarding Immigration Detention
International human rights law has identified even more
specific requirements in application of the reasonableness,
necessity and proportionality framework to analyze the
permissibility of immigration detention. Human rights bodies
do not always clarify whether a specific requirement is necessary
to satisfy a particular prong of the trilogy or reflects an
application of all three elements. The decisions and
interpretations of human rights bodies nonetheless coalesce
around the following requirements to ensure compliance with
the reasonableness, necessity, and proportionality framework.15
120. Human Rights Comm., A v. Australia, supra note 79, 9.2.
121. Velez Loor v. Panama, Preliminary Objections. Merits, Reparations, and
CostJudgment, Inter-Am. C. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218, 1 171 (Nov. 23, 2010).
122. IACH R REPORT ON DETENTION, supra note 83, 11 9, 102.
123. UNHCR Detention Guidelines. supra note 78. 11 2, 18.
124. BACK TO BASICS, supra note 20, at 21.
125. In addition to the specific standards below, the international human rights
bodies sometimes raise a requirement that immigration detainces be provided free
legal representation. See Velez Loo. Inter-Am. CL. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218, 1[11 132. 146
(finding due process violations in the failure to appoint free legal representation to a
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First, to be reasonable and free from arbitrariness,
detention must take place only in compliance With pre-existing
domestic lawi.126 In connection with this standard, detainees
must also be informed as to the legal reasons for their
detention. 1
Second, for detention to be reasonable and proportional,
the government mustjustify the deprivation of liberty based on a
detained migrant); Special Rapporteur Report on Mission to US, supra note 81, 114
(recomniinding appointed counsel for detained mnigrants); Special Rapportcur 2012
Report, supra note 81, 1 72(a) (recommending that migrants in detention should
receive free legal representation); Special Rapporteur 2002 Report, supra note 81,
75(c) (samc). The human rights standards do not make clear whether they require free
legal representation in connection with the decision regarding custody or in
connection wvith the underlying proceedings to determine immigration status. See Velez
Loor Inter-Am. (t. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218, 132, 146 (emphasizing that the migrant
faced punitive custody in requiring appointment of counsel): compare Special
Rapporteur Report on Mission to US, supra note 81, 114 (recommending that
appointed counsel should be available to immigration detaineces "placed in removal
proceedings"): and Special Rapportcur 2012 Report, supra note 81, 1[ 72(a)
(recommending that appointed counsel should be assisted by free legal counsel
"during administrativc proceedings"); and Special Rapportcur 2002 Report, supra note
81, 1[ 75(c) (saei) with IACHRRLPORT ON DETENTION, supra note 83, 1f 441 (requiring
that the government provide access to legal counsel for migrants in detention). Given
the lack of clarity regarding appointment of counsel and the overlap between issues
relating to the rolk of counsel in immigration status proceedings and in dCtCntion
decisions, I do not address the issue of legal counsel in this Article. However, other
scholars have argued persuasively that a right to counsel should exist for detained
migrants seeking to challenge their detention. See Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional
Deprivatior: Th Rightto Appointed Counsel f Aandatoriy Detained JImmaigrants Pending
Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. j. RACE & L. 63 (2012); see also Michael J. Churgin, An
Essay on Legal Representation of Non-Citizens in Detention, 5 INTERCULTURAL HLM. RTs. L.
REV. 167, 172 (2010) (suggesting possibility of appointment of counsel for detained
children or migrants with mental disabilitics).
126. Special Rapporteur 2012 Report, supra note 81 1[1 9, 72(a) (explaining that
"detention of migrants must be prescribed by law," and that a "decision to detain
should only be taken under lear legal authority"); Special Rapportcur 2002 Report,
supra note 81. 1[ 75(c) (stating that detention is allowed "only on the basis of criteria
established by law"); see also Deliberation No. 5, supra note 80, Principle 6; Velez Loor,
Inter-Am. (t. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218, 1 116 (holding detention unreasonable where the
decision authorizing detention failed to set forth specifically which legal dispositions
applied).
127. 2010 Report of the Working Group on A bitlrary Detention, supra note 81,
61; Special Rapportcur 2012 Report, supra note 81, 1[ 72(a) (Stating that migrants
should be informed in a language they understand of the reasons for detention);
Special Rapportcur 2002 Report, supra note 81, 1 75(d) (stating that detained migrants
mnust be informed of the reasons for the deprivation of liberty); Deliberation No. 5.
supra note 80, Principles 1, 8.
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valid governmental purpose.28 Detention is permissible only
where it is "essential" to "serve a legitimate interest of the
State." 129
In recognition of the non-penal nature of immigration
detention, the principal permissible purpose for detention is to
allow a government to execute removal of a deportable migrant
from the country.so Removal is not always automatic or
immediate, however, and proceedings must sometimes be
undertaken to determine immigration status and to decide
whether deportation will even be required."' Detention may
then be permitted for other circumscribed purposes relating to
the immigration process.13 2 Specifically, detention may be
128. See Human Rights Comm., A v. Australia, supra note 79, 1[ 9.4 (holding that
without legitimate governmental objectives justifying detention, detention may be
considered arbitrary); Special Rapporteur 2012 Report, supra note 81. 11J 9, 24
(requiring "legitimate objectives" for detention and establishing that the "principle of
proportionality requires that detention has a legitimate aim"); 2010 Report of the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, supra note 81, 1[ 64 (establishing that the
principle of proportionality requires that detention always has a legitimate aim").
129. See IACHR REPORT ON DETENTION, supra note 83, 1 39; see also Human
Rights Coimt., A v. Australia, supra note 79, 1 9.2 (establishing that detention is
arbitri ary if not "ncccssary" to meet government goals); Human Rights Comm., Shams v.
Australia, supra note 81, 1 7.2 (holding that the state must provide adequate
justification for detention).
130. Special Rapportcur 2012 Report, supra note 81 1 24 (finding detention
permissible only where there is a legitimate aim, which is a "real and tangible prospect
of removal"); 2010 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, supra note
81, 11[ 59. 64 (finding that "facilitating the expulsion of an irregular migrant" with a
removal order is a permisible justification for detention and noting that detention will
usually only bc justificd if there is a "real and tangible prospect of removal"); Special
Rapporteur 2002 Report, supra note 81 1 35 ("Administrative deprivation of liberty
should last only for the time necessary for the deportation/expulsion to become
effective.").
131. See UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 78, 1 33 (establishing that
detention on the grounds of expulsion can only occur after a claim to remain has been
finally determined and rejected and noting that those in ongoing proceedings are not
available for removal" and so cannot be detained to effectuate removal).
132. The human rights bodies have made clear, on the one hand, that
immigration detention is mainly permissible to facilitate expulsion where the prospect
of removal is "real and tangible." See Special Rapporteur 2012 Report, supra note 81, 1
24; 20 10 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, supra note 81, 115 9,
64; Special Rapportcur 2002 Report, supra note 81. 1 35. On the other hand, they have
also established that detention may bc justified for specified reasons connected with
the immigration process that go beyond facilitating immediate deportation of
individuals required to dcpart. See Special Rapportcur 2012 Report, supra note 81. .9
(listing the "risk of absconding" and danger to public security as lkgitimate ojcctivcs
for detention); 2010 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, supra note
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justified during the pendency of proceedings to determine
immigration status in order to address the possibility that a
migrant might evade or obstruct the proceedings or constitute a
danger to the community.13 Verification of identity may also be
an acceptable governmental objective for brief periods of
detention pending a decision regarding immigration status.134
81, 1 59 (listing as reasons for detention the "risk of absconding" or the identiication
of an irregular migrant, as well as expulsion of a migrant with removal order); see also
Velez Loot, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218, 1 169 (accepting detention to execute a
deportation order or to ensure that a migrant will appear for immigration
proceedings). The two types of justifications for detention fit together by assuming that
justifications relating to flight risk or public security apply when ongoing proceedings
have yet to determine removability or where there is some reason preventing or
delaying deportation even after deportation has been ordered. See UNHCR Detention
Guidelines, supra note 78, 1 33 (clarifying that the need to physically deport a migrant
may constitute one basis for detention but that another basis must be invoked during
ongoing proceedings where removal is not imminent or definite): see also David Cole,
Out oJ the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CALF. L. REV.
693, 697 (2009) (asserting that civil immigration detention of persons who "pose a
danger to the community or a risk of flight" is permissible "because the adjudication of
... immigration status cannot be performed instantaneously") [hereinafter Cole, Out of
the Shadows].
133. IACHR RLPORT ON DETENTION, supra note 83, 11[ 39. 102 (accepting the
need to ensure that an individual reports for immigration proceedings and protection
of public safety as justifications for detention); 2010 Report of the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention, supra note 81, 1 59 (listing "the risk of absconding" as a
permissible justiication for detention); Special Rapporteur Report on Mission to US,
supra note 81[ 110 (identifying "danger to society" and "flight risk" as justifications
for immigration detention); Special Rapporteur 2012 Report, supra note 81, 1 9
(identifying "risk of absconding" and danger to self or "public security" as legitimate
objectives for detention); Special Rapporteur 2002 Report, supra note 81, 1[1[ 35, 75(c)
(identifying the risk of absconding or non-cooperation with proceedings and the need
to protect "public security" asjustifications for detention); see also Velez Loor, Inter-Am.
CL. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218, 114-116, 169 (holding that reasons of security and public
order, as well as the need to ensure appearance at immigration proceedings, might
justify detention).
134. 2010 Report of the Working Group on Ar bitrary Detention, supra note 81, 1
59 (listing "the necessity of identification of [a] migrant in an irregular situation" as an
additional justification for detention); see also Human Rights Comm., A v. Australia,
supra note 79, 1 9.4 (short detention for the purpose of investigating an illegal entry
might be permissible). Some have suggested that international human rights law
standards may be open-ended in allowing for additional justiications for detention. See
Special Rapportcur 2012 Report, supra note 81. 11 (asserting that, under the 1CCPR,
an assessment of the accepted grounds for detention is made "on a case-by-case basis").
This reading is not reflected in the weight of the guidance provided by international
human rights bodies, which list specific acceptable governmental purposes for
detention. See, e.g., id. 1 9 (listing specific legitimate objectives for detention as only
including the need to prevent a flight risk or a security risk); Special Rapporteur
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For asylum seekers, the permissible state objectives mirror
the acceptable goals under general human rights law but are
even more specifically delineated. UNHCR has concluded that
detention of asylum seekers may be necessary, and therefore
permissible, only in connection with three purposes: public
order, public health or national security.'5 The UNHCR
guidelines further clarify that detention to "protect public
order" is only appropriate where: 1. the asylum-seeker is likely to
abscond or refuse to cooperate; 2. detention is associated with
accelerated procedures in narrow circumstances; 3. brief
detention is necessary to carry out initial identity and security
checks; or 4. an initial brief period of detention is necessary to
allow for a "preliminary interview" on the asylum claim. 1
Third, detention must be both necessary to meet the
identified legitimate goals of the state and proportional to those
goals. ' To verify the necessity and proportionality of detention,
the state must consider all alternative means of achieving its
legitimate goals."," If there is a means for meeting the identified
goal of detention without resorting to deprivation of liberty,
then detention is not necessary and proportionate.s9
Specifically, the government must consider alternatives to
detention, such as release on bond, enrollment in a community
Report on Mission to US, supra note 81. 1 110: IACHR RLPORT ON DETLNTION, supra
note 83, 1 39.
135. UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 78, 21.
136. Id. Il 21-30.
137. See Velez Loor, Inter-Arn. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218, 171; IACHR REPORT ON
DETLNTION, supra note 83, 11[ 39, 102.; Special Rapportcur 2012 Report, supra note 81,
9; UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 78, 11 2, 18.
138. Human Rights Comm., Shans v. Australia, supra note 81, 1 7.2 (holding that
a government must show that "there were no kess invasive means of achieving the same
ends" to justify detention); 2009 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,
supra note 81, 1 67 ("[A]lternatives to detention should be sought whenever
possible ... ."); Special Rapporteur 2012 Report, supra note 81. 1 51 (finding that
States must always "consider in the first instance less intrusive alternatives to detention
of migrants"); Special Rapporteur 2002 Report, supra note 81, 75(1) (providing that
"non-custodial measures and alternatives to detention" should be made available to
migrants).
139. See UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 78, 1[ 34 ("[N]ccessity and
proportionality tests . . . require a assessment of . . . alternatives to detention");
Human Rights Comm., Shams v. Australia, supra note 81, 7.2.
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supervision program or electronic supervision, before deciding
to detain a migrant.1401
Fourth, the government must establish the necessity of
detention on an individualized basis.141 The need for detention
and the viability of less restrictive alternatives must be assessed
on a "case-by-case basis" with a view to the specific circumstances
presented.142 The government bears the burden of proof in
establishing the need for detention.143 In addition, detention
should not be automatic or mandatory for all irregular migrants
or for certain classes of migrants.144
140. See UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 78, 1 34; Human Rights
Comm., Shams v. Australia, supra note 81, 1 7.2: Velez Loor, Inter-Am,. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 218, 1 171; IACHR RLPORT ON DLTENTIO'N, supra note 83, 1 41; Special
Rapporteur 2012 Report, supra note 81, It 50-67 (emphasizing the requirement that
governments consider non-custodial altrinatives to detention and laying out standards
regarding alternativcs to detention); see generally BACK TO BASICS, supra note 20.
Alternatives to detention include any measures that allow release from physical custody,
including release on bond, riclase through a formal alternative- to-detention
supervision progriam, reporting requirements and other mechanisms. Special
Rapporteur 2012 Report, supra note 81, 1 51.
141. See UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 78, 1[1[ 18-19 (providing that
decisions to detain are to be based on a "detailed and individualized assessment");
Human Rights Comm., A v. Austalia, supra note 79, 11 9.2, 9.4 (holding that detention
must be necessary "in all the circumstances of the case" and the grounds for detention
must be "particular to ... individuals"); IACHR RLPORT ON DETENTION, supra note 83,
3 5, 37; Special Rapporteur Report on Mission to US, supra note 81, 1 23.
142. IACHR REPORT ON DETENTION, supra note 83, 11 35, 37; see also Special
Rapporteur Report on Mission to US, supra note 81, 1 23 (noting that detention
decisions "should be made on a case-by-case basis after an assessment of the functional
need to detain a particular individual"). Cf Special Rapporteur 2012 Report, supra
note 81, 1[ 10 (emphasizing that detcntion on public safety grounds must be based on
an "individual assessment in each case").
143. IA( HR REPORT ON DETENTION, supra note 83, 11 39, 134 ("The burden of
proof must be on the authority ordering detcntion or denying parole. not on the
immigrant"); UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 78, 1 47(v) (" [The] burden of
proof to establish the lawfulness of the detention rests on the authorities in question");
see Human Rights Comm., Shams v. Australia, supra note 81 1 7.2 . (holding that a
government must advance grounds "particular to [individual] cases which wvould justify
their continued detcntion"); Human Rights Comm., A v. Australia, supra note 79. 1 9.4
(holding that a government must provide appropriate justification for detention not to
be designated as arbitrary).
144. UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 78, 1 20 (establishing that
mandatory or automatic detcntion is prohibited as arbitrary); Velex Loor, Inter-Am,. CL.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 218, 118 (finding a violation of the right to liberty where detention
of irregular migrants was automatic without consideration of individualized
circumstances); IACHR RLPORT ON DETLNTION, supra note 83, 1 428 (disapproving
"mandatory detention for broad classes of immigrants"); Special Rapporteur 2012
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Fifth, to ensure proportionality, detention still must be for
the shortest time period possible even Where necessary and
reasonable.145 In addition, a maximum period of detention
should be established by law. 6
Sixth, an individual detained for immigration purposes
must have the possibility to seek review of his detention before
an independent tribunal shortly after detention begins.147
Specifically, the international human rights standards require
that detention "must be ordered or approved by a judge." 48 In
other words, if the initial decision to detain is not made by a
court, then the detainee must have the ability to access prompt
court review of the decision to detain. In addition, after the
initial determination or review of detention by a court, there
Report, supra note 81, 1 68 ("Detention for inmigration purposes should never be
mandatory or automatic.").
145. Special Rapporteur 2012 Report, supra note 81. Il 21. 68 (noting that
immigration detention is "only permissible for the shortest period of timc"); 2009
Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, supra note 81, 1 67 (same); Velez
Loor. lIntcr-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218, 1 171 (same): UNHCR Detention Guidelines.
supra note 78, 1 45 (noting that asylum-seckers should not be held in detention "for
any longer than necessary").
146. 2010 Report of the Working Group on A bitLrary Detention, supra note 81,
61; Special Rapportcur 2002 Report, supra note 81, 1 75(g): Deliberation No. 5, supra
note 80, principle 7; UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 78, 1 46 (" [M]aximum
periods of detention should be set in national legislation"); see also Vele Loot. Intir-Am.
CL. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218, 1 117 (noting that Panamanian law did not include time
limits for the period of detention in finding a violation of the right to liberty).
147. 1e1ez Loor, inter-Am. CL. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218, IT 107 127 (requiring review
of inunigration detention by a judge or tribunal); Special Rapporteur 2012 Report,
Supra note 81, 11 18, 19 (establishing right to proceedings before a court on the
lawfulness of detention without lengthy delay); 2008 Report of the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention, supra note 81[ 52 (noting that a judicial authority shall decide
promptly on the lawlulness of detention); Special Rapporteur Report on Mission to US,
supra note 81, 1 122 (finding that detention of a non-citizcn must be "promptly
assessed by an independent court"); 2003 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, supra note 75, 1 86 (requiring review "by a court or a competent,
independent and impartial body" to avoid a finding of arbitrary detention);
Deliberation No. 5, supra note 80, Principles 3, 8; IACHR RLPORT ON DLTENTION, supra
note 83, 1 429; UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 78, 1 47(iii) (requiring
review of detention decision by "judicial or other independent authority" within 24-48
hours of the decision to detain).
148. 2010 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, supra note 81,
61; see also Special Rapporteur 2012 Report, supra note 81, 1 23 (observing that review
of detention should be judicial); 1e1ez Loor. intr-Aim. C. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218, 11 107,
126 (requiring review of immigration detention by a judge or tribunal).
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must be "automatic, regular and judicial . . . review of
detention."1 49
Review of detention by a court must encompass not only
compliance with domestic law but also with human rights
standards.' 1 Even where domestic provisions allow for
detention, the court must order release if the government fails
to establish, on an individualized basis, that detention was
necessary to meet legitimate government goals.1 51
111. THE RELEVANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS STANDARDS TO US IMMIGRATION DETENTION
In Part IV, I will identify a number of points of
incompatibility between the international human rights
standards and current law and practice on immigration
detention in the United States. However, this Part will first offer
a foundation for how and why these international human rights
standards should apply to immigration detention in the United
States. International human rights standards are appropriately
applied to US immigration detention for two principal reasons.
First, the standards constitute international obligations for the
United States. Second, the international human rights standards
governing immigration detention largely mirror the US
constitutional standards applicable to civil detention in contexts
other than immigration.
Given these two points, it is appropriate to urge the United
States to use the international human rights standards to delimit
immigration detention and to provide migrants with the same
liberty and due process protections offered to others facing civil
detention in the United States. It would be ideal if the executive
149. 2010 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, supra note 81,
61; see Human Rights Comin., A. v. Australia, 1 9.4 (requiring periodic review of
justification for detention); 2009 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,
supra note 81, 1 67; Special Rapporteur 2012 Report, supra note 81, 1 23 ([P]criodic
review of detention should be automatic"); UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note
78, 1 47(iv) (requiring "regular periodic reviews of the necessity for the continuation
of detention").
150. See Human Rights Comm., A v. Australia, supra note 79. 1[ 9.5; see also 2010
Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, supra note 81, 1 61 (stating that
review inust extend to lawfulness of detention not just reasonableness); Special
Rapporteur 2012 Report, supra note 81, 1 23 (same).
151. See Human Rights Comm., Shams v. Asai, a1,, supra note 81, 17.3.
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and legislative branches took action to bring immigration
detention in the United States into line with international
human rights norms. However, the trends suggest that such
action is not forthcoming. For example, in announcing
detention conditions reforms in 2009, the lead governmental
official on immigration detention made clear that the
announced changes would not extend to the process for
imposing detention or the scale of detention.15 The US
Congress has also refused to allow any reconsideration of the
parameters and extent of immigration detention it mandates
and funds each year.''5 In fact, Congress has recently considered
legislation that would expand detention and further weaken
existing limits.A Barring action by the political branches, US
courts should utilize international human rights standards as
they engage in statutory and constitutional interpretation in
cases regarding immigration detention in order to achieve
compliance with international norms.
A. US Obligations Under International Human Rights Law
It is appropriate for the US courts to apply international
human rights law standards in interpreting statutes and
constitutional guarantees to ensure that the United States does
not fail to uphold international obligations that it has
assumed.15 Regardless of their direct domestic effect, the
152. Morton Press Conference on Detention Reform, supra note 18 ("This is not
about whether or not we're going to detain people.... This is about how we detain
them"). In another example of executive resistance to reform of the detention scheme,
DIS and the Department of justice have both denied petitions for rulemaking that
would expand access to individualized review of detention of asylum seekers by the
immigration courts. See Letter from U.S. Dcp't of Justice, Exec. Office for Immigration
Rev., Office of the Gen. Counsel to Mary Meg McCarthy (Mar. 19, 2012) [hereinafter
Denial of Petition for Rulemaking] (on file with the author).
153. 2013 SENATE REPORT ON APPROPRIATIONS. supra note 65, at 52 (explaining
that the lull mark-up of appropriations legislation for fiscal year 2013 provides greater
funding than requested by DHS to ensure that the number of detcntion beds remains
at 2010 and 2011 levels): HOUSE 2013 APPROPRIATIONS BILL FOR DHS, supra notc 65, at
13 (insisting that ICE maintain 34,000 detention beds to keep detention at the same
level funded in 2012).
154. H. COMM. ON THE JLDICIARY, KEEP OUR COMMUNITIES SAFE ACT OF 2011,
H.R. REP. No. 112-255 (2011) (voting out of full committee legislation that would
expand mandatory detention and further limit judicial review of detention decisions).
155. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804)
(holding that satutes must be construed so as not to conflict with international law).
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United States is bound by the treaties that underlie the
international human rights standards relating to immigration
detention and thus has an international obligation to comply
with those standards.'15
The United States became bound by the Refugee
Convention through accession in 1968 to the Refugee
Protoco. 15  The United States has recognized its legal
obligations under the Refugee Convention and has adopted
legislation to codify the Convention in US law in order to ensure
compliance with its terms. 15
The ICCPR also creates legal obligations for the United
States, as a treaty duly ratified by the United States in 1992.159
The United States did not limit its legal obligations under the
ICCPR in the context of immigration detention by entering any
relevant reservations, understandings or declarations to the
relevant provisions, in articles 9 and 14 of the ICCPR, relating to
the right to liberty and due process.1so While the United States
Senate declared the ICCPR non-self-executing at the time of
ratification,161 that fact does not dilute the international
obligations imposed.'@6 While direct domestic judicial
enforcement of the ICCPR may not be possible without
domestic implementing legislation, the international legal
156. See LOUts HENKIN ET AL., HUMIAN RIGHTS 211, 937 (2d ed. 2009) (noting that
human rights treatics create kgal obligations for states).
157. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31. 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223.
606 U.N.T.S. 267; see also I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987).
158. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436-37.
159. I((PR, supra note 72: see HLNKIN LT AL., HUMLAN RIGHTS, supra note 136, at
211, 937.
160. See 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (ICCPR).
161. Id. §11.
162. 1 otis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATFS CONSTITUTION
(2d ed. 1996) (noting that, "[w]hether a treaty is self-executing or not, it is lgally
binding on the United States" and must be a rule for the courts as necessary to carry
out treaty obligations); Sarah Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L
L. 1, 118 (2006) (" [T]he fact that a treaty is not self-executing does not qualify the
United States' international obligations under the treaty."); Carlos Manuel Vazquez,
The FourDoctrines ofSelfExecuting Treaties, 89 A.J.I.L. 695, 706, 719 (1995) (noting that a
"treaty would be violated" where the United States fails to implement it, regardless of a
determination that it is not self-executing and furither commenting that treaties
"impose primary obligations on ... government olicials"). Cf. Medellin v. Texas, 552
U.S. 491, 504 (2008) (holding that treaties are binding as an international issue but
"not all international law obligations automnatically constitute binding federal law
enforceable in United States courts").
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obligation to comply with the treaty remains binding on the
United States.,"
Through its membership in the OAS and ratification of the
legally binding OAS Charter, the United States accepted
binding obligations to protect the human rights set forth in the
American Declaration.164 While the United States questions the
exact nature of its obligations, which are well-established as a
matter of international law, the government acknowledges that
the American Declaration does serve as a source of obligation.'6
The US government has accepted the applicability of the
American Declaration as a source for reviewing its actions in
matters brought before the bodies of the inter-American human
rights system. 166 The United States has also explicitly undertaken
163. See supra notes 156, 162 and accompanying text. Some scholars argue that a
treaty continues to have domestic lkgal effect, and possibly judicial enforceability, even
if it is declared to be non-self-executing. See William M. Carter, Jr., Treaties as Law and
the Rule ofLaw: TheJudicial Power to Compel Donestic Treaty Implementation, 69 MD. L. REV.
344, 383-84 (2010) (asserting that a non-self-executing declaration should not be read
to deprive a treaty of domestic legal effect); Vazquez supra note 162, at 706-07
(arguing that validity of non-self-executing declarations as an automatic bar to court
enforcement of treaties is problematic under US and international law).
164. The United States ratified the OAS Charter on June 15, 1951. and the
agreement entered into force on December 13, 1951. See OAS Charter (as amended
through 1993), Apr. 30, 1948. 2 U.S.T. 2394. 119 U.N.T.S. 3. The OAS Charter
identifies the protection of "fundamental rights of the individual" as a central principle
agreed upon by the "American States." Id. art. 3(1). The nature of the human rights
obligation accepted by the member statcs of the OAS is further developed in the
Statute of the Intcr-AImcrican Commission on Human Rights approved by the General
Assembly of the OAS. See O.A.S. Res. 447, 9th Sess., Vol. I at 88 O.A.S. 01f. Rec.
OEA/Scr.P/IX.0.2/80 (Oct. 1979) [hereinafter IACHR Statutc]. The Statutc dcfines
human rights as including the rights set forth in the American Dcclaration. See id. art.
1(2). Thus, for purposes of the obligations of the United States under the Charter,
human rights are those protected in the American Declaration. See, e.g., IACHR
RLPORT ON DETENTION, supra note 83, 1[ 30: IACHR, Workman v. nited States, Case
12.261, Report No. 33/06, at 70 (2006); IACHR, Roach & Pinkerton v nited States, Case
9647, Report No. 3/87, OEA/Sery.L./V/11.71. at 48-49 (1987); see also I/A Ct. H.R.,
Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, Interprctation of the American Dcclaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on
Human Rights, at 42-47 (July 14, 1989) (establishing that the member states of the
OAS are bound by the Declaration as a lkgal mattcr); Douglas Cassel, Inter-American
Human Rights Law, Soft and Hard, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF
NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 393, 396-97 (Dinah
Shelton cd., 2000) (noting that the American Declaration became "hard" law, which is
legally binding, by incorporation through the OAS Charter).
165. U.S. Submission to the IACHR, supra note 46, at 3.
166. See, e.g., IACHR, Workman. Case 12.261, supra note 164, at 63 (Setting forth
the United States' argument that the petition should be rejected "on the basis that it
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a "political commitment to uphold the American Convention"
and has agreed that violations of the American Declaration
constitute a failure to fulfill that obligation. 167
The rights to due process and liberty set forth in these
binding instruments form the basis for the human rights
standards governing immigration detention described above,
while further interpretation by human rights bodies converted
the general terms of those rights into more specific principles
and requirements for states to follow. The expert bodies issuing
these interpretations were created for just the purpose of
interpreting and enforcing those human rights instruments.)"
Their interpretations thus constitute persuasive authority
fails to state a violation of the American Declaration"); IACHR, Roach &Pinkerton, Case
9647, supra note 164, at 38 (setting forth the United States' argument that the Inter-
American Commission should look to the American Declaration for the "relevant
standards" in analyzing the claim against the United States); see also HENKIN ET AL.,
supra note 156, at 620 (noting the United States has somewhat "contradictory
positions" regarding the binding nature of the American Declaration).
167. US Submission to the IACHR, supra note 46, at 3.
168. See Refugee Convention, supra note 92. art. 35 (giving the UNHCR the "duty
of supervising the application" of the Refugee Convention); see also I.N.S. v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (1987) (noting that the UNHCR guidelines provide
"significant guidance" in "giving content" to U.S. obligations under the Refugee
Convention); ICCPR, supra note 72, arts. 28, 40, 41 (charging the UN Human Rights
Committee with treaty interpretation and case adjudication tasks); Lawrence R. Helfer
& Ainc-Maric Slaughter. Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjud cation 107
YALE L.J. 273, 338-44 (1997) (noting the role of the Human Rights Committee in
"supeivising states parties' compliance with the I(PR"); OAS Charter, supra note 164,
arts. 53(c), 106. 145 (charging the Inter-Amcrican Commission with promoting and
monitoring "the observance and protection of human rights"); IACHR Statute, supra
note 164, art. 1(2) (identifying th Inteir-Ameirican Commission as the organ of the
OAS responsible for human rights issues); American Convention, supra note 72, arts.
52-60, 62, 64 (establishing the Inter-American Court and charging it wvith
mnterpretation of the human rights norms applicable to mcmbers of the OAS); 1/A CA.
H.R., Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, supra note 164. 11 44, 47 (affirming authority of the
Inter-American Court to interpret the American Declaration, together with the
American Convention as part of the same evolving body of intcr-Ame rican human
rights law applicable to member states of the OAS); U.N. Commission on Human
Rights Resolution 1999/44, 11 2-3, 7 (requiring the appointment of a Special
Rapportcur on the Human Rights of Migrants with recognized international standing
and experience and charging the rapporteur to monitor and interpret the human
rights obligations of States under the ICCPR); U.N. Commission on Human Rights
Resolution 1991/42, ch. 1, sec. A. 1 11 (charging that the meibers of the Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention serve as independent experts and apply the 1((PR and
other binding international instruments).
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regarding the international obligations assumed by the United
States in connection with the underlying instruments.' 
B. Similarities Between the International Human Rights Standards
and US Constitutional Standards on Civil Detention
Furthermore, upon consideration, the international human
rights law standards for evaluating immigration detention do
not differ greatly from standards applied by the Supreme Court
of the United States to civil detention in contexts other than
immigration, such as criminal pre-trial detention or
commitment of those deemed mentally ill. The Supreme Court
has interpreted the liberty and due process rights enshrined in
the US Constitution1 71 to impose requirements on civil
detention that are very similar to the international human rights
standards described above.' 7 1
The caselaw of the US Supreme Court, particularly the
Demore v. Kim decision, suggests that the same limitations on
civil detention do not always apply in the immigration context.172
As will be discussed below, the Demore decision is a problematic
outlier in light of other case law and theoretical understandings
of the current state of immigration law.' As such, international
human rights law standards can play an important role in
reinterpreting Demore and US law to ensure that immigration
detention is delimited in line with international human rights
law and generally applicable US civil detention standards. The
point of the discussion here, however, is to show that limitations
on civil detention outside of the immigration detention context
169. See Dinah Shelton, Comm.entar and Conclusions, in COMMITMENT AND
COMPLIANCL: THE ROLL OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM
451-52, 461-62 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) (noting that non-binding human rights
statements by jurisdictional bodies and specially appointed rapporteurs and working
groups apply legally binding obligations to specifc human rights situations and express
broad international consensus).
170. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."); U.S. CONST. anend. XIV (" [N]or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
171. See Cole, In Aid ofRemoval, supra note 20 (noting similarities between human
rights law and US constitutional law and urging application of constitutional limits on
civil detention to immigration detention).
172. 538 U.S. 510, 521-24 (2003); see alo Carlson v. Landon, 324 U.S. 524 (1952).
173. See infra notes 207-22, 348-56 and accompanying text.
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are carefully delineated in a manner that closely parallels
international human rights law standards.
Thus, in the leading case on civil detention, United States v.
Salerno, the US Supreme Court held that detention without trial
or before trial is permissible but only in limited circumstances.'7 4
Salerno arose in the criminal justice context and involved a
federal statute that permitted courts to refuse bond to
individuals charged with certain crimes.17 The Supreme Court
held that pre-trial detention in criminal cases is sometimes
constitutionally acceptable and noted that preventive or civil
detention is appropriate in certain other contexts, such as the
commitment of mentally unstable individuals.17 6 However, in
line with the general principles of the international human
rights standards on immigration detention that impose a
presumption against detention, the Supreme Court further held
that "liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without
trial is the carefully limited exception."' 77
Also in line with the general international principles, the
Supreme Court held that a civil restriction on liberty must be
non-punitive. 78 Additional Supreme Court decisions have
reached similar conclusions regarding the general principles
that civil detention must be non-punitive and exceptional.'7 9
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence on civil detention also
parallels international law in requiring a legitimate
governmental goal for detention as well as a showing of necessity
and proportionality in the use of detention to meet that goal.8 0
As with the international standards on immigration detention,
legitimate governmental goals are circumscribed. The
permissible goals generally involve preventing danger to the
174. 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987).
175. Id. at 739.
176. Id. at 748-49.
177. Id. at 755.
178. Id. at 746-47.
179. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346. 356-57. 363-64 (1997) (finding civil
commitment constitutionally permissible in "narrow circumstances" if no "punitive"
objective or intent shown); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979)
(finding that state power in civil conmitlent cases is not exercised in a "punitive
sense").
180. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748-50 (1987) (describing "particularized," "legitimate
and compelling" governmental ifteresL justifying pre-trial detention and noting that
there must be no alternatives to detention available).
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community or avoiding the risk of flight to ensure proper
administration of justice.181 The Supreme Court requires that
these goals underlie the statutory scheme allowing for civil
detention in a particular context (e.g. pre-trial detention in
criminal cases, mental health commitment), but also that these
goals justify particular detention decisions. In Salerno, for
example, the Supreme Court found the pre-trial detention
statute constitutional because it required the government to
establish that detention was actually necessary in each case to
ensure the safety of the community.' 1' Furthermore, the statute
required a showing that no other mechanism, such as conditions
of release, could ensure community safety., 4
US law also matches the requirement imposed in the
human rights law standards that the government must bear the
burden of proving the necessity of detention on an
individualized basis. In upholding the pre-trial detention statute
in Salerno, the Supreme Court emphasized that pretrial
detention decisions must be made on an individualized basis
and that the government bears the burden of proving the need
for detention "by clear and convincing evidence."1 85 Similarly,
the Supreme Court recently emphasized the government's
burden of demonstrating individualized reasons for detention in
approving use of a federal material witness statute to detain.' 86
The Supreme Court has similarly required that the government
justify civil commitment of persons with mental illness on an
individualized basis.18 7
181. Id., at 748-49; see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2079, 2085 (2011)
(allowing for detention of material witnesses); Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-26 (noting
the "kgitimate interest" in protecting citizens unable to care for themsielves and in
protecting "the community from the 'dangerous tendencies' of some who are mentally
ill"); Cole, In Aid oj Removal, supra note 20, at 1006-10 (highlighting these two
principle justifications for civil detention derived from US case law-flight risk or
danger to the community). Of course, the central governmental objective in the
immigration context-securing deportation-is not named in other contexts.
182. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747; Addington, 441 U.S. at 426-27.
183. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750.
184. Id.; see also al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079 (noting approvingly that the material
witness statute requires release if other alternatives exist for securing testimony).
185. Salern, 481 U.S. at 750-51.
186. alKidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2082.
187. Addington, 441 U.S. at 427 (holding that the government must meet its
burden with "proof more Substantial than a mere preponderance of the evidence"); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (allowing for civil commitment of a "sexually dangerous"
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The limitations on the length of detention imposed by US
law mirror the international standards as well. In Salerno, the
Supreme Court relied on the strict time limits imposed in the
statute to find pre-trial detention constitutional.'8
Finally, consonant with international human rights law, US
law requires a judicial imprimatur on civil detention decisions.
The Supreme Court found the statute at issue in Salerno
constitutional in significant part because it offered a meaningful
judicial hearing with procedural safeguards on the detention
decision. 189
Because international human rights standards relating to
immigration detention do not differ greatly from US law on civil
detention in other areas, invocation of international law would
not alter US law principles relating to liberty and due process.
Rather, use of the international standards would allow for the
application of liberty and due process rights to immigration
detention in a way that would reinforce the important content
given to these rights both in the United States and
internationally.
C. The Use of the International Human Rights Standards to Interpret
US Law
International human rights law standards should therefore
be used in the United States to ensure adequate protection of
the right to liberty and due process in the immigration
detention context. This Article urges a moderate route by which
the courts would use the international standards to inform their
interpretations of the US Constitution and the relevant US
statutes regulating immigration detention. This proposal
acknowledges that not all of the international human rights
standards are fully binding and judicially enforceable as a matter
person where dangerousness is established by "clear and convincing" evidence at an
individualized hearing).
188. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747; see also Addington, 441 U.S. at 428, n.4 (noting
approvingly that involuntary cominitient is imposed only for the time necessary until
there is no longer a danger); al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2079 (noting approvingly that the
material witness statute requires pretrial release if continued detention is not
necessary).
189. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 742-43 (also noting the possibility for expedited
appellate review).
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of US law, even where they do constitute international
obligations. 190 However, as noted above, the potential problems
with direct applicability, under US law, do not affect the
international obligations of the United States in connection with
the human rights standards set out in Part I.I.9 As such, the
proposal maintains that it is feasible and desirable for courts to
interpret US law in a manner that allows compliance with those
obligations.19' This approach responds to the suggestion by
scholars that US courts are most likely to use international law,
and are on the most stable ground in doing so, when
international law informs their interpretations of statutes and
the Constitution rather than serving as a direct source of US
law. 9
The proposal finds specific support in the work of
international law scholars who have suggested that US courts
should reference international law in circumstances such as
those presented in the immigration detention context, where
190. As noted above, for example, some treaty provisions have been explicitly
decied non-self-executing, which may preclude a direct judicial cause of action. See
Supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 735 (2004) (holding that the ICCPR is "not self-executing and [does] not itself
create obligations enforceable in the federal courts"). The United States has
questioned the enforceable effect of other international instruments. See, e.g:, Flores-
Nova v. Att'y Gen. of United States, 652 F.3d 488, 495 (3d Cir. 2011) ("[NI]either the
unratified American Convention nor the American Declaration is itsclf enforceable
domestically"); Denial of Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 152, at 8 (asserting that
relevant international human rights authorities "do not create any legally enforceable
rights"). In addition, the direct applicability within US law of some obligations may be
called into question where particular detention statutes have been adopted after the
US became bound to the relevant international norms. See Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S.
580, 597-98 (1884) (noting a later-iin-time statute prevails over earlier treaty
provisions); Vazquez, supra note 162, at 696-97.
191. See supra notes 156, 161-63 and accompanying text; Vienna Convention on
the Law of Trcatics, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (requiring that states perforim
their international obligations under the treaty in good faith regardless of domestic
law).
192. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
193. David Cole, The Idea of Hu)anity: Human Rights and Im.igrants' Rights, 37
COLLim. HLim. RTs. L. R'v. 627, 645-49 (2006) [hereinafter Cole, The Idea ofHumanity,];
Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monisn: The Judicial Tend Toward Interprt ive Incorporation of
Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. RLv. 628, 700-05 (2007); see also Harold Koh,
International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 56 (2004); Gerald L.
Neuman, The Uses oflnteratoal Law in Co nstitt ional Intpretation, 98 AM. j. INT'L L.
82, 88 (2004) (noting that intrinational human rights norins and decisions "cannot
control colst1i tLuional interpretation, but they may inforin it" and may prove helpful in
requiring reexamination of long-standing doctrinal structures).
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international human rights standards bind the United States
and do not run counter to basic principles of US law.194 The use
of international human rights standards relating to immigration
detention fits particularly well with the framework proposed by
Sarah Cleveland, which outlines principles for the application of
international law in constitutional interpretation.1 9 Two central
criteria identified by Cleveland for the use of international law
in US courts inquire about: 1. the level of US acceptance of the
international law norms; and 2. the degree of receptivity in the
US Constitution to the norms. 9
The principle giving weight to the degree of US acceptance
of the international rule argues in favor of the applicability of
the international standards here.19 As discussed above, the
human rights standards constitute "'US international law
obligations"' which are "'binding on the United States."'" 8
The constitutional receptiveness principle is met as well,
because the international standards do not "depart from the
established constitutional rule."'" Rather they match the
"historical interpretation" given to the rights of liberty and due
process found in the US constitution.2oo US courts have even
194. See Cleveland, supra note 162, at 107-08 (suggesting four criteria for
evaluating the appropriateness of reference to international law in constitutional
intcrpretation); Waters, supra note 193. at 701 (urging consideration of the domestic
"value" of a treaty, including a review of the ratification history and any reservations to
treaty provisions); Neuman, supra note 193, at 87 (favoring use of international human
rights law in constitutional interpretation where the "normative foundations [of
human rights law] are compatible with the basic assumptions of the U.S. constitutional
system").
195. See Clceland, supra note 162, at 107-08.
196. I emphasize these two criteria as they are the most relevant in analyzing the
suitability of using international human rights standards on immigration detention to
interpret US law. Use of the international standards would be appropriate under the
other two criteria oftered by Cleveland as wvell, however. The criteria of "norm
universality" argues in favor of application of international law, because the
international instruments in qucstion are widely ratified and the norms of liberty and
due process are universally recognized. There is also a great degree of consistency
between the universal interpretation of these rights and the interprctation of the
regional system for the Americas. See id. at 119-22. The consideration of "international
law limits" on international law powers also supports use of international human rights
standards, because those standards include recognition of government power over
immigration as well as limits on that power. See id. at 122-23.
197. Id. at 115.
198. Id. at 115-16.
199. Id. at 109.
200. Id.
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acknowledged the benefits of interpreting US law in light of the
applicable international norms on immigration 01
Of course, the US standards on civil detention that match
the international rules are not currently applied with full force
to immigration detention.2: It is for this reason that
international human rights law standards fill a lacuna by placing
limitations on the detention of migrants in accordance with the
rights of liberty and due process.2os Even more, the immigration
exceptionalism that leads to the inapplicability of constitutional
constraints on civil detention in the immigration context is
highly problematic as a matter of both US and international law.
This exceptionalism should not serve as an impediment to
constitutional receptiveness of international human rights law
standards that apply liberty and due process rights to
immigration detention.
The US Supreme Court's decision in Demore v. Kim, issued
in 2003, countenanced a distinction between immigration
detention and other civil detention. 0 4 The Supreme Court
upheld a statute that allowed for mandatory detention of entire
categories of migrants with criminal histories without reference
to the constitutional limits applied in other contexts.2on The
Court explicitly stated as justification that, "Congress may make
rules as to aliens that would be unacceptable if applied to
citizens."2116
It is difficult to see the basis for the Demore decision in
specific constitutional precedent.:o? In fact, the decision diverges
201. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987); see also Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 721 (2001) (Kennedy.j., dissenting).
202. See Cole, In Aid ofRemoval supra note 20, at 1014: T. ALEXANDER XIEINTKOFF,
SLMBLAINCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE AND AMLRICAN
CITIZENSHIP 153 (2002); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (approving
detention of broad categories of imnigrants without reference to the constitutional
limitations on civil detention applicable in other contexts).
203. See Neuman, supra note 193, at 87 (favoring consideration of international
human rights law where gaps in US constitutional law protection exist based on
outdated doctrinal structures).
204. Demore, 538 U.S. at 531.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 522.
207. See Cole, Out of the Shadows, supra note 132, at 717 (indicating that the
reasoning in Demore was "flawed" because it distinguishes between Citizens and non-
cilizens for detention purposes); M. Isabel Medina, Demnore v. Kin-A Dance of Power
and Hanan Rights, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 697, 722 (2004) (asserting that "[n]one of the
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significantly from the Supreme Court's decision just two years
earlier in Zadvydas. 2 In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court applied
contemporary constitutional liberty understandings to the
detention of migrants in prohibiting indefinite and categorical
detention of individuals pending physical deportation after
entry of a removal order.2o1 While putting Zadvydas aside, the
Demore decision relied heavily on the 1950s case of Carlson v.
Landon 10 in justifying mandatory detention.1 1 However, even
the older Carlson decision found immigration detention without
bail constitutional only where justified by individualized
decisions regarding involvement in Communist activities that
suggested a danger to the community."'
Given the lack of support in the Court's own case law, the
Demore decision may best be understood as relying on a general
principle of exceptionalism in the immigration context based on
the aged doctrine of governmental "plenary power" over
immigration.21' However, the plenary power doctrine has fallen
into disrepute in the US legal system.214 Perhaps for this reason
the Demore decision does not directly mention the doctrine.
cases relied on by the Court" directly support the idea that migrants have a lesser
liberty interest).
208. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
209. Id. at 690-92 (citing extensively to United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739
(1987)).
210. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
211. Demore, 538 U.S. at 523-25. Denore also relied on the Court's decision in
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), and its progeny for the gencral proposition that
Congress may treat inmigrants differently than Citizens. Demore 538 U.S. at 521-22.
However, neither Aathews nor the other cases cited related to detention and the core
right to liberty from physical custody. See Aathews, 426 U.S. 67, 85-87; Demore, 538 U.S.
at 521-22.
212. Carlson. 342 U.S. at 541-44: see Demore 538 U.S. at 574 (Souter, Stevens. and
Ginsburg, Jj., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the Supreme
Court has recognized "that the detention scheme in Carlson required 'some level of
individualized determination' as a precondition to detention" and unanimously held as
such in [subsequent caselaw] ").
213. See Medina, supra note 207, at 722 (noting "oblique reference to the plenary
power doctrine" in the Demore decision). The Demore decision relics on cases that
recognize and apply the plenary power doctrine. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 522-25;
Carlson, 342 U.S. at 334: see general Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
214. See Zadvydas 533 U.S. at 695 (applying constitutional limitations to the
plenary power in the context of immigration detention); Medina, supra note 207, at
704; Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End ofPlenary Power, 16 GLO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339 339-40
(2002) (describing doctrinal "abandonment of plenary power"); ALEINIKOFF, supra
note 202, at 184 (arguing that the plenary power doctrine is "wholly out of step with
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Even more importantly, the very concept of the plenary
power doctrine relies on conceptions of maximum sovereignty
over immigration that derived from earlier versions of
international law.'1 With the development of human rights
treaties and standards, international law no longer condones an
understanding of sovereignty that grants states unlimited powers
over migrants.216 Several scholars have noted that newer
international law constraints on absolute state authority over
immigration require reconsideration of the treatment of
migrants under US law.' 7  As Cleveland notes, "if the
government's constitutional authority over aliens is based on
powers allowed under international law, then the government's
constitutional authority logically also should be limited by the
constraints that international law imposes."2 18 Some US courts
have similarly accepted the premise that evolving international
law may impose new limits on US immigration law, given its
international law underpinnings. '
modern constitutional law"); Louis Henkin, The Constitution a ,d United States
Sovereignty. 100 HARN. L. RLV. 853. 862 (1987) ("The doctrine . . . cmened in the
oppressive shadow of a racist, nativist mood a hundred years ago.").
215. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, 46 UCLA L. RFV. 1, 58-59 (1998) (observing that the
Supreme Court "derived the plenary power doctrine from its understanding of
international law rather than any specific provision of the Constitution"); Neuman,
supra note 193, at 83 (noting that Supreme Court invocation of sovereignty to justify
broad powers over immigration "addressed the international regime of [the] period");
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893) (relying on "the principles of
international law" to establish sovereign power over immigration not subject to judicial
review); see also Carson, 342 U.S. at 534, n.18 (relying on III HACKWVORTH'S DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAXW 725 (1942) in applying the plenary power doctrine).
216. See supra Part H.A.; see also Bosniak, supra note 75, at 751-53.
217. Clceland, supra note 162. at 122; see also Cole, The Idea of Humnanity, spra
note 193, at 636 (noting that "the source of the 'plenary power' of immigration has
long been identified as international law itself" and "thc evolution of international
human rights has placed significant restrictions on sovereignty"); Michael Scaparilanda,
Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 965, 1015 ("[W]here the
international law of sovereignty provides the background norn for constitutional
decision making as it does in [immigration] cases. the Court ought to look at the
current norm with its recent limitations.").
218. Clceland, supra note 162. at 122.
219. See Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1982)
("[W]c note that in upholding the plenary power of Congress over exclusion and
deportation of aliens, the Supreme Court has sought support in international law
principles.... It seems proper then to consider international law principles for notions
of fairness as to propriety of holding aliens in detention."); Beharry v. Reno, 183 F.
Supp. 2d 584 (2002), rev'd on other grounds, 329 F.3d 51, 2003 (2d Cir. 2003) ("It is
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This analysis requiring consideration of international
human rights norms in the immigration context, even in the
face of traditional assertions of plenary power, applies with
particular force to detention. As detailed above, the evolution
since the 1990s of international human rights law standards
regarding immigration detention has been significant.22o The
international human rights standards addressing immigration
detention recognize state sovereignty over immigration but
nonetheless establish concrete protections for migrants facing
deprivation of liberty in connection with their immigration
status. Thus, international law has not only developed
limitations on state authority over immigration in a general
sense but now imposes specific restrictions on a state's
invocation of sovereignty to detain migrants.22 2 In doing so,
human rights law requires full liberty and due process
protections for migrants facing detention, foreclosing any
possibility of invoking international law to afford lesser versions
of these rights to migrants. The current version of international
law must hold sway in determining the contours of US
sovereignty over immigration detention.
It would be circular to accept that the United States might
avoid the application of international human rights standards in
the immigration detention context on the grounds that US law
withholds rights from migrants in reliance on an outdated
notion of international law. In the end, the United States
interprets the rights to liberty and due process in line with
international human rights law regardless of the questionable
distinctions that currently prevent full application of those rights
to immigration detention. US courts should thus reference
international human rights law to guarantee to migrants facing
inappropriate to sustain . . . plenary power based on a 1920 understanding of
international law, when the [current] conception is radically different.").
220. See supra Part H.A.
221. See s1pra Part II.B.
222. Cf Jean v. Nelson. 727 F.2d 957, 964 n.4 (11th (ir. 1984) (considering
almost thirty years ago the possibility that human rights law limited US sovereignty in
connection with immigration detention but 1inding no evidence at that time that
"international practice" had changed the "background" of international law
suliciently to require reconsideration of expansive sovereignty over detention of
migrants).
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detention the same liberty and due process rights that it applies
to others facing civil detention.
IV. INCOMPATIBILITIES BE TWEEN THE IMJGRA TION
DE TENTION REGIME IA THE UNITED S TA TES AND THE
INTER4TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS
Having established the relevance and role of the
international human rights standards, it is now necessary to
measure the US immigration detention system against those
standards. Detention in the United States takes place pursuant
to pre-established law and so meets that basic requirement of
international human rights law. Unfortunately, the overall
detention system in the United States, as well as specific
components of that system, conflict with multiple other
international standards. The system thus fails to adequately
protect liberty and due process. This Part will first address
systemic violations created by the approach of the US detention
system as a whole. It will then consider the main categories of
detentions that deprive migrants of liberty pending a decision
in their immigration cases by the US immigration courts: 1.
detention of individuals in limited or abbreviated proceedings
known as expedited removal and reinstatement of removal; 2.
detention of "arriving aliens" who are placed into immigration
proceedings upon arrival at a port of entry into the United
States; 3. mandatory detention of individuals suspected of
223. I attempt to provide a general sense of the scope of detention in each of these
categories. However. ICE does not provide a breakdown showing the numbers of
individuals held in different detention categories. See DHS Immigration Enforcement
Actions 2011, supra note 13. This lack of transparency is difficult to understand,
because the disaggregated numbers would be relatively easy for ICE to provide. For
example, ICE records information idcntifying individuals subject to mandatory
detention and those deemed "arriving aliens" on the custody determination and
charging document forms issued in almost all cases. See generally Memorandum from
Asa Hutchinson, Under Sec'y for U.S. Border and Transportation, on Detention
Prioritization and Notice to Appear Documentary Requirements to Michael J. Garcia,
Assistant Sec'y for U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, and Robert Bonner,
Comi'r of U.S. Custons & Border Prot. (Oct. 18. 2004). Complicating the analysis
further, the figures for each category overlap wvith other categories. Thus, an individual
may move from detcntion under expedited removal to dctention as an arriving alien or
discretionarv detention. Similarly, individuals may be subject to mandatory detention
both as arriving aliens and under criminal mandatory detention provisions. The
numbers and percentages offered in this Article represent estimates based on the
limited data that is available.
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criminal activity or involvement in terrorism; and 4.
discretionary detention of all other individuals undergoing
immigration proceedings.92 4
A. The Overall Detention Regime
The detention regime of the United States does not comply
with the general human rights principles treating detention as a
last resort.225 The statistics regarding the sheer number of
individuals subjected to immigration detention and the lengthy
duration of detention demonstrate a systemic emphasis on
detention in the immigration context without meaningful
constraint.2b In its careful investigation into immigration
detention in the United States, the Inter-American Commission
specifically concluded that the United States utilizes "detention
based on a presumption of its necessity."2)7 As outlined below,
224. I examine only the most prevalent components of the complicated and
intertwined detention system. For example I do not examine the specific rules for the
detention of stowaways. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.11 (2012). I do not analyze detention
resulting fron the placement by DHS of immigration "dctaincrs" on individuals
physically detained by other federal, state and local law enforcement agencies.
Detainers form an increasingly important role in the immigration detention process,
particularly with the expansion of the Secure Communities progriam, which
automatically alerts ICE to individuals in law enforcement custody elsewhere, Icading to
the issuance of many more detainers. See KATE M. MAN EL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.
R42690, IMMIGRATION DETAINERS: LEGAL ISSUES 3 (2012), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42690.pdf. ICE frequently retrieves and
detains individuals placed on such detainers, and many individuals in immigration
detention arrived there as a result of the detainer process. However, the detainers do
not themselves necessarily constitute a category of immnigration detention. It is not even
clear whether ICE has custody of individuals who are still held by other law
enforcement authoritics through imposition of a detainer. Id. at 14-17. Noncthelcss,
questions do arise about the impact of detainers on liberty and due process, which are
being addressed elsewhere. Id. at 17-25; see generally Christopher N. Lasch, EF'orcing the
Limits of the Executive's Authority to Issue humigration Detainers, 35 WM. MITCHEII L. REV.
164 (2008).
225. See Special Rapporteur Report on Mission to US, supra note 81, at 112
(finding that "overuse of immigration detention in the United States" violates
international law); IACHR RLPORT ON DLTENTION, supra note 83, 11 17. 102. 354, 416
(concluding that US immigration detention is the rule rather than the exception, in
violation of human rights requirements).
226. See supra Part I: see also Kalhan, supra note 25, at 48 ("[E]xisting policies and
practices almost certainly have caused overdetention: detention of individuals who pose
no actual flight risk or danger to public safety or are held under overly restrictive
circulsLtances. ").
227. IACH R REPORT ON DETENTION, supra note 83, 117.
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the various components of the immigration detention system
operate to create an overall structure that assumes migrants
apprehended by ICE will be detained for all or lengthy portions
of proceedings to determine their status, without serious
consideration of the need for such detention or adequate access
to judicial review2 The result is a system in which the
government spends approximately US$2 billion a year on
detention, 29 without clarity as to who is detained on what basis,
while impacted migrants pay the human cost of this severe
deprivation of liberty.
Given the extent to which the US immigration detention
system as a whole is out of line with international human rights
standards, significant realignment is necessary to guarantee the
presumption against detention and adequate protection of
liberty. Limits must be imposed on the various components of
immigration detention, as described in the following sections,
228. See infra Part IV.B-F- Habeas corpus is potentially available to challenge
detention in the various categories described below. However, availability of habeas
does not satisfy the requirement for judicial authorization and review. as it is an
exceptional remedy available only at the instigation of the detainee. Additionally, the
case law strictly limits the availability of habeas relief as a mcans of protecting liberty.
See generally, e.g., Diop v. ICE. 656 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (granting habeas relief and
requiring individualized hearing before the immigration court, but only after nineteen
month period of detention,); Nadarajah v. Gonzakes, 443 F.3d 1069, 1082 (3d Cir.
2006) (limiting habeas review of detention on the grounds that govcrnment "discretion
in making a [custody] decision is quite broad"); Noh v. INS, 248 F.3d 938, 942 (9th Cir.
2001) (holding that certain custody determinatios are "unrevicwabic" in habeas); see
generally Crcspo v. Baker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47909 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 3 2012)
(requiring individualized hearing where there was a prolonged detention of 15 months
but denying habeas relief for other challenges to automatic detention). This Artile
assumes, on the other hand, that immigration courLt review would mect the
requirement of authorization and review of custody by a tribunal. However, as
described in Parts IV.C and IV.D, immigration court review often is not available. See
infra Parts IV.(-D Also. as set out in Part IV.E, a number of limitations currently make
the immigration court custody review process inadequate to meet international human
rights law obligations even where it does apply. See infra Part IV.E. These limitations
nust be resolved for immigration court review to satisfy the international human rights
law requirement of judicial review of detention.
229. The currlnt average Cost of detention per day is US$122, requiring an
annual budget of approximately USS2 billion. See DHS CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
J STIFICATION, supra note 39; see also NAT'L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 67, at 2
(noting that ICE has confirmed an actual daily cost of USS164 per bed, including
overhead, and summarizing legislative action to authorize approximnately USS2 billion
for immigration detention for 2013).
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using the international human rights standards to interpret US
statutory and constitutional law.
However, scaling back immigration detention to bring the
system in line with international standards does not mean that
the United States cannot exercise control over immigration. o
The United States might most effectively assert control over
immigration by recreating the entire system to legalize logical
immigration flows, thus making harsh enforcement of outdated
laws, including through detention, much less necessary.231 In any
case, the United States may continue to engage in immigration
enforcement, so long as it does so with respect for human rights
and without resorting to detention automatically.
For example, nothing in the international human rights
standards prevents the initial apprehension of migrants believed
to be removable from the United States.232 Currently, many
removals each year take place shortly after such an arrest
through abbreviated proceedings or decisions to return
voluntarily without a formal deportation order." The United
States could continue to remove individuals in this way as a
function of immigration control, and the arrests would be
justified as necessary to facilitate immediate deportation so long
230. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
231. See AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYLRS Ass'N, SOLUTIONS THAT WORK: A POLICY
MANUAL FOR IMMIGRATION REFORM aenny 1. Levy ed., 2010); Compehensive
lmmigration Reform in 2009; Can We Do It and How?: Heaing Before the Subconmm. on
Immigration, Refugees and Border Sec. of the S. Comm. on thej uiciary, 111th Cong. 9-10
(2009) (statement of Doris Meissner, Migration Policy Institute); Stuart Anderson,
Answering the Critics of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, Cato Institute Trade Briefing
Paper, no. 32, May 9, 2011.
232. The distinction between apprehension and detention is recognized in
inimgrailon law and in other detention scheines. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (2012) (noting
that arrest must be followed in forty eight hours by decision whether to continue in
custody); DHS Immigration Enforcement Actions 2011, supra note 13, at I
(distinguishing between apprehension and detention); Cnty. of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (requiring a hearing regarding detention within
forty eight hours after arrest in the criminal context); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,
534 (2004) (requiring additional procedures after initial seizure when the decision is
made to continue to hold).
233. See supra notes 42, 52 and accompanying text; see also ICE Bypassing
Immigration Courts? Deportations Rise as Deportation Orders Fall, TRANSACTIONAL RLCORDS
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Aug. 13, 2012), hIIp://tLrac.syr.e du/immigration/reports/
291.
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as due process and other human rights were protected. 23 As an
alternative means of enforcement, the United States could also
focus its resources on accomplishing the removal of non-
detained individuals who have alreadv received a final order of
deportation rather than on detaining them pending a final
decision on deportability and immigration status. The
government has largely ignored such a strategy, but it could be
effective."
The United States has instead become reliant on detention
as its principal means of immigration enforcement, and the
conflation of detention and immigration control has led to the
current presumption of detention that violates international
human rights standards. 236 US immigration law and practice
must disentangle detention and enforcement and restore the
use of detention to its proper limited role.
234. For example, due process protections must apply to ensure that individuals
with claims to asylum or othier relief were not removed summarily without the
opportunity to present those claims.
235. See U.S. DLP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICL'S RLMOVIAL OF ALIENS ISSUED FINAL
ORDERS (2003) (recommending measures to improve rate of removal for non-detained
individuals with final orders of removal, including improvements in controlling
database information on addresses, negotiating with governments who do not readily
accept returned deportees, and more promptly and effectively serving surrender
notices to individuals scheduled for deportation); Fact Sheet: ICE Fugitive Operations
Program, U.S. 1MMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Nov. 7, 2011),
http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/fugops.htm (reporting that dedication of
increased resources allowed for a substantial reduction of the number of individuals in
the United States with outstanding deportation orders): EILEEN SULLIVAN LT AL.. VERA
INSTITU TE, TESTING COMMUNITY SUPERVISION FOR THE INS: AN EVTALUATION OF THE
APPEARANCE AsSISTANCE PROGRAM (Aug. 1, 2000) (recommending that individuals
with final deportation orders be subjected to the "most intensive levels" of non-
custodial alternatives to detention to ensure departure); see also BACK TO BASICS, supra
note 20, at 70 (describing supervision programs for individuals ordered deported in
Belgium and Australia, which led to high rates of returns).
236. See, e.g., 2013 SENATE REPORT ON APPROPRIATIONS, supra note 65, at 52
(stating that detention is "critical to ensuring the integrity of our entire immigration
enforcement system"); Special Rapportcur Report on the Mission to the U.S., supra
note 81, 1 33 ("Detention has not always been the primary enforcement strategy relied
upon by the United States immigration authorities, as it appears to be today.");
NATIONAL NETWORK FOR IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE RIGHTS, REPORT TO THE U.N.
SPECIAL RAPPORTLLR ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS: DETENTION OF MIGRANTS
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1 31 (2012), available at http://www nnirr.org/~nnirrorg/
dIrupal/sites/default/files/unsr-migrants_ january2012 us detention overview.pdf
(noting that the US immigration detention system has become the "cornerstone of
immigration enforcement").
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DETENTION
As noted, the government need not rely on expansive
detention to enforce immigration laws."' Conversely,
presumptive use of detention does not necessarily further
enforcement goals. The US immigration system foresees the
possibility that, after an initial arrest, some migrants will
undergo contested immigration proceedings where they may
assert challenges to the government's allegations of deportability
or otherwise seek authorization to remain in the United
States.23 8 The opportunities to raise claims to avoid deportation
reflect the rights due to migrants and policy decisions about
which migrants should hold lawful immigration status in the
United States.2" The detention regime must reflect this reality
that not all migrants placed in removal proceedings will merit
expulsion from this country. There can be no presumption,
then, that detention during immigration proceedings is justified
as a means of achieving deportation in enforcement of the
immigration laws.240
To comply with international human rights standards, the
detention system must instead require that the government
justify ongoing detention after arrest in connection with
immigration proceedings.241 The government must do so based
237. See supra notes 231-35 and accompanying text.
238. As noted above, such cases currently involve somewhere above 125,000
detained migrants a year. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying tcxt.
239. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. 1229a (2006) (granting migrants due process rights to
defend against the government's allegations of deportability); 8 U.S.C. I 158 (2006)
(providing for asylum as a means of avoiding deportation, in codification of US
obligations under the Refugee (onvcntion); 8 U.S.C. 1255 (2006) (providing
adjustment of status as a route for some migrants to avoid deportation by obtaining
lawful permanent resident status through close family members); 8 U.S.C. 1229b
(2006) (allowing for cancellation of removal and a grant of permanent status to some
migrants where close family members, who are US citizens or lawful permanent
residents, would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship as a result of
deportation).
240. Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Imiration Detention,
45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REV. 601, 602 n.9 (2010) (citing data obtained by the ACLU
indicating that, betwccn 2001 and 2009, almost 6,000 persons obtained permission to
remain in the United States after spending more than six months in detention).
241. An initial decision regarding custody after arrest must be made within forty
eight hours of arrest under the regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (2012). The
requirement of an individualized determination regarding the necessity of detention
with judicial review under international human rights law might attach at this point or
at sele point soon thcrcafter when it becomes dcear whether an individual will be
deported summarily or leave voluntarily or will instead undergo proceedings to
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on individualized determinations, with adequate review,
regarding the existence of a flight risk or danger to the
community. The government must also consider all possible
alternatives to detention that might address such risks.242
This is not to say that factors currently triggering detention
would have no relevance." Factors such as criminal history,
manner of arrival into the United States, strength of the claim to
remain in the United States, prior immigration violations and
family ties could be considered in evaluating the need for
detention to avoid flight risk or danger to the community.244 ICE
has announced that it will seek to apply these factors with
greater accuracy and consistency through deployment of a risk
classification assessment tool, which would be fully
appropriate.24 5 However, reference to these relevant factors
determine status. I will not propose a specific timcfrane for the determination, but the
requirement of a prompt determination and review suggests no longer than a wveek or
two after detention. In the United States, the statistics on kngth of stay in detention
suggest that migrants arc either removed rapidly in such a timcfraic or will instead
undergo proceedings to determine status, making this timeframe appropriate for a
meaningful analysis of the need to detain. See supra notes 42. 52 and accompanying
text.
242. See IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC. RUTGERS SCHOOL OF LAW-NLWARK FRLLD
BUT NOT FREE: A REPORT EXAMINING THE CURRENT USF OF ALTERNATIVES TO
DETLNTION 10 (2012) [hcreinafter FRELD BUT NOT FREE] (reporting that the
appearance rate in removal proceedings for individuals enrolled in official alternatives
to detention programs was 938%); DHS CONGRESSIONAL 1 DGET j USTIFICATION, supra
note 39, at 54 (positing how alternatives such as "elctronic monitoring and
supervision can be just as elletive . . . as traditional detention"); IMMIGRATION AND
CU STOMS ENFORCEMENT, ALTERNATIVTS TO DETENTION FOR ICE DETAINFFS (Oct. 23,
2009) (describing how alternatives to detention prograns provide "an appropriate
level of supervision during removal proceedings" for individuals with low flight risk);
see also BACK TO BASICs, supra note 20, § iv-v (laying out "best practices" that make
alternatives to detention an effective and less invasive means of addressing
governmental goals).
243. See 8 U.S.C. 1226(a)-(c) (2006); Guerra, 24 1. & N. Dec. 37, 39 (B.I.A.,
2006).
244. Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec., at 40.
245. See Detention Refrim Accomplishments, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/detention-
reform/detention-reform.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2013). To the extent that the tool
requires ICE to make individualized determinations regarding flight risk or danger to
the communit based on objective and relevant criteria, it could present a positive
development leading to relcase of individuals on bond or into formal alternatives-to-
detention programs where they would have been detained in the past. See JAILS AND
jU \IPSUITs, supra note 17, at 41, 43. However, the tool, as currently designed, may still
be weighted problematically in favor of detention. See BACK TO BASICS, supra note 20, at
81.
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might only be made on the basis of the specific nature of the
factors in a given case. It would not be permissible to place
migrants into categories presumptively requiring detention,
such as conviction of a particular crime, rather than analyzing
individual circumstances.
Under a human rights-compliant system, some individuals
would still be detained. There can be little doubt that some
migrants in the United States represent a flight risk or a danger
to the community that cannot be mitigated effectively, other
than through detention, while their proceedings are ongoing.
To be clear, though, significantly fewer migrants should be
detained under a system that reverses the presumption of
detention and requires individualized showings of need to
detain with adequate judicial review of detention decisions.246
Even government officials have recognized that the current
structure imposes restrictions on liberty in situations where it is
unnecessary, and commentators have noted the "excessiveness"
of detention in the United States 47 Migrants, such as BM and
FH, would be candidates for release if the risk of flight or
danger were to be meaningfully analyzed, since they posed no
threat, had strong ties to the United States, and presented a
reasonable likelihood of winning their immigration cases, which
gave them every reason to appear for hearings. Other migrants
might present some risk of flight or danger in this system, but
should nonetheless be released, under a system that treats
detention as a last resort, upon payment of a bond or placement
in the least restrictive supervision program that would mitigate
the risks.248
246. It is impossible to estimate the exact decrease in detention numbers that
should occur, because disaggregated information regarding the characteristics of
individuals in detention is not available. However. it is almost certain that the decrease
would be substantially greater than the 1,200 fewer beds that the Obana
administration proposed for the 2013 fiscal year. See DHS CONGRESSIONAL BtDGF T
JUSTIFICATION, supra note 39.
247. Kalhan. supra note 25, at 49 (referencing a "pattern of excessiveness"
spanning the detention process); SCHRIRO STUDY, supra note 29, at 2-3.
248. Government officials sometisni assert that the US system currently focuses
detention on only those migrants who require that ineasure. ICE officials have clained
that ninety percent of detainees fit within certain set priorities for detention based on
criminal history, repeat immigration violations or recent border crossing. See Statement
of Gary Mead, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Working Group Meeting
on Immigration Detention and Due Process in the United States (Oct. 2011) (notes on
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Overall, a system revised in accord with international
human rights standards would preserve liberty while allowing
the government to target its enforcement more effectively by
detaining only those who require such custody, and freeing up
resources to process others who do not. Unfortunately, such a
system has never been tested in the United States.2 9
The US immigration detention system has not been driven
by individual determinations regarding the need to detain but
rather by external factors not relevant either to migrants' liberty
interests or the government's goal of administering effective
immigration proceedings. Thus, the Supreme Court in Demore
indicated that procedures for individualized bail determinations
in place before 1996 had not been tested "under optimal
conditions," because release was often necessitated by "funding
and detention space considerations."2o DHS officials have also
stated that migrants were generally released due to lack of bed
space before 2005, without individual consideration of the need
for detention 51 Rather than responding to these difficulties by
establishing a more effective system based on individualized
need for detention, the United States adopted a similarly
arbitrary but more liberty-restrictive detention regime. Congress
now insists on the detention of large numbers of migrants
file wvith the author); see also DIS CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETJUSTIFICATION, supra note
39, at 54 (noting that ICE focuses detention "on those high priority individuals who
have criminal convictions or fall under other priority categorics"). These statements
conceal important distinctions between individuals in each priority category. For
examplc, ICE does not indicate how many recent border crossers are asylun seekers
with a facially viable claim to remain in the United States. Nor does ICE indicate what
type of criminal history is involved for individuals detained in that category. The
criminal histories of many currently detained are very minor and do not suggest any
serious flight risk or danger to the community. See Graphical Highlights: Most Serious
Charge Recordedfor ICE Detainees Ordered by Frequency, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS AcCESS
CLEARINGHOUSE (2012), http://trac.syr.edu /immigration /reports/274/include/
tablc4.htil (noting that traffic offenses and public order crimes were included in
numbers of criminal detainees); SCHRTRO STUDY, supra note 29, at 6 (indicating that
the imost common crimes include drug and traffic offenses). At best, by its own
admission, the government continues to detain individuals based on their status or
connection to extremely broad categories. Individualized analysis does not determine
who the government detains.
249. See Deinore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 528 (2003) (acknowledging that
individualized detention hearings have "not been tested under optimal conditions
or ... in all their possible perinutations").
250. Id. at 519. 528.
251. DRS to End Catch and Release, supra note 63, at 1.
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(specifically 34,000 a day) without regard for the need to
detain. 2 Mandatory detention without review also applies to
entire categories of migrants.M3 Financial considerations and
political currents have imposed a presumption that almost all
other individuals arrested by ICE should be detained as well for
a portion, if not all, of their proceedings.254
The Demore Court did not find it problematic that the US
government had failed to attempt the "least burdensome
means" of immigration enforcement by engaging in
individualized detention decisions with review.255 However,
international law standards set out a different expectation: that
immigration systems will only restrict liberty as a last resort. The
United States should modify its detention processes to meet that
standard. The result will be a regime that detains those migrants
who truly require detention, leading to much greater rationality
at less cost to the government,256 while significantly improving
respect for liberty.
252. HOU SF 2013 APPROPRIATIONS 11TIT1 FOR DIS, supra note 65, (insisting that
DHS "shall maintain a lcycl of not lss than 34,000 detention beds").
253. See ifra Part W.C.
254. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text; Detainees Leaving ICE Detention,
supra note 44, at 3 (noting that ten percent of migrants were released on bond during
proceedings nationally, while the remaining migrants in detention were released only
upon deportation, voluntary departure, or a win in their case allowing them to remain
in the United States); News Release, ICE, ICE Opens its First-Ever Designed-and-uiilt
Civil Detention (enter (Mar. 13, 2012), available at http://www.ice.gov/news/rcleases/
1203/ 120313karnescity.htm [hereinafter Designed-and-Built Civil Detention (enter]
(describing new 600-bed detention facility that detains migrants who have been
carefully screened to ensure that they do not pose a threat to themselves or others,
and are not a flight risk"); UNLOCKING LIBLRTY, supra notC 17, at 32 (reporting that
resource constraints on institutional alternatives to detention programs, such as the
fact that certain programs exist only within a certain radius from a limited number of
designated ICE offices. make the programs ineffective substitutes for detention).
255. Denore, 538 U.S. at 528.
256. There would undoubtedly be costs associated with a system that detains fewer
migrants. such as the cost of making individualized detention determinations or the
cost of imposing alternatives to detention, such as ankle bracelets, or even the cost of
locating individuals who do abscond. See Denial of Petition for Rulemaking, supra note
152, at 10. However, those Costs would almost certainly not be greater than the cost of
detaining across the board. See NAT'L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 67, at 8
(predicting a savings of USS1.6 billion annually-an eighty-two percent reduction in
costs-by recasing individuals without serious criminal histories and placing them in
already existing alternatives-to-detention programs).
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B. Detention ofIndividuals in Expedited Removal and Reinstatement
ofRemoval
The US immigration detention system provides for
detention of individuals in streamlined removal proceedings.
These proceedings are known as expedited removal and
reinstatement of removal.
1. Expedited Removal
Under expedited removal, migrants who are apprehended
at or near the border without proper documents may be
removed immediately without recourse to any hearing or other
procedure.257 The statute and regulations require their
detention until removal, which takes place promptly in most
cases.258
The statute includes an exception to the expedited removal
process for asylum seekers.25 Asylum seekers may avoid
expedited removal if they declare their intention to seek asylum
and then pass a screening interview known as a credible fear
interview.2 o The statute and regulations mandate detention of
individuals awaiting a credible fear interview and credible fear
decision except in very narrow circumstances.261 Only ICE,
which is the detaining authority, can make a decision to
release.262 There is no opportunity to seek independent review
257. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(2006). Currently, expedited removal applies to
individuals apprehended upon arrival at sea or at a US port of entry, as well as to those
who are apprehended within 100 miles of the border after entering the United States
no more than fourteen days prior to their apprehension. See id.; see also Designating
Aliens For Expedited Removal. 69 Fed. Reg. 48877 (Aug. 11, 2004).
258. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1) (11) (iii) (IV,); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b) (2) (iii) (2012); see BLAS
N NEZ-NETO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33097, BORDER SECURITY:
APPRLHLNSIONS OF "OTHLR THAN MLXICAN" ALIENS 8 (2005), available at
http://trac.syr.edu /immigration/libraryPl.pdf. (indicating that deportation under
expedited removal takes place as soon as the day of apprehension); U.S. DETENTION OF
ASYLUM SELKERS, supra note 17, at 14 (describing "immediate" deportation under
expedited removal).
259. 8 U.S.C. § 1225b(1) (A) (ii). Migrants placed in expedited removal also have a
limited ability to challenge expedited removal on the grounds that they are US citLizens
or lawlul permanent residents or already have religee status. See 8 C.F.R. 235.3(b) (5).
260. 8 U.S.C. 1225(b) (1) (lB); 8 C.F.R. 235.6(a) (1); 8 C.F.R. 208.30(f).
261. See 8 U.S.C. 1225(b) (1) (B) (iii) (IV) (providing for mandatory detention); 8
C.F.R. 235.3(b)(4)(ii) (2012) (allowing for parole only in cases of "medical
emergency or -legitimate law enforcement objective").
262. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b) (4) (ii).
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by an immigration court or any other tribunal.2 6 In 2011,
approximately 11,000 asylum seekers were detained as part of
the expedited removal process. 264
Normally, the period of detention pending the credible
fear interview is short. Most of the interviews are held within two
weeks after the asylum seeker is taken into custody.265 Individuals
who pass the credible fear interview are placed into removal
proceedings in immigration court where they have the
opportunity to pursue their asylum claim.266 They are no longer
in expedited removal and are not subject to the expedited
removal mandatory detention rules.267 Their eligibility for
release from detention, and the procedures that will apply,
depends on other factors discussed below.268
The summary nature of the expedited removal process
raises profound concerns regarding the compatibility of
expedited removal with international human rights norms,
particularly for asylum seekers. However, the human rights
problems inherent in expedited removal do not relate directly
to detention but to other aspects of the process.
Detention under expedited removal for a brief period of
time is likely not itself incompatible with international human
263. See id.
264. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SFRVS., ASYLUM DIV. QUARTERLY
STAKEHOLDER MLLTING: CRLDIBLE FLAR AND REASONABLL FLAR WORKLOAD RLPORT
(Nov. 30, 2011) [hereinafter NOVEMBER 2011 ASYLUM STAKEHOLDER MEFTING].
265. See U.S. (ITIZLNSHIP & IIMIGRATION SLRVS., ASYLLN Div. QUARTLRLY
STAKEHOLDER MEETING MINUTES 2 (June 8, 2010) (stating that the agency goal is to
complete most credible fear interviews within fourteen days and showing statistics that
support success in meeting that goal).
266. See 8 U.S.C. 1225(b) (1) (B) (ii); 8 C.F.R. 235.6(a) (1); 8 C.F.R. 208.30(f).
267. SeeX-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 731, 731 (B.LA., 2005).
268. See id.; see infra Parts IV.C, IV.E.
269. See U.S. CON INfN ON INT'L RLLIGOUS FREEDOM. ASYLLM SELKERS IN EXPLDITED
REMoV AL 3 (2005); I(ACHR REPORT ON DETENTION, supra note 83, 116-18; 1U.N.
High Comm'r for Refugees. Submission for the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights Compilation Report Universal Periodic Review: United States of
America, at 3 (2010), available at, http://wwW.unher.org/refworld/pdfid/
4bcd741c2.pdf; see also Is This America? The Denial of Due Process to Asylumn Seekers in the
United States, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (2000), http://www.humanirightsfirst.org/our-
work/refiugee-protetion/duc-process-is-this-america (last visited on March 13, 2013). It
could be argued that the entire expedited removal process is so clearly contrary to
intcrinational human rights law that detention in connection with expedited removal
must also be unlawld. I will not take up that argument here, as my focus is exclusively
on detention.
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rights standards relating to immigration detention. Detention of
individuals who will be imminently removed presents the
situation in which the government's legitimate goal of securing
removal is most salient. For individuals who do not seek asylum,
a final removal decision is in effect, and the government is
justified in maintaining custody over them for the short period
until it executes their removal.
For individuals who do seek asylum, detention during the
brief period before the credible fear interview is also likely
justified by the possibility that removal will soon become
necessary for at least some individuals who will fail the
screening, such that detention directly relates to ensuring the
possibility of prompt removal. In addition, even the UNHCR
standards permit detention of asylum seekers for the brief
period necessary to confirm identity and initially screen the
claim, o which is essentially what the credible fear interview
does.27 ' So, brief detention of those who will pass the credible
fear interview does not present a serious difficulty under
international standards either.27 2
The expedited removal procedures do not permit an
individualized determination regarding the necessity of
detention or any possibility for judicial review. However, it would
be difficult if not impossible to guarantee a hearing on the need
for detention more quickly than the removal itself or the
credible fear interview and decision. The individualized
determination and review of detention required under
international law must take place promptly, but almost all
270. See UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 78. 11 24-28.
271. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SFRVS., ASYLUM IVir. QUARTERLY
STAKEHOLDER MLLTING: CRLDIBLE FLAR AND REASONABLL FLAR WORKLOAD RLPORT
SUMMARY FY 2012 (jan. 26, 2012) (reporting credible fear interview passage rate of
approximately eighty percent); U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SFRVTS., ASYLUM DIV.
QLARTERLY STAKEHOLDLR MEETING: CRLDIBLL FEAR AND REASONABLE FLAR WORKLOAD
REPORT SUMMARY FY 2010 (Oct. 19, 2010) (reporting credible fear interview passage
rate of approximately seventy two percent).
272. This analysis assumes that asylun seekers will be released once they pass the
credible fear interview or will be detained only based on an individualized
determination with judicial review. However, under current law and practice, ICE
detains some asylun seekers after a favorable credible fear interview, without adequate
justification, and judicial review is not always available and is problematic where it does
apply. See infra Parts IV.C., IV.E. Additional interpretations of the statutes and
regulations are required in light of the international human rights standards to resolve
these incompatibilities with international norms. See id.
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systems allow for some short period of detention before those
determinations are made.2m
However, should the wait period for a credible fear
interview extend beyond a brief period, probably no more than
two weeks, detention under expedited removal would no longer
comply with the international standards.2 4 In that case, the
courts could interpret the statute to impose a strict time limit on
the credible fear interview process to ensure compliance with
international standards.)75 Otherwise, it would become necessary
to interpret the expedited removal statute to provide the
protections required under international law including
individualized determinations, a showing of necessity of
detention, and judicial review.27 6
273. See 8 C.F.R. 287.3 (2012) (arrest must be followed in forty eight hours by
initial decision whether to continue in custody); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2012)
(containing specific guidelines regarding the timing of pre-trial detcntion hearings in
federal criminal proceedings and requiring that the hearing take place upon
appearance before a judicial offer or within three to live days after that appearance).
274. I do not suggest the exact time limit that would be required, but
international human rights law would likely not condone a period of longer than the
current two weeks. See Saadi v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13229/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 7
(2008) (finding detention at border for expedited proceedings was permissible where
the lkngth of detention was limited and lasted only seven days).
275. Current law contains no such limitation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)
(2006); 8 C.F.R. § 208.30 (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b) (4) (2012).
276. The courts have previously been unwilling to entertain litigation to curtail
the expedited removal statute. See AILA v. Reno, 18 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 1998),
affirmed by 199 F.3d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The resistance was based partly on
procedural limitations in the statute and partly on long-standing conceptions regarding
the lack of constitutional protection due to migrants at the border. Procedural
limitations should not be read in a way that would prevent review of the scheme that
would bring it into compliance with international law. As for the rights granted to
individuals at the border, the distinction between individuals outside of the boundaries
of the United States and those within the United States is eroding. See infra notes 318-
22 and accompanying text. In any case, expedited removal now applies to individuals
who have made their way into the United States and who should claim protection of
the right to liberty even under a restrictive interpretation of the territorial reach of US
constitutional law. See Designating Aliens For Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48877,
(Aug. 11, 2004) (applying expedited removal to individuals apprehended within 100
miles of the border). An interpretation guaranteeing international human rights law
protections to those placed in expedited removal is thus possible without significantly
altering US law.
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2. Reinstatement of Removal
Reinstatement of removal is a similarly abbreviated process
for removing immigrants from the United States without
proceedings in immigration court. Reinstatement of removal
applies to individuals who previously received an order of
removal and left or were deported from the United States but
then returned illegally.27 In these cases, the statute provides that
the prior order will simply be reinstated and the individual will
be deported without any opportunity to appear before an
immigration judge or to challenge deportation in any other
way.27  During the reinstatement of removal process, the migrant
is detained, under the provisions requiring detention of persons
with final orders of removal.2 *
There is an exception to reinstatement of removal, similar
to the exception to expedited removal, for individuals who fear
persecution in the country to which they would be returned.2" A
migrant claiming a fear of persecution or torture if deported is
referred for an interview to determine whether the fear is
"reasonable."28 1 If the result of this screening interview is
favorable, the migrant will be allowed only to seek withholding
of removal (the US precept for non-refoulement of refugees to a
country where they would face persecution) in strictly limited
proceedings before the immigration court:" Persons who pass a
reasonable fear interview generally remain detained without
review during the proceedings in immigration court.283 More
277. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a) (5) (2006).
278. See id.; 8 C.F.R. § 1241.8(a) (2012).
279. 8 U.S.C. 1231 (a) (2); 8 C.F.R. § 241.3 (2012) (regulating detention after
entry of removal order); 8 C.F.R. § 1241.8(f) (2012) (regulating reinstateinen t of
removal and providing that detention will be in accord with the general provisions on
detention after entry of a removal order); Memorandum from the Office of the Chief
Immigration Judge, Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum No. 99-5 on
Implementation of Article 3 of the UN Convention Against Torture 9 (May 14, 1999)
(noting that it is "likely" that individuals in reinstatement of removal who request a
reasonable fear interview will be detained).
280. 8 C.F.R. § 1241.8(c) (2012).
281. Id.; 8 C.F.R. 1208.31; 8 C.F.R. 208.31 (2012).
282. 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c) (2012).
283. OFFICL OF THL CHILF IMMIGRATION JUDGL, DLP'T OF JUSTICL. IMMIGRATION
COU RT PRACTICE MANUAL 108, 110 (2008) (noting individuals in "limited removal
proceedings," including withholding-only proceedings, may be detained and there is
no possibility of review of deLention by thre immigration courL); 8 C.F.R. § 1241.8 (f)
(2012).
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than 3000 individuals with refugee claims were detained in
connection with the reinstatement of removal process in 2011.211
As with expedited removal, there are serious concerns that
reinstatement of removal violates rights, such as due process. 2
However, brief detention of migrants in reinstatement of
removal usually will not independently violate international
human rights standards. Detention in these instances is
designed to facilitate the execution of a pre-existing final
decision on removal.
However, for individuals who claim persecution while
awaiting deportation under reinstatement of removal, detention
pending the reasonable fear interview violates international
human rights standards, at least as the process is currently
carried out. Individuals seeking withholding of removal
proceedings remain in detention for lengthy periods of time,
waiting for a reasonable fear interview and then a decision on
whether they may pursue refugee protection in the United
States. The regulations require that the reasonable fear
interview be conducted within ten days of referral for the
interview, in the absence of "exceptional circumstances."26
Notw ithstanding the shorter time limits set out in the
regulations, government officials charged with conducting the
reasonable fear interview process have set an expectation that
most interviews will be conducted within ninety days after
referral.287 Officials further acknowledge that some migrants in
detention are held for "about six months" pending the
reasonable fear interview.288
284. See NOVEMBER 2011 ASYLUM STAKE HOLDER MEETING, supra note 264.
285. See Lee J. Teran, Mexican Children oJ .S. Citizens: "Viges Prin" and Other Tales of
Challenges to Asserting cqud US. Citizenship, 14 SCHOLAR 583, 658-68 (2012); Daniel
Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The Challenging
Construction oj the Fifth-and -a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. RLV. 1461, 1465 (2011).
286. 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(b) (2012).
287. Memorandum fron Ted Kim, Acting Chief of Asylun Div., U.S. Citizenship
& Immigration Servs., to All Asylum iOffice Staff on Implementation of Reasonable Fear
Processing Tinielines and APSS Guidance, Attachment 1 (Apr. 17, 2012) [hereinafter
Reasonable Fear Memorandum].
288. AM. IMMIGRATION ILAWYERS Assoc., HOU STON OFFICE IMEETING MINUTES
(May 10, 2012) (on file with the author); see also Reasonable Fear Menorandun, supra
note 287 (requiring special notfications when reasonable fear interviews will be
delayed more than 150 days).
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In these circumstances, detention is not incident to
immediate deportation based on a final order and so may only
be justified for the purposes of avoiding a flight risk or danger to
the community during the pending proceedings to determine
status. While persons subject to reinstatement of removal have a
final removal order, they have invoked a procedural mechanism
that requires a determination of their immigration status. This
mechanism is provided by statute in order to comply with
international obligations to prevent expulsion of refugees to a
country where they will be persecuted or tortured.289 Given the
length of time they must spend in detention pending a
screening interview, individuals who have requested a
reasonable fear interview are in a situation that most closely
compares to the situation of individuals detained pending a
determination of their status prior to entry of a removal order.
As such, the decision regarding the necessity of detention must
be made on an individualized basis with the possibility for
judicial review. International human rights law does not permit
an exception to these standards based only on the existence of a
prior removal order, as contemplated by the reinstatement of
removal process in the United States 90
Current practice regarding detention after a favorable
reasonable fear interview also violates international human
rights standards. Individuals who do not pass the reasonable fear
interview might be detained, if execution of the confirmed
removal order were rapid, without violating international law.
However, individuals who have passed the reasonable fear
interview fall clearly within the category of persons pending a
determination of their immigration status and so may only be
detained in limited circumstances. Their removal is far from
imminent, because an initial threshold determination has
already been made that they may be eligible for withholding of
289. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SFRVs., AsUM OFFICER BASIC
TRAINING COURSE. RLASONABLE FLAR OF PERSLCUTION AND TORTURE DLTERMINATIONS
5 (2008).
290. See Velez Loor v. Panama, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment. Inter-Am. CL. H.R. (ser. C) No. 218, 169, 172 (Nov. 23, 2010)
(specifically finding impermissibly punitive the imposition of detention as a result of a
prior deportation order).
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removal and thus may not ever be deported.91 Yet, under the
current system, detention is automatic rather than a measure of
last resort. There is no possibility for an individualized
determination regarding detention with the possibility for
judicial review. Nor does the system provide guarantees to
ensure that detention is for the shortest period of time possible,
with a maximum limit, or allow for periodic review.
The courts should thus reinterpret the current statute and
regulations in order to ensure compliance with international
human rights standards in the reinstatement of removal context.
In connection with migrants awaiting a reasonable fear
interview, the courts might interpret the statute and regulations
as imposing a strict deadline for conducting and ruling on the
reasonable fear interview after taking the migrant into custody.
The ten day time limitation already found in the regulations
could provide the deadline, and exceptions could be read as
very limited. If the reasonable fear interview were conducted in
this timeframe,'2 the existing removal order would likely serve
as adequate basis for detention during this brief period when
immediate removal would not yet be subject to serious question.
Absent the imposition of such a time limit, for individuals
awaiting an interview and decision on reasonable fear, the
courts should interpret the statute and regulations to allow for
release based on an individualized determination of the need
for detention with the possibility for judicial review. In any case,
the requirement of an individualized determination with review
should be imposed for individuals who have passed the
291. Under the unique US nonrefoulement systei. the individual would still have
an order of removal even if an immigration court granted withholding of removal after
full proceedings; the decision would only preclude removal to the country of
persecution or torture. See8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(t) (2012); I-S- & C-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 432
(B.I.A., 2008). However, removal to a different country would generally be impossible,
and the individual would be permitted to remain and work in the United States. See
Hecren, supra note 240, at 926 (" [T]hcrc are very few cases where DHS has ever
succeeded in deporting an immigrant to a country where she does not have
citizenship.").
292. As with the credible fear interviews, I do not suggest a specific deadline for
conducting the reasonable fear interview. However, there is nojustification for making
the deadline for reasonable fear interviews more kenient than the timefrane for
credible fear interviews, and international law would presumably limit that period to no
more than a week or two. See supra notes 273-74 and accompanying text.
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reasonable fear interview and must wait for a final
determination of their claim in immigration court proceedings.
Such an interpretation in compliance with international
human rights standards is fully plausible given the structure of
the statute and regulations. The post-removal order detention
statute allows for release of individuals subject to its
provisions.29 3
The relevant implementing regulations do not provide a
procedure for release of individuals in the context of
reinstatement of removal and withholding-only proceedings in
immigration court, but they also do not prohibit release.294 The
regulations also fail to provide for review of custody decisions
affecting persons subject to reinstatement of removal, by
immigration court or other means.2s However, they need not be
interpreted as impeding immigration court review of detention
in the reinstatement of removal context. The regulations already
provide for immigration court review of custody decisions in
other post-removal order cases where removal is unlikely and
detention is thus problematic.29 6 The regulations could be
interpreted to provide the same review of decisions regarding
custody of individuals in reinstatement of removal proceedings
where a migrant is awaiting, or has already passed, a reasonable
fear interview.29 If the regulations are instead read to preclude
293. Specifically, the statute establishes the authority for post-order detention and
then prohibits post-order reicase of individuals subject to the criminal grounds for
mandatory detention (discussed below), suggesting that others may be released. 8
U.S.C. 1231 (a) (2) (2006).
294. See 8 C.F.R. § 1241.8 (2012) (regulating the reinstatement of removal
process). The general regulation on post-order detention provides that an individual
subject to an order of removal will be taken into custody, but remains silent on the
possibility of release during the removal period. 8 C.F.R. § 241.3 (2012) Cf 8 C.F.R. §
1241.14(a) (2) (2012) (allowing for review of decisions not to release after expiry of the
removal period, without removal, based on special circumstances).
295. See 8 C.F.R. § 1241.8 (2012) (omitting any provision on ricase or review of
detention); 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d) (2012) (allowing immigration court review of custody
dctcrinnations, but only "[p]rior to [a] final order," without any mention of the status
of individuals subject to reinstatement of removal).
296. See 8 C.F.R. § 1241.14(a) (2) (2012) (allowing for continued detention after
removal period only in exceptional cases and with immigration court review).
297. In fact, for proceedings taking longer than six months, relcase should
presumptively occur. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (holding that
nigrants may not be held indefinitely based on a final removal order, if removal does
not occur. and establishing a presumptive six-month time limit on post-order
detention); 8 U.S.C. 1231(a) (1) (B) (beginning removal period when removal order
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release on the grounds that proceedings are ongoing and
removal still may become possible, detention should be subject
to individualized immigration court review under the general
provisions relating to individuals in pending proceedings.29
C. Detention ofArriving Aliens
US immigration law also provides for the detention without
review of entire classes of individuals who are categorized by law
as "arriving aliens."2' An arriving alien is any individual who
applies for admission to the United States at a port-of-entry, for
example at an airport or border bridge.soo ICE does not provide
statistics regarding the number of individuals subject to
"arriving alien" detention rules."o The arriving aliens provisions
primarily affect certain categories of asylum seekers and
returning lawful permanent residents who have allegedly
abandoned their status or have criminal histories.
Many asylum seekers originally placed in expedited removal
are categorized as arriving aliens, because they were placed into
expedited removal after having presented themselves at a port-
of-entr.3 11 Even once they pass a credible fear interview and
becomes final); 8 U.S.C. 1231(a) (3) (providing for supervised release after the
removal period if removal not accomplished).
298. See 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) (2006) (allowing for riclase from detention during
removal proceedings); C.F.R. § 1208.2(c) (3) (2012) (outlining that withholding only
proceedings are to follow same procedure as removal proceedings); 8 C.F.R. §
1236.1(d) (2012) (allowing for appeal to the immigration court of custody decisions
before final order of removal); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i) (2012) (precluding
immigration court review of immigration detention decisions in other contexts, but not
in reinstatement of removal or withholding-only conexts). It may be most appropriate
for the courts to interpret detention in reinstatement of removal as detention during
the pendency of proceedings, allowing for release and immigration court review. See
Castillo v. ICE Field Office Dir., 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 162862 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 14,
2012) (holding that an applicant for withholding of removal who has passed a
reasonable fear interview should have the opportunity to seek review of detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). To do so, the courts would only need to invalidate the
current regulatory requirement that review of detention take place before entry of a
final order. See 8 C.FR. § 1236.1(d) (2012).
299. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h) (2) (i) (B) (2012).
300. 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2012).
301. DHS Immigration Enforcenent Actions 2011, supra note 13.
302. Those asylum seekers who entered the United States and wvere placed in
expedied removal because they were apprehended near the border shortly after
crossing, but who were not apprehended at the border, are not arriving aliens. See X-K-,
23 1. & N. Dec. 731, 735 (B.I.A., 2005).
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leave the expedited removal process for normal immigration
court proceedings, they remain arriving aliens because of the
manner of their original arrival. * FH presents just such a case.
Lawful permanent residents returning to the United States
are generally not deemed to be seeking admission, and
therefore are not treated as arriving aliens. However, the statute
delineates circumstances involving criminal history or
abandonment of status in which lawful permanent residents will
be deemed to be arriving aliens, seeking admission to the
United States. These lawful permanent residents will be
detained upon return to this country and placed in proceedings
in immigration court to determine their status.304
For arriving aliens, the law grants ICE officials exclusive
authority to make determinations regarding their custody
situation.3" ICE may continue to detain a migrant or may
release the individual on parole, with or without the payment of
a bond. ICE's custody determination may not be reviewed by an
immigration judge or other tribunal.son Furthermore, the
regulations place the burden on the detained immigrant to
show an absence of flight risk or danger to the community
before ICE will even consider release.s0
The provisions that tightly circumscribe the rights of
arriving aliens and sanction their detention are incompatible
with international human rights standards. * The rules on
arriving aliens create a presumption of detention, rather than
release, for whole classes of migrants. They preclude meaningful
individualized determinations requiring the government to bear
the burden of showing a legitimate goal justifying detention and
the unavailability of alternatives other than detention to meet
that goal. The rules further fail to provide for authorization or
303. See id.; EXLC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REV., iMMIGRATION JUDGE
BENCHBOOK, (IX) (C) (2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/11/benchbook/
resource s/ sfoutline/juirisdiction.hiinl.
304. 8 U.S.C. §1101a(13) (C).
305. 8 C.F.R. 236. 1(c)(8)-(11) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B); 8 C.F.R.
S235.3(c) (2012).
306. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h) (2) (i) (B) (2012).
307. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c) (8) (2012); 8 C.F.R. 235.3(c) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)
(2012).
308. Special Rapporteur Report on Mission to the US, supra note 81. 122-23;
IACHR REPORT ON DETENTION, supra note 83, 11 139, 418, 431.
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review of detention by a tribunal and periodic review. They
certainly do nothing to ensure that detention is for the shortest
period necessary or to impose a limit on the length of detention.
The restrictions on the liberty and due process rights of
arriving aliens are particularly problematic, because they have
the greatest impact on asylum seekers and on returning lawful
permanent residents. Asylum seekers enjoy special protections
against detention under international law even when they arrive
to a country with no documented status.so9 In addition, both
asylum seekers and returning lawful permanent residents who
have been placed in removal proceedings have strong reasons
and legal opportunity to challenge their removal. They will both
likely be detained for an extended period during ongoing
proceedings, and their detention cannot be justified by a certain
and imminent removal. Nor can detention be justified by the
risk of flight, because such individuals will have every incentive
to appear for their proceedings. In this context, the
international human rights standards should be closely followed.
The US courts should, therefore, reference international
law to invalidate the special rules limiting the rights of arriving
aliens in connection with detention. To achieve this result, the
courts need only invalidate the regulations that currently
prevent arriving aliens from accessing an individualized review
by an immigration court regarding detention.-,0 There is no
statute that requires the government to treat arriving aliens
distinctly from other migrants. The courts could simply
determine that proper interpretation of the immigration statute,
in light of international standards consistent with constitutional
protections, does not require or permit implementing a
regulation that restricts the rights of this particular group of
migrants to such an extent.-"
309. See UNICR Detention Guidelines, supra note 78, 1 32.
310. Specifically, it would be necessary to invalidate 8 C.F.R. §
1003.19(h) (2) (i) (B) (2012) (precluding immigration court review of detention
decisions regarding arriving aliens) and possibly 8 C.F.R. 235.3(c) (2012) (suggesting
that arriving aliens in removal proceedings be dctaincd unkess paroled by ICE). See
discussion infra Part IV.E for problems with the immigration court review process, as
pertains to human rights compliance, which also must be resolved.
311. At Icast one court has reached the conclusion that arriving aliens arc
cotlsLi tiLionally entitled to an individualized bond hearing before the immigration
court, where the government has the burden of proving flight risk or danger to the
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Such a reinterpretation might meet with resistance. The
regulations presumably limit the rights of arriving aliens under
the theory that individuals presenting themselves at the US
border seeking admission have few, if any, rights.3 '2 Based on the
Supreme Court's decision in Mezei in the early 1950s, and other
cases from this same period, conventional wisdom held for years
that migrants at the nation's periphery enjoyed almost no legal
protection. 1
However, that notion was based on the plenary power
doctrine. 14 As described above, that doctrine has eroded
significantly3 '
Even more, the treatment of migrants seeking entry to the
US was based on a manifestation of the plenary power doctrine
that has recently become particularly suspect: the assertion that
constitutional protections do not apply at the border as a
question of territorial sovereignty. 16 The extraterritoriality
exception to rights affected even those individuals physically
detained within the United States under the fiction that they
had not been allowed to enter, as a legal matter, and so they
remained outside US boundaries and without protection. 17 In
2008, the Supreme Court called that fiction into question.3'8
community once detcntion becomes prolonged, despite the regulations precluding
such a hearing. See Crespo v. Baker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47909 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 3,
2012); Centeno-OrLtiz v. Cully, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 170123, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 19,
2012).
312. In fact, DIS and the immigration courts have recently refused to adopt new
regulations that would allow immigration courts to review thc detention of arriving
aliens on this basis. See Denial of Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 152, at 5.
313. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212-13 (1953);
see also United States ex rel Knauff y. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537. 542-43 (1950).
314. See Mezei, 345 U.S. 212-13: Knauff 338 U.S. 542-43; see also ALEINIKOFF, supra
note 202, at 174 (noting that Mezei and Knauffwould be overturned if the plenary
power doctine were cast aside).
315. See supra notes 214-19 and accompanying text.
316. See Cole, The Idea of Hananity, supra note 193, at 650-51; Zadvyas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678. 693 (2001).
317. See Jean v. Nelson. 727 F.2d 958. 969 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that the cntry
distinction applies to individuals even though they were held in detention centers in
thc United States); Gisbert v. Attorney General, 988 F.2d 1437, 1440 (5th Cir. 1993)
(same).
318. I thank Jordan Pollock, a recent University of Texas Law School graduate, for
helping me to develop the idea that both international human rights law and US
consitutional law have noved in the saic direction in climinating the distinctions in
rights granted to migrants at the border.
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In the 2008 case, Boumediene v. Bush, involving the
detention of suspected terrorists at Guantanamo, the Supreme
Court employed a pragmatic approach to analyzing sovereignty
and territorial jurisdiction for the purpose of determining the
applicability of constitutional liberty protections.3"9 The Court
held that the proper analysis should consider the "nature of the
sites where apprehension and then detention took place,"
including the degree of US control.o20 Under this practical
reading, detention within the physical territory and control of
the United States requires protection of the central liberty rights
of detainees, regardless of their status as migrants stopped at the
border.
This newer approach is also reflected, albeit more
tentatively, in the Supreme Court's decision in Clark v.
Martinez.32' In Clark, which predates Boumediene by several years,
the Supreme Court held that migrants with final orders of
removal may not be detained indefinitely within the United
States, even if they were never legally admitted to this country. 22
While the decision was based on statutory interpretation, it
supports a rethinking of the territoriality limitations as applied
to migrants, particularly in light of both Boumediene and the
evolution of international standards applying to immigration
detention. Given these developments, the questionable
distinction made between migrants deemed to be at the border
(even when they are physically held in custody inside the United
States) and those who have entered the United States, should
not require continued allegiance to the arriving alien
regulation. The courts should invalidate the regulation in light
of international human rights standards.
The United States has implicitly acknowledged the
tenuousness of the current rules regarding arriving aliens, at
least as to asylum seekers, further supporting invalidation of the
regulations. In December 2009, ICE issued a memorandum
319. Bourediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 763-71 (2008); see also Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466. 482 (2004) (noting that the right to assert liberty through habeas corpus has
depended "not on formal notions of territorial sovereignty" but rather on practical
questions regarding the entity that has jurisdiction over the place of detention)
320. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 763-71.
321. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371. 380 (2005).
322. Id. at 377-81.
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providing for the presumptive release from detention on parole
of arriving asylum seekers who have passed credible fear
interviews.32  Under the new policy, ICE releases a far greater
number of asylum seekers, categorized as arriving aliens, than
was previously the case. 2 ICE has thus acknowledged that
detention is not necessary for many asylum seekers arriving at
the border and that across-the-board detention is problematic in
this context.
This policy memorandum, however, does not go far enough
to conform US law to international standards. The policy still
does not allow for review of detention decisions by a tribunal,
and thus leaves full discretion to detain or release in the hands
of the same administrative officials who have taken custody over
the asylum seeker. Individualized custody review by the
immigration courts would likely result in release, on a finding of
no flight risk or danger to the community, for at least some
"arriving" asylum seekers who remain in detention under the
current policy.." The absence of a mechanism for challenging
ICE's decisions regarding detention of arriving asylum seekers
also still contrasts with the availability of individualized court
review of detention for those who make their way into the
United States before apprehension. 26 Thus, asylum seekers such
as FH who arrive at the border and declare their need for
protection, continue to be systematically disadvantaged in
challenging detention, in conflict with international human
rights law standards that require individualized assessment and
review for all detention decisions.3 27
323. ICE, Dir. No. 11002.1, Parole of Arriving Aliens Found to Have a Credible
Fear of Persecution or Torture, 1[ 1 (Dec. 8, 2009).
324. Denial of Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 152 (noting that, under
current guidelines, ICE releases approximately seventy six percent of arriving aliens
who have passed a credible fear interview).
325. See Notes of Nikiya Natale, Summer 2012 Intern wvith the South Texas Pro
Bono Asylum Represientation Project (July 19, 2012) (on file with thc author)
(providing information regarding "arriving" asylum seekers from Eritrea and Rwanda
detained in south Texas as of july 19, 2012 who had been held from seventy-four to
ninety-two days after passing their credible fear interviews).
326. See infra Part IE; see also Denial of Petition for Rulcmaking, supra note 152,
at 1.
327. See UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra note 78, 1[ 13 (prohibiting thc
application of punitive measures to asylun seekers who present themselves promptly to
the authorities).
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In addition, the new release policy takes the form of a
memorandum, rather than a regulation, and so may be changed
at any time.." 2 As such, US immigration detention law still does
not adequately ensure the rights to liberty and due process of
individuals presenting at the border. Further transformation of
US law, by reference to international standards, is necessary to
secure those rights.
D. Mandatory Detention on Criminal and Terrorism Grounds
US immigration law also mandates the detention of entire
categories of individuals, regardless of their arriving alien status,
who have been convicted or suspected of particular crimes or of
involvement in terrorism.." 9 Lawful immigration status, length of
residence in the United States and family ties here are irrelevant
in these mandatory detention cases. Consequently, lawful
permanent residents like BM are regularly detained under these
statutory provisions. ICE does not provide information
regarding the number of individuals mandatorily detained in
this category. However, the available numbers suggest that, on a
given day, near half of the migrants in ongoing immigration
court proceedings to determine deportability and status are
subject to mandatory detention.ss
328. Policies on parole of arriving aliens have, in fact, changed multiple times
through memoranda such as this one. See ICE Policy Directive No. 7-1.0, Parole of
Arriving Aliens Found to Have a 'Credible Fear' of Persecution or Torture (Nov. 6,
2007) (imposing stringent standards for release of individuals who have passed the
credible fear interview and explicitly superseding prior policy that favored release,
contained in Memorandum from Michael Pearson, Detention Guidelines Effective
October 9, 1998 (Oct. 7, 1998)).
329. See 8 U.S.C. 1226(c) (2006). Numerous commerntators have noted that the
criminal and terrorism grounds requiring mandatory detntion are extremely broad
and do not encompass only serious and dangerous crimes or acts. See. e.g., HU -MAN
RIGHTS FIRST, DENIA AND DEiAY: THE IMPACT OF THE IMMIGRATION IAW'S "TERRORISM
BARS" ON ASYLLM SELKLRS AND RLFUGEES IN THL UNITED STATLS 10-11 (2009);
Stephen H. Legornsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of
Criminal fustice Naorms, 64 WASH & LEE I. RVF. 469, 483-86 (2007); Teresa A. Miller,
Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigratin Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GLO. IMMIGR.
I. J 611, 619, 632 (2003).
330. The US government, in 2009, stated that sixty-six percent of individuals
detained on a given day were subject to mandatory detention. See SCHRIRO STUDY, supra
note 29, at 6. However, this mandatory detention figure must encompass those
individuals held under the separate provisions requiring detention of migrants subject
to a final removal order, which I do not address. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a) (2) (2006).
Otherwise, all individuals not subject to a final removal order would be subject to
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The detainee may challenge the determination that he falls
within the broad categories of persons subject to mandatory
detention, but detention is otherwise automatic. A 1 Individuals
subject to mandatory detention may not be released during the
pendency of their proceedings except in extremely limited
circumstances, and only at ICE's discretion. 3 Even then, the
detainee bears the burden of proving that there is no risk of
flight or danger to the community. There is no review by the
immigration court or any other tribunal regarding the necessity
or proportionality of detention.
mandatory detention, since approximately thirty-four percent of individuals in
detention on a given day have a final order. See MPI Study, supra note 32, at 16-18. If
the thirty-four percent of individuals with a final order are excluded from the sixty-six
percent in mandatory detention, then approximately thirty-twvo percent of the total
number of individuals in detention are subject to mandatory detention on criminal or
terrorism grounds while they await the conclusion of the proceedings in their
immigration cases. If the number of individuals held pursuant to a final order of
removal is actually higher than thirty-four percent, then the percentage of individuals
held in mandatory detention based on criminal or terrorism grounds would be slightly
smaller. See id. (calculating thirty-four percent figure for individuals with final orders as
a percentage of all detainees rather than as a percentage of cases for which information
was available regarding pending or post-final order status). Further complicating the
calculations, the thirty-two percent subjected to mandatory detention pending a final
removal order likely includes individuals detained pursuant to expedited removal in
addition to those inandatorily detained on criminal or terrorism grounds. So, the
number of individuals mandatorily detained on criminal and terrorism grounds is
probably fewer than thirty-two percent of the total nuinbcr of individuals detained
pending a final decision. In comparison, migrants who are discretionarily detained
during ongoing immigration procccdings-in other words, migrants who are not
included in the sixty-six percent of migrants who are mandatorily detained during
immigration proceedings or based on a final order-reprcsent about thirty-four
percent of the total number detained on a given day. See SCHRTRO STUDY, supra note 29,
at 6. A comparison of the discretionarily detained percentage (thirty-four percent) with
the percentage of individuals mandatorily detained pending proceedings (below thirty-
two percent) demonstrates that mandatory detention applies to a little less than half of
the total number of individuals detained pending a decision on their case. See also
JAILED NVITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 6 (describing difficulties in obtaining
information from ICE regarding numbers of individuals mandatorily detained).
331. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h) (2) (ii) (2012); Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (B.I.A.,
1999).
332. 8 U.S.C. 1226(c) (2) (2006) (allowing relcase only where necessary to
provide protection to witnesses r other individuals cooperating with a major criminal
investigation); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(1)) (2012) (prohibiting immigration court
review of detention for individuals held under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c) (2)).
333. 8 U.S.C. 1226(c) (2).
334. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (e); 8 C.F. R. § 1003.19(h) (2) (i) (D) (2012).
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The mandatory detention statute conflicts with the
international human rights standards regarding immigration
detention in multiple ways.." At the level of principles, it
establishes a system that presumptively and irrevocably detains
large classes of individuals rather than treating detention as a
measure of last resort.
In relation to the more specific requirements of
international human rights law, the mandatory detention statute
prevents any analysis of the existence or legitimacy of
governmental goals justifying detention and certainly does not
hold the government to its burden of proof to establish the need
for detention in individual cases. Nor does the mandatory
detention statute allow for adoption of less restrictive means for
meeting governmental objectives, such as through imposition of
alternatives to detention, other than physical custody.3 3 The
statute does not ensure that detention is for the minimum
period necessary, and there is no time limit on the period of
detention under the statute. While detention should end with
the completion of removal proceedings, no timeframe is
imposed on those proceedings. Detention may also continue
even after there is no longer any justification that detention is
necessary to effectuate removal or to prevent flight risk or
danger to the community. For example, detention sometimes
continues even when the detainee has won the right to remain
in the United States but awaits a decision on an appeal filed by
ICE.,3
Finally, the mandatory detention statute and the
implementing regulations preclude the type of determination or
review of detention by a tribunal required by international law.
The possibility for a hearing to determine whether a detainee
335. See Special Rapporteur Report on Mission to US, supra note 81, 11 15, 23,
72-74, 110; IA(HRRLPORT ON DETENTION, supra note 83. 1[ 17, 49, 428.
336. Advocates have argued that the mandatory detention statute could be read to
allow use of alternatives to detention, such as ankle bracelets or reporting
requirements, as a means of complying with the statutory comiand to take all
individuals subject to the statute into custody. See UNIOCKING ITBERTY, supra note 17, at
38-39; Hecrcn, supra note 240, at 632. However, the statute is not currently interpreted
in that manner. Id.
337. See Heeren, supra note 240, at 629 (describing the history of an individual
client detainee who remained in detention for cleven months after an immigration
court granted him the right to remain in the United States); see also Letter from
Barbara Hines, supra note 6.
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properly falls within the category of individuals subject to
mandatory detention is not adequate under the international
human rights standards. The international standards require
that the reviewing tribunal have the authority to review not just
compliance with domestic law but also with the international
requirements of an individualized showing of the need for
detention.
The mandatory detention statute is not readily susceptible
to an interpretation that would bring it into line with
international human rights standards." It will likely be
necessary, then, to instead interpret the US Constitution's rights
to liberty and due process in accord with international human
rights standards in order to overcome the mandatory detention
provisions. Specifically, the courts should invalidate the
mandatory detention statute as exceeding the limits on
detention imposed by the liberty and due process provisions of
the Constitution. By striking down the mandatory detention
statute, the courts would devolve to immigration officials the
authority to detain and release all individuals in removal
proceedings after an individualized determination without
regard to their inclusion in the categories currently subject to
mandatory detention. The decision to detain or release would
be subject to review by the immigration courts in the same way
338. See Human Rights Comm., A v. Australia, supra note 79, 1 9.5 (finding that
the detention review process violated human rights where it allowed only inquiry into
the applicability of the mandatory detention category to the detainee); Human Rights
Comm., Shams v. Australia, supra note 81, 1[7.3 (noting similarly that the detention
review process as applied violated human rights).
339. Some scholars have argued that ICE could interpret the mandatory detention
statute more narrowly than it currently does. See Kalhan, supra note 25, at 53-54. Such
narrowed interpretations would bring the statute closer to compliance with
international human rights law and might even lead to de facto individualized hearings
in many cases to determine whether mandatory detention should apply in particular
circumstances. Such reinterpretations would be desirable and would be consistent with
the approach urged in this Article. However, even if more narrowly interpreted, the
statute would presumably still apply to require detention of at least some categories of
migrants without any individualized determination or opportunity for review. As such,
it would still violate liberty and due process as understood under international human
rights law.
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that non-mandatory detention decisions are currently subject to
review.sso
It will be necessary to wrestle with the Supreme Court's
decision in Demore to reach such a conclusion regarding the
unconstitutionality of the mandatory detention statute. In
Demore, the Supreme Court approved the current broad
interpretation of the mandatory detention statute as
constitutionally sound. 41  However, the Supreme Court's
decision should not stand in the way of a determination of
unconstitutionality in light of international human rights
standards that aid in construing the Constitution's liberty and
due process provisions in a manner that provides adequate
protection of these central rights. Constitutional interpretations
can and should change in light of persistent and coherent
international standards that call those interpretations into
question, as is the case here.342
The use of international human rights standards would do
important work in bringing constitutional interpretation back
into line with Supreme Court jurisprudence in cases other than
Demore. An interpretation that rendered the mandatory
detention statute invalid would be fully in line with the civil
detention cases in contexts other than immigration, as described
above.3 It would also be consistent with the Supreme Court's
decision in Zadvydas, establishing the applicability of
constitutional protections regarding civil detention to
immigration detention.344 Zadvdas' reference to constitutional
limits on detention after a finding of removability strongly
suggests that the Constitution is properly interpreted to impose
limits on immigration detention before a decision regarding
removal has even been made.345
340. See infra Part IV.E for discussion on human rights compliance problems with
the immigration court review process, which also must be resolved for immigration
court review to comply with international human rights standards.
341. 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
342. Clcycland, supra note 162, at 111 (noting that "judicial construction of
constitutional provisions does evolve" and the "persistent presence" of an international
rule that diverges from a particular constitutional interpretation should lcad to
reconsideration of the constitutional rule).
343. See supra Part II.B.
344. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
345. Id.; see Cole. In Aid of Removal supra note 20, at 1022 ("If aliens filnally
ordered deported have a liberty interest in being free of physical custody, a firtiori
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It would also be possible to reverse course after Demore by
recognizing some of the limitations of the decision on its own
terms, particularly when the international human rights
standards help to explain the relevance of those limitations. In
Demore, the Court upheld the mandatory detention statute on
the grounds that it allowed for detention for the brief period
necessary to facilitate immediate removal.34 6 Putting the Court's
analysis in the terms of the international human rights
standards, detention would be purely for the purpose of
imminent removal and so would be non-punitive.347 However,
the Court misinterpreted the mandatory detention scheme in
ways that conceal its incompatibility with international human
rights law. The mandatory detention scheme in fact imposes
detention during proceedings to determine status, which may be
lengthy and without a definite outcome. Once this reality
becomes apparent, the grounding of the decision in Demore
falters.
Thus, the Demore court expressly based its analysis and
decision on an understanding that detention times under the
statute were very brief.348 However, the information now
available demonstrates that detention times are much longer
than understood by the Court, at least for individuals
challenging removal.349 A number of courts have already
concluded that the realities of lengthy detention times require
the imposition of constitutional limitations on the mandatory
detention statute despite the decision in Demore.,50 These
aliens who have only been charged as deportable have at lcast as strong a liberty
interest.").
346. Demore v. Kin, 538 U.S. 510. 513-14. 529 (finding detention for a "brief
period" constitutional where the migrant conceded that he was deportable).
347. Even if detention under the scheme was intended to facilitate immediate
removal, international human rights law standards would still require a determination
that detention was actually necessary to secure removal in the individual circumstances
if detention for this purpose exceeded a very limited period.
348. Demore, 538 U.S. at 529.
349. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
350. See Diop v. ICE, 656 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (deciding that the Constitution
only authorizes mandatory detention for a reasonable tilie, after which an
individualized custody deterinination hearing is constitutionally required); Casas-
Castrillon v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2008) (determining that
the mandatory detention statutc cannot constitutionally authorize prolonged
detention, so individual review is required under general detention statute rather than
mandatory detention provision); Monestime v. Reilly, 704 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D.N.Y.
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decisions do not go far enough to impose constitutional limits
on detention in compliance with the international standards,
though. Rendered in the shadow of Demore, they require
individualized review only after detention has become
prolonged. International standards instead require an
individualized determination with judicial review pronptly after
detention takes place and require periodic reviews thereafter if
detention continues.'5 1 The decisions nonetheless demonstrate
very real possibilities for reinterpreting constitutional norms to
invalidate mandatory detention even after Demore.
The Demore decision also relied heavily on the
understanding that the statute covered individuals who would be
deported. Thus, the Court repeatedly referenced mandatory
detention of "deportable criminal aliens" )2 and placed emphasis
on the fact that the named detainee had acknowledged
deportability.153 In concurrence, Justice Kennedy explicitly
noted that the "purpose behind the detention is premised upon
the alien's deportability." 64
However, many individuals subject to mandatory detention,
such as BM, face complex immigration proceedings in which the
final result is far from clear. US law makes available procedures
for challenging removability or for seeking permission to remain
in the United States even to individuals subject to mandatory
detention.5 Some non-trivial number will not be deported at
the end of those proceedings but instead will receive
2010) (holding that an individualized hearing is constitutionally required despite
mandatory detention statute).
351. The decision and review may not be feasible immediately upon
apprehension. But they must take place promptly and as a means of determining
whether detention is necessary, not whether it has become unduly prolonged.
352. Demore, 538 U.S. at 513, 528 (emphasis added).
353. Id. at 514, 523; cf. id. at 523 n.6 (noting that the individual detainee had
applied for relief from deportation and might not be deported without analyzing the
impact that this reality had on its characterization of detention as incidental to
deportation).
354. Demore, 538 U.S. at 531.
355. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)-(c) (2006) (setting out proceedings and burden
of proof where deportability is challenged); 8 U.S.C. 1101(a) (15) (U) (2006 & Supp.
V 2011) (providing for visas for individuals who have been victimized and have assisted
law enforcement authorities); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d) (13) (providing a waiver for criminal
and other bars to lawful immigration status); 8 C.F.R. § 208.17 (2012) (precluding
deportation of individuals who would be subjected to torture even if they have serious
criminal convictions).
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authorization to remain in the United States. 5 In these
circumstances, automatic detention does not directly serve the
purpose of removing deportable migrants. Detention must then
be deemed punitive unless the government engages in
individualized determinations of the need for detention to meet
specific goals relating to the pending removal proceedings, such
as preventing flight or danger to the community.
Because mandatory detention is instead automatic for
entire categories of persons, it fails to meet the international
human rights standards. The limitations of the Demore decision
require reconsideration of its holding regarding the
constitutionality of mandatory detention in light of international
human rights standards.
E. Non-Mandatory Detention
In a final category, the immigration laws allow for the
detention of all other migrants in immigration court
proceedings who are not subject to automatic detention under
one of the schemes described above. Asylum seekers who are not
arriving aliens and who have been placed into proceedings after
a successful credible fear interview fall into this category. All
other individuals apprehended within the United States and
placed into proceedings also fall into this category if not
otherwise subject to mandatory detention under the criminal
and terrorism grounds.
After apprehension, for individuals not subject to
mandatory detention, ICE makes an initial decision to detain or
to release with or without payment of bond.m The detainee may
356. See EOIR Statistical Yearbook 2011, supra note 43, at D2, P2 (noting that
favorable results were achieved in twenty-five percent of deportation cases in
immigration court in 2011 and even individuals who undcient removal proceedings
during incarceration on scrious criminal charges obtained relief or termination of
proc eedings in alrmost 150 cases during 2011); Historic Drop in Deportation Orders
Continues as humgration Court Backlog Increases, TRANSACTIONAL RECORT)s ACCFSS
CLLARINGHOUSL (Apr. 24, 2012), http://trac.syr.edu/inmigration/repor ts/279
(showing that relief was granted in approximately fifteen percent of all removal
proceedings and another approximately fifteen percent of all removal cases resulted in
termination of removal proceedings for failure to sustain deportability or other similar
reasons).
357. See 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 23 6 .1(c)(8) (2012). ICE has full
authority not to detain an individual after apprehension under these provisions. The
statute and regulations allowing detention pending removal proceedings are explicitly
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seek review by the immigration court of a decision to detain,
and the court may order release and may lower any bond set by
ICE.3 An appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, the
appellate administrative body on immigration issues, is also
possible. " The available data suggests that a little more than
half of all detainees awaiting a decision in their immigration
cases are detained discretionarily rather than pursuant to
mandatory detention.3) A rough estimate would put the
number of individuals held by ICE in discretionary detention at
approximately 75,000 per year. 1
The non-mandatory detention scheme has received less
attention than the mandatory detention provisions, perhaps
because individualized determinations and release from
permissive rather than mandatory. 8 U.S.C. 1226(a); 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(b) (2012).
However, as a general rule, ICE officials detain arrested individuals and place them
into removal proceedings. See AARTI KOHLI ET AL.. THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL V.ARRLN
INST. ON LAw/V & SOC. POLICY, SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF
DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 7-10 ( 2011) (noting that ICE proceeded to detain
sixty tw'o to eighty three percent of apprehended individuals, releasing few on bond,
and detention rates were similar for aggravatcd felony cases and discretionary
detention cases); Detainees Lea ingICE Detention. supra note 44 (finding that, nationally,
only ten percent of migrants were released on bond during proceedings).
358. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d) (2012).
359. Id. § 1236.1(d) (3).
360. Seesupra note 330 (calculating the approximate portion of individuals subject
to mandatory and discretionary detention pending a decision on deportability and
status, in reliance on data made available by the government); SCHRIRO STIDY, supra
note 29, at 6.
361. The immigration courts report that 75,000 individuals sought bond hearings
in 2011. See EOIR Statistical Yearbook 2011, supra note 43. at B7. This number serves as
a proxy for those wvho are detained discretionarily and thus have the ability to seek
release at a hearing in immigration court. Some small percentage of those who pursue
a bond hearing in immigration court are actually subject to mandatory detention. See
julie Dona, Making Sense of ubstantialy n (likey' An Empirical Analysis of the joseph
Standard in Mandatoy Detention Custody He args, IMMICR., REFUGEE & CITIZENSHIP L. L-
., ailable at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 856758 (finding fewer than 200 cases
involving hearings that challenged mandatory detention over a four-year period). On
the other hand, some individuals wvho were detained on a discretionary basis will have
obtained recase from ICE through payment of a bond without requesting a bond
hearing in immigration court and wvill thus not be reflected in the figures from the
immigration court even though ICE detained them at agency discretion for some
period. This 75,000 number also represents slightly more than half of the total number
of individuals detained pending immigration court proceedings, which is consistent
with other government figures. See supra notes 43-45, 330 and accompanying text
(calculating that discretionary detention accounts for more than half of detention
pending proceedings and estimating that more than 125,000 individuals are detained
pending proceedings in total).
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detention are broadly available under these provisions in
theory.362 However, most migrants eligible for release
nonetheless remain in detention for some or all of the length of
their removal proceedings. 36 The statutory regime does not
comply with the general principle of international human rights
law imposing a presumption against detention.34
The continued emphasis on detention in this segment of
the US detention system follows from a number of
incompatibilities between the discretionary detention scheme
and the more specific international human rights requirements.
As an initial matter, ICE and the immigration courts do not
make a determination regarding the least restrictive means for
meeting governmental objectives relating to the immigration
process before resorting to detention. After initial
apprehension, ICE and the immigration courts generally only
evaluate the possibility of continued detention or release on
bond. They do not systematically consider the possibility of
deploying alternatives to detention, other than payment of a
bond, to address the potential for flight risk or danger to the
community.
ICE could employ formal alternative-to-detention
programs, such as community supervision programs, reporting
requirements and ankle bracelet technology. However, the
agency generally initiates enrollment in these programs for
individuals who have already been released from detention. * As
a result, the programs do not serve as means of allowing release
from detention. Instead, when ICE requires participation in
such a program, it increases the level of supervision imposed
rather than minimizing the restrictions, as required by
362. But cf. KaIhan. supra note 25, at 48 (attributing "overdetention" in soe part
to "bonds that are routinely set too high for detainees to pay").
363. See Detainees Leaving ICE Detention, supra note 44 (noting that only ten
percent of nigrants are recased on bond); Designed-and-Built Civil DeLtcntion (enter,
supra note 254 (describing detention center exclusively for detainees who "do not pose
a threat to themselves or othiers, and are not a flight risk").
364. See IACHR RLPORT ON DETENTION, supra note 83 1 232 (" [D]tcention for a
protracted period owing to the inability to post bond-which is what happens in most
cases-becomes arbitrary").
365. See UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra nOW 17.
366. Id. at 32; FREED BUT NOT FREE, supra note 242, at 1.
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international human rights law. " Even then, ICE's decision
regarding use of these alternatives usually does not depend on
any evaluation of the level of supervision necessary in an
individual case, but rather on the financial and physical
availability of programs at the time and place when ICE
considers their use.A6*
The immigration courts do not consider the possibility of
imposing alternatives to detention, other than bond, at all in
their review of custody decisions.69 The immigration courts
cannot order release while requiring participation in an
alternatives-to-detention program.s7o Only ICE may enroll a
migrant in such a program. 1 The immigration courts cannot
then conduct a review of ICE detention decisions that includes a
meaningful analysis of the possibility for controlling any
potential flight risk or danger through mechanisms less
restrictive than detention.
Given the insistence in the international human rights
standards that the full range of alternatives to detention be
considered to ensure the least restrictive means of meeting
governmental objectives, the courts should interpret the
immigration regulations to require ICE to consider all
alternatives to detention before reaching a decision to detain.
Similarly, they should interpret the custody review authority of
the immigration court to include the ability to order release
from detention and imposition of the least restrictive alternative
to detention that would address any flight risk or danger to the
367. See Kalhan, supra note 25, at 55 (asserting that, if a migrant placed in a formal
alternative-to-detention program would otherwise have been released on recognizance
or bond, the "alternative" involves a restraint more restrictive than necessary to
accomplish governmental goals).
368. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 17, at 31; FREFD BUT NOT FREE, supra note
242, at 8; DHS CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 39, at 44; SCHRIRO
STUDY, supra note 29, at 20.
369. The exclusive focus on bond leads to the problematic rule that individuals
who pose a danger to the community may not be released at all. See Uriena, 25 1. & N.
Dec. 140 (B.IA., 2009). If payment of a inonetary bond is the only available alternative
to detention, it is understandable that the courts would see it as a means of meeting the
governmental goal of avoiding flight risk but not of preventing dangerousness. If other
alternatives were considered, such as electronic supervision. the result would likely be
different.
370. See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d) (2012) (allowing immigration court review only to
decide detention, release or relcase on bond).
371. See UN LOCKING IIBERTY, supra note 17.
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community. The regulations must also be read to preclude
imposition of an alternative to detention that is more restrictive
than release alone once ICE or the court has determined that
no flight risk or danger to the community exists. Nothing in the
statute or regulations prevents such an interpretation in light of
international human rights law.172
Apart from the failure to consider true alternatives to
detention, the custody determination process in discretionary
detention cases suffers from several other problems under
international human rights law. The process fails to require the
government to justify detention in reference to a legitimate goal
as required under the international human rights standards.
The case law and regulations require consideration of the
appropriate governmental goals of avoiding flight risk or danger
to the community during the pendency of removal
proceedings." However, the process and consideration of
factors relating to flight risk or danger focus exclusively on the
determination as to the amount of bond required for release."
Thus, bond is not treated as an alternative to detention that may
be utilized to address some level of established flight risk.
Instead, the process assumes that detention may be ended only
through payment of a bond, without requiring the government
to establish danger or flight risk in the first place.37
372. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2006) (allowing for release on bond or parole and
mentioning the possibility of conditions); 8 C.F.R. § 236.1 (c) (8) (2012) (referencing
the statute to describe detention decisions allowed by ICE); 8 C.F.R. § 1236. 1(d)
(providing for imnigration court review of ICE custody decisions). As a practical
matter, procedural and contractual arrangements would need to be worked out
between ICE and the immigration courts to allow the immigration courts to enroll
migrants in formal alternatives to detcntion progriams, because ICE currently dictates
when and where such programs are available.
373. See Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.IA., 2006) (requiring analysis of flight
risk or danger to the community and delineating factors to be considered including the
migrants criminal record, record of appearance at hearings, family ties, and fixed
address, and manner of entry into the United States); 8 C.F.R. 1236.1 (c) (8).
374. 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) (2006) (allowing for relcase on bond or parok); 8 C.F.R.
§ 236.1 (c) (8) (2012) (giving ICE the authority to relcase migrants on bond):
1236. 1(d) (providing for immigration court review of bond decisions).
375. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8),(d) (2012). ICE or a
reviewing immigration court may order release without payment of a bond, on
recognizance. However, such release is relatively uncommon and its availability does
not dilute the focus on bond as the primiary means of obtaining relcase. See supra notes
357, 363. The UNHCR Detention Guidelines specifically address the situation where a
bond is "systematically required," with any failure to pay bond resulting in continued
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Furthermore, release from detention is deemed to be
discretionary at all times. 7 In other words, the process does not
result in mandatory release where the government fails to make
a showing of the necessity of detention in an individual case. In
line with the discretionary nature of the process, "the burden is
on the alien" to show that he or she "merits" release on bond. 7
The detainee must establish that "he or she does not present a
danger to persons or property, is not a threat to the national
security, and does not pose a risk of flight."378 The process
inverts the burden of proof required under the international
human rights standards. Rather than requiring the government
to establish the necessity of detention, the detainee must show
an absence of reasons for detention in order to seek release.
The imposition of the burden of proof on the detainee and
the broad discretion enjoyed by ICE and the immigration courts
in reaching detention decisions often lead to prohibitively high
bond amounts, which in effect constitute a decision to detain
rather than release. The average bond amount set nationwide is
USS6,000, and bonds are often much higher.."' It is simply
impossible for many detained migrants to pay this amount and
obtain release, so they remain in detention throughout their
removal proceedings.3" The setting of a bond becomes a means
of continued detention, without established necessity, rather
than a means of securing appearance at removal hearings after
release. Where bond is set at a prohibitively high level, a
determination has been made that detention is not necessary to
meet governmental objectives; yet the migrant is not released.
detention. UNHCR finds that such a systern provides for detention that is "arbitrary" as
insufficiently tailored to individual circunstances. UNHCR Detention Guidelines, supra
note 78, at Annex A (vi).
376. See Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 39; DJ, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 575 (B.I.A., 2003); 8
C.F.R. § 1236.1(c) (8) (2012).
377. Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 40: see 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1 (c) (8) (2012).
378. Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 38; see 8 C.F.R. § 1236. 1(c) (8) (2012).
379. IA( HR REPORT ON DETENTION, supra note 83, 81 (citing to the US
government response to the IA( HR Report); NYU SCH. OF L. IMMIGRANT RIGHTS
CLINIC, ET AL., INSECURE COMMUNITIES, DEVASTATfD FAMIL TES: NETW DATA ON
IMMIGRATION DLTENTION AND DLPORTATION PRACTICLS IN NEW YORK CITY 8 (2012)
[hereinafter NAlU IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC DATA] (noting that high bonds often
require individuals to remain in detention throughout proceedings and providing a
recent example of a high bond amount of USS100,000).
380. See IACHR RLPORT ON DLTENTION, supra note 83, 81; NXU 1IMIGRANT
RIGHTS CLINIC DATA, supra note 379 at 8.
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The bond procedures thus also fail to ensure that detention is
for the shortest period possible.
The detention determination process should be modified,
in light of the international human standards. The government
must bear the burden of proof of showing the necessity of
detention in the proceedings. Where necessity is not shown, the
immigration court must order a migrant's release if ICE has
chosen not to do so. Discretion to detain or to set bond levels
must be correspondingly limited to ensure adequate protection
of the right to liberty.
The courts could interpret the current statute in
accordance with the international human rights standards to
achieve these changes. The statute does not designate who
carries the burden of proof for detention decisions)3' although
it does suggest that release from detention is permissive rather
than mandatory and that detention decisions fall within the
government's discretion.382 The statute could nonetheless be
read to recalibrate the burden of proof and cabin discretion to
detain or release where the government has failed to make a
showing of the need for detention. Changes in the regulations
and case law would necessarily follow changes in the
interpretation of the statute.
A final difficulty remains with the current process for
detention determinations. There is no provision for automatic
periodic review of detention as required under international
law. After ICE makes an initial detention decision, ICE may
change custody conditions or order release, but faces no
requirement to periodically consider such possibilities or to
consider the continued need for detention on its own
initiative.384 Furthermore, the regulations generally limit a
detainee's ability to challenge detention to a single request for
immigration court review of the detention decision.385 After an
381. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2006).
382. Id. (providing that a migrant "iay be released on such conditions as the
[government] deems appropriate").
383. The regulations and caselaw imposing the burden of proof on the migrant to
justify relcase would necessarily be found to be incompatible with a proper
interpretation of the statute. See 8 C.F.R. 236.1(d) (2012); 8 C.F.R. 1236. 1(d) (2012);
Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 40.
384. See8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d) (2012).
385. 8 C.F.R. 1003.19(e) (2012).
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initial challenge, a detainee may only invoke renewed review by
the immigration court through a written request "showing that
[the detainee's] circumstances have changed materially." 86 The
law thus includes no procedure for evaluating the continued
necessity of detention, based on the length of detention or the
circumstances of the case, and imposes no maximum time limit
for detention. The detention decision review procedure should
be strengthened by imposing requirements based on the
international human rights standards. Specifically, the
regulation imposing restrictions on renewed challenges to
detention decisions should be deemed inapplicable, and
automatic review of detention by ICE with recourse to the
immigration court should be required.387
Changes in the non-mandatory detention process in line
with the international human rights standards are made
relatively easily under new interpretations of the current
statutory and regulatory structure. Yet, they would lead to
significant improvements in protections of the rights to liberty
and due process in the immigration detention context.
COACLUSION
The time to align the US immigration detention regime
with international human rights standards has come. Reform of
the immigration detention system in light of international
human rights law will not do violence to basic US constitutional
principles. To the contrary, invocation of international human
rights law will strengthen the strict constitutional limitations on
civil detention already applied in the United States and hasten
the application of those restraints in the immigration detention
context. The international human rights standards are
desperately needed to bring reason in this contentious area and
to ensure protection of the fundamental rights to liberty and
due process.
386. Id.
387. As part of a settlement agreement in litigation regarding the Hutto detention
facility in Taylor, Texas, ICE was required to engage in periodic automatic reviews of
detention and to provide reasons where it continued detention. See Settlement
Agreement § 5, In re Hutto Family Detention (enter, No. A-07-CA-164-SS, (W.D. Tx.
Aug. 26. 2007). While ti systenm did not work perfectly, it dcmonstratCd the feasibility
of periodic review of detention and provided a model.
